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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to analyse the impact of Margaret Thatcher's premiership on 
Scotland between 1979 and 1990, while examining the extent to which 
Conservative policy under Thatcher represented a break from the 'post-war 
consensus' in British politics. Thatcher oversaw the electoral collapse of the 
Scottish Conservatives, and this is widely attributed to her lack of personal 
appeal in Scotland. This thesis addresses the reasons why Scottish Conservative 
support contracted under Thatcher, challenges the assumption that Thatcher was 
'anti-Scottish' and places her in the wider context of Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist history, whilst illuminating Scottish Conservative personalities. 
There is a shortage of modem Scottish political historiography, and this 
field has been monopolised by lain Hutchison, Richard Finlay and Christopher 
Harvie. They have tended to focus on specific aspects of the Thatcher years, 
such as the 'Scottish question' and, to some extent, the economy, but have 
largely neglected other related topics, such as the influence of the Scottish 
trade union movement and local government. As a result a disjointed and 
incomplete picture has emerged of Thatcher's premiership. To redress the 
balance, this thesis has taken an overview of Thatcher's tenure as Prime 
Minister, and illuminates key areas of Scottish society in the 1980s that have 
hitherto been under-researched. No historian or social scientist has attempted 
the broad perspective before. 
The research has been split into six chapters, and each chapter follows 
a chronological pattern. Chapter One provides a historical overview of the 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party since 1886, which is interlinked with 
the development of the post-war consensus. The chapter concludes by analysing 
Scottish Conservative Party personalities and in-fighting, both of which are 
under-rated features of Thatcher's premiership. Chapter Two examines 
Thatcher's economic restructuring and the growing prominence of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Chapter Three analyses Thatcher's industrial 
relations reforms, and the 1984/85 miners' strike. Chapter Four scrutinises the 
Conservatives' overhaul of the welfare state. Chapter Five focuses on 
Thatcher's reform of local government, including the introduction of the 
community charge. Chapter Six charts the development of the 'Scottish 
question'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research related to Margaret Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister is 
unavoidably complicated by her continuing resonance in early twenty-first 
century politics, as was illustrated by her prominence in the 2001 General 
Election campaign and the Conservative Party leadership contest of the same 
year. At the time of writing (2004), the political sensitivity surrounding the 
Thatcher years presents research obstacles, as a thirty year embargo has been 
placed on all of the Government papers from her premiership. Nevertheless, 
this should not preclude historians from undertaking research into her period at 
Downing Street, particularly as many of the leading protagonists are still alive 
and willing to comment on the impact of her premiership on Scotland. 
This thesis has drawn heavily on numerous alternative resources. The 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) Archive, and the Gallacher Memorial 
Library (GML) at Glasgow Caledonian University Research Collections have 
provided many core sources. Furthermore, the Conservative Party Archive at 
the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Association (SCUA) Archive at the National Library of Scotland were of 
integral importance when covering the Conservative dimension of this thesis. 
However, both the Conservative Party and SCUA imposed a time limit on the 
resources available for research. The Kinnock Papers and the Thatcher Papers, 
which are held at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge were also 
useful, but the Cabinet Office limited access to one box of the Thatcher 
papers. 
The Scottish Local Government Information Unit (SLGIU), and the 
SLGIU Poll Tax Archive at Paisley University Library offered a plethora of 
information on all areas of Scottish local government and rating reform. In 
addition to this, the Labour History Archive in Manchester complemented the 
Labour Party material that was available in the Kinnock Papers, and the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (Scotland) Archive at Glasgow 
University Archives was consulted. These primary sources have been 
augmented by the use of newspapers, parliamentary papers, journal articles, the 
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Scottish Government Yearbook series, and oral testimony. 
Full scale academic work on Thatcher's time In office has been 
overwhelmingly British in its outlook, and it has placed far greater emphasis 
on events in England than developments north of the Border. Scottish social 
scientists, such as David McCrone, James Mitchell, Lynn Bennie and Lindsay 
Paterson, and historians, notably Richard Finlay, Christopher Harvie, Michael 
Fry and lain Hutchison, have attempted to rectify this anomaly, but their 
analysis has contained a number of oversights. All of these individuals, with 
the exception of Hutchison, fail to emphasise the role played by the Scottish 
media in shaping perceptions of Thatcher and her Scottish policies, and the 
tone of some of their research embellishes the media stereotype of Thatcher as 
an 'English nationalist' 1 or 'anti-Scottish'. 2 
Mitchell questions the 'coherence' 3 of Thatcher's policies and Harvie 
compares her unfavourably to Edward I. Both of these assertions are 
unfortunate, as Mitchell's research focuses too heavily on the minutiae of 
specific Conservative policies and statements in order to discredit Thatcher's 
beliefs, and discounts the unavoidable obstacles and difficulties that any Prime 
Minister encounters, regardless of reforming zeal, in the daily operation of 
government. On the other hand, Harvie's statement vastly exaggerates the 
severity of Thatcher's policies in Scotland, overlooking the prevalence of Scots 
in all of Thatcher's Cabinets and their role in the intellectual development of 
the British 'New Right'. 
Furthermore, Mitchell concludes that, 'In order to maintain the myth 
that Britain is some kind of international power it was necessary that parts of 
the post-war consensus would have to be dispensed with,.4 This is a strange 
assertion, as Britain was, and continues to be at the time of writing, the 
closest ally of the world's leading nation, America. Since Mitchell's research 
was published, in 1990, Britain has engaged in two Gulf wars, and led 
numerous peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. Under Thatcher, Britain was 
not a superpower, on the scale of America or the Soviet Union, but it 
remained a significant international power. 
Mitchell also contends that Thatcher implemented 'assimilationist' 
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policies in Scotland, but fails to comment on the extent to which she 
enhanced the powers of the Scottish Office. 5 In addition to this, Hutchison 
accurately identifies a divergence between Scotland and the rest of Britain in 
the pursuit of Thatcher's objectives, and states that, 'Most of the agencies of 
political culture in Scotland were, unlike England, impervious to the 
blandishments of Toryism'. 6 Moreover, the personal background of Thatcher IS 
entirely overlooked, and the position of the Scottish Conservative Party IS 
marginalised by most researchers. 
On the other hand, Finlay correctly highlights the importance of 
government subsidies in Scotland, believing that, under Thatcher, 'corporate 
Scotland would evolve to become civic Scotland'.7 Finlay concludes that, 'The 
construction of the idea of civic Scotland was a polite way of saying that the 
Scots hated Thatcher', but his analysis overlooks the existence of Scottish civil 
society, and its pivotal role in moulding Scottish society within the Union. 8 
Paterson is the only academic to present a coherent picture of the 'vested 
interests' of civil society during Thatcher's premiership.9 
Both McCrone and Finlay argue that Thatcher's attacks on these 
interests were, 'perceived as an attack on 'Scotland' itself, but fail to 
compare this with her attempts to undermine elements of the English 
'Establishment,.lD Michael Fry, provides excellent analysis of Thatcher's 
reforms between 1979 and 1987, but his research does not explain why civil 
society remained attached to the post-war consensus. All of these academics, 
with the exception of Harvie, Finlay and Fry, do not convey the chronological 
nuances of the Thatcher years, and their research is lacking in critical analysis 
of corporatism and state intervention in Scotland 
This thesis aims to fill a sizeable void In Scottish history by 
illuminating and reinterpreting, where appropriate, Scotland's experiences during 
Thatcher's premiership. In particular, this research challenges the perception of 
Thatcher as anti-Scottish, and dismisses the notion that Scotland was used as a 
'test bed' for rating reform. I I Furthermore, it highlights Scottish Conservative 
attitudes towards Thatcher and her policies, and outlines the importance of 
civil society in shaping perceptions of Thatcher. 
4 
The introductory section examines Thatcher's ideological beliefs and the 
influences that helped to shape her political outlook. In particular, it 
emphasises the importance of her personal experiences during her Grantham 
childhood. The term 'New Right' is defined, and the academics who played a 
role in promoting New Right ideas are introduced. This chapter also highlights 
the role of Conservatives, such as Keith Joseph, who exerted influence over 
Thatcher, and concludes by analysing the Conservatives' 1979 General Election 
manifesto. 
Margaret Thatcher: The Grocer's Daughter 
Thatcher's personal background is an important factor when seeking to 
understand her political beliefs. She has attracted a number of biographers, 
most notably Hugo Young, John Campbell and Brenda Maddox, and has 
produced her own memoirs in two volumes, the first of which charts her Path 
to Power, the second her experience of the Downing Street Years.12 Hugo 
Young, who produced the earliest of the three biographies, in 1990, 
emphasises the importance of Thatcher's upbringing, but contends that she did 
not remain true to all of the values that she learnt during her childhood. On 
the other hand, John Campbell, in 2000, argues that Thatcher concealed her 
personal background until she became Conservative Party leader, when she 
contrived to make political capital out of it. 13 Brenda Maddox, who published 
her biography of Thatcher in 2003, also attempts to highlight the continuity 
between Thatcher's experiences as a child, and her rise to political 
prominence, but does so in less depth than Campbell and Young. Nevertheless, 
all agree to a differing extent that Thatcher's upbringing was a critical 
influence on her political strategy and outlook. 
Margaret Hilda Roberts was born on 13 October 1925 in the 
Lincolnshire town of Grantham.14 Her father, Alfred Roberts, was a grocer, and 
the Roberts were a lower middle-class family. IS She received a strict Methodist 
upbringing, and reputedly attended Chapel three or four times each Sunday. 
Methodism has largely been associated with the radical left in British politics, 
5 
but Wesleyan Methodism was different. It was an individualistic strand of 
Methodism, similar to Calvinism in many ways, as it asserted that individuals 
were responsible to God for their behaviour, placing great emphasis on self 
help and the work ethic. 16 According to Thatcher, 'We were taught what was 
right and wrong in very considerable detail', and Campbell asserts that Alfred 
Roberts, 'made no distinction between commercial, political and religious 
values' Y He put his beliefs into practice in the field of local government, and 
became chairman of the Borough Finance and Ratings Committee. Roberts 
stood as an Independent, but there is little question that he was a 'true blue' 
Conservative. When the Jarrow hunger marchers passed through Grantham in 
1936, Alfred refused to give them charity and protested that they should find 
ways to help themselves. Little is known of Thatcher's relationship with her 
mother, Beatrice, but in 1961 she stated that, 'after I was fifteen we had 
nothing more to say to each other'. 
Thatcher attended Kesteven and Grantham Girls' School, and despite 
winning a scholarship, her father insisted on paying the fees. 18 Academically 
successful, she left Grantham for Oxford University in 1943 to study science. 
There the University Conservative Association beckoned, and she became its 
president in 1946/9 outraging many left-wing students there by declaring 
'Welfare is wrong' .20 Her political career began to develop at the 1950 
General Election when she fought and lost in the safe Labour seat of Dartford. 
During campaigning she met her future husband, Denis Thatcher, a divorced 
millionaire, ten years her senior. 
Both Maddox and Campbell believe that this was a pivotal moment, as 
his carefree attitude balanced her seriousness and tendency to overwork. 
Furthermore, his financial wherewithal enabled her to immerse herself in 
politics without any monetary difficulties. 21 They married in London at 
Wesley's Methodist Chapel on 13 December 1951, shortly after the General 
Election in which she had unsuccessfully recontested Dartford.22 Despite her 
claim to have learnt 'almost everything' from her father, she rarely visited 
Grantham after her marriage, and Thatcher subsequently became a member of 
the Church of England 23 
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In September 1953 Thatcher gave birth to twins, and, thereafter, almost 
quit politics after being consistently overlooked for Conservative candidacies. 24 
Nevertheless, in August 1958 Thatcher was adopted as candidate for Finchley, 
a safe Conservative seat in north west London.25 She retained the seat easily 
at the 1959 General Election, and adapted well to the rigours of parliamentary 
life. In 1961 Harold Macmillan made her Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister for Pensions and National Insurance, where she remained until 
Labour's victory in the 1964 General Election. 26 
Thatcher became Shadow Minister for Power In October 1967, and 
Shadow Transport Minister in November 1968,27 but little was known of her 
personal beliefs. This changed, however, at the Conservative Party conference 
in October 1968 when she made a speech to the Conservative Political Centre 
attacking the post-war consensus. 'There are dangers in consensus', she said, 
'it could be an attempt to satisfy people holding no particular view about 
anything. It seems more important to have a philosophy and policy which 
because they are good appeal to sufficient people to secure a majority'. 28 
Thatcher was handed the Shadow education portfolio in October 1969,29 
and in June 1970 made her Cabinet breakthrough as Education Secretary. 
Thatcher had a poor relationship with her civil servants, and Edward Heath 
attempted to minimise her input at Cabinet meetings.30 Contrary to her strong 
personal belief in grammar schools, Thatcher approved more schemes for 
comprehensive schools than any Education Secretary before or since. 31 By 
sanctioning the stoppage of free school milk for children over seven, she 
became a hate figure and the tabloid media branded her 'Thatcher, Milk 
Snatcher' . 32 
'The Peasants' Revolt,33 : Thatcher's Leadership Campaign and her 
Political Outlook 
Defeat at the 1974 general elections marked a turning point for some 
Conservatives, who believed that the party had to overturn the post-war 
consensus and marginalise socialist influence. One such individual, Keith 
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Joseph, went on the offensive and was given reluctant permission by Heath to 
establish a new right-wing think-tank, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 
1974.34 Thatcher became its Vice-Chairman, and Alfred Sherman, a 'free 
market polemicist', was appointed Director of the CPS.35 Joseph asserted that 
inflation could be reduced by controlling the money supply, and argued that 
Heath's pursuit of full employment and subsidisation of failing industries was 
erroneous.36 Joseph, however, was an eccentric who suffered from a nervous 
disposition, and was excessively self-critical. 37 Indeed, Joseph sabotaged his 
own leadership bid in a speech at Edgbaston, by proposing the sterilisation of 
women in low-income groups. 38 
Thatcher was one of the few Cabinet members to share his political 
outlook and believed, 'someone who represents our viewpoint has to stand' .39 
At this stage, the highly talented organiser and influential backbencher, Airey 
Neave, swung behind Thatcher's candidature. Neave, who had escaped Colditz 
prisoner of war camp, had established a small committee to identify the next 
party leader, and ran a subtle campaign of deception that rallied support for 
Thatcher from all wings of the party.40 After two ballots that included senior 
figures, such as William Whitelaw and James Prior, she was confirmed as the 
new leader of the Conservative Party on 11 February 1975.41 Thatcher 
famously was the first female ever to lead a British political party, and her 
victory was portrayed as a 'Peasants' Revolt', because she did not have the 
support of the Conservative Party establishment. 
Thatcher's position was far from secure, but she cautiously set about 
realigning Conservative JX>licy. She was heavily influenced by the work of the 
'New Right', which Joseph encouraged her to read. 42 The New Right was by 
no means as homogeneous as the term suggests, but its followers were united 
by a belief in free market economics, low public spending, reduced taxation, 
freedom of choice, patriotism and minimal government. 43 These values have 
also been described paradoxically as neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, and 
amount to a wholesale rejection of Keynesian economics. Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich von Hayek, were two high profile academics who played integral 
roles in shaping this New Right ideology. 
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Friedman was an American conservative, and the foremost proponent of 
monetarism.44 This doctrine claims that if governments allow money supply to 
outstrip the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) then the knock-on effect 
IS an increase in inflation. He contended that a natural wage level existed, 
which trade unions were distorting through their inflationary wage demands. 
Friedman associated capitalism with personal freedom, believing that the 
voluntary interaction of the market created economic freedom and, therefore, 
political freedom. 
On the other hand, Hayek was opposed to Conservatism, believing that 
Conservative politicians distrusted the market. 45 Hayek attacked collectivism, 
and contended that centrally-controlled planning was dangerous, as it reduced 
individual liberty. 46 He asserted that state planning suppressed competition, 
encouraged monopolies, leading to an expansion in controls and intervention. 
Hayek blamed the trade unions for distorting the labour market, as they 
refused to accept that wages and employment levels had to respond to market 
conditions. Furthermore, the Austrian promoted the rule of law, and the 
upholding of traditional institutions and practices. The Cold War between 
America and the Soviet Union had an immense influence on both Friedman 
and Hayek, and New Right scholars were amongst the foremost critics of 
Communism. 
Nevertheless, David Seawright states that, 'It may be argued that 
Thatcherism owes more to St Andrews University Conservatives than to 
Friedman or Hayek'. 47 Ralph Harris, a St Andrews University economics 
lecturer, was a founder of the Institute for Economic Affairs in 1955, and was 
an inspiration to many young Conservatives, such as Allan Stewart and 
Michael Forsyth. It was Harris along with Sherman, who converted Joseph to 
monetarism in 1974, and in 1977 the right-wing Adam Smith Institute was 
established by Douglas Mason, Madsen Pirie, Eamonn Butler and Michael 
Fallon, all of whom were St Andrews University graduates. Individually if not 
collectively, therefore, Scots were at the forefront of the British New Right. 
Paradoxically, however, the Scottish political establishment showed little interest 
in their work and remained committed to the post-war consensus. 
9 
In stark contrast, Thatcher embraced these ideas with a VIew to 
overturning the consensus and restoring British 'greatness' . On this front, she 
possessed one advantage over her predecessor, Heath, as by 1975 the 
Conservative Party had become disillusioned enough to consider challenging the 
orthodoxy of the consensus. Thatcher agreed with Joseph that the post-war 
consensus had created a 'socialist ratchet' moving leftwards under every 
Labour government,48 and incorporated this message in her rhetoric. More 
importantly, consensus politics were not delivering economic revival, and 
Thatcher argued that the state was stifling private enterprise through 
nationalisation and high taxation. 
Thatcher could only rely upon Joseph and Geoffrey Howe for support 
on economic matters in her Shadow Cabinet, and the CPS was used as a 
stalking horse for radical initiatives.49 This led to a split gradually emerging 
between the 'Wets' and the 'Dries'. The phrase 'Wet' was a derogatory term 
associated with English public schools, and implied cowardly, unmanly 
characteristics. 50 Thatcher is alleged to have widely used the term when 
distinguishing between supporters and opponents of her emerging economic 
strategy. 51 Her supporters christened themselves the 'Dries'. Counted amongst 
the ranks of the 'Wets' were many Tory Party grandees, and major 
Conservative figures such as Heath, Prior and Sir Ian Gilmour. 
Thatcher could barely contain her hostility towards these individuals, 'I 
was not only a woman, but 'that woman', someone not just of a different sex, 
but of a different class, a person with an alarming conviction that the values 
and virtues of middle England should be brought to bear on the problems 
which the establishment consensus had created I offended on many counts,.52 
In effect, Thatcher was leader of a right-wing Conservative faction rather than 
the entire Conservative Party, and the period between 1975 and 1977 was 
concerned with winning the battle of ideas, whilst placating the Party grandees. 
Thatcher also rediscovered her roots in Grantham, which she had 
previously seen as a disadvantage in upper-class Conservative circles, 
emphasising her lower middle-class upbringing and the extent to which this 
enabled her to relate to the electorate. 53 The image projected was that of a 
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determined woman who had overcome the barriers of her sex and class to 
achieve her ambitions. Furthermore, Gordon Reece, a former television 
producer, restyled Thatcher's image by jettisoning her flamboyant hats and 
persuading her to lower the tone of her voice when delivering speeches. 54 
Reece arranged for her to meet tabloid newspaper editors, such as the Sun's 
Larry Lamb, in an attempt to broaden the Conservatives' appeal amongst the 
working-class. 
In order to signal the changes occurring In party policy, Thatcher 
undertook a programme of speeches that promoted individual responsibility, 
private enterprise, reduced public spending, low taxation and sound money. 
These values were associated with the New Right, but also drew heavily on 
her own upbringing in Grantham. In Thatcher's inaugural address as party 
leader at the 1975 Conservative conference, she expounded her beliefs, 'Let 
me give you my vision: a man's right to work as he will, to spend what he 
earns, to own property, to have the State as servant not master: these are the 
British inheritance. They are the essence of a free country'. 55 
Her speeches made a conscious attempt to associate the post-war 
consensus with socialism, and in her 1975 conference speech Thatcher 
explicitly stated that her aim was, 'to defeat socialism' . 56 This goal was 
inextricably linked with her view of Communism. Thatcher believed that the 
Soviet Union represented a clear and present danger to Britain on a social and 
military front, and in a speech timed to coincide with the Helsinki Armaments 
Summit in July 1975, she propounded her beliefs. The Conservative leader's 
message sought to drive home her conviction that the West could win the 
Cold War, and that the Soviets should not be appeased. She reiterated this 
message in another speech in January 1976, and in retaliation, the Soviet 
Union branded her the 'Iron Lady'. This boosted her public profile, and 
Thatcher embraced her new title. 
A separate but interlinked issue was British membership of the EEC, in 
1973, a pivotal achievement of the Heath Government. In constitutional terms, 
Thatcher was a reluctant European, who resented any loss of British 
sovereignty. 57 However, her free market instincts favoured the principle of a 
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European free trade zone, 58 believing that the EEC had the potential to act as 
a capitalist bulwark against the Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc. In Thatcher's 
eyes, Britain's presence stiffened the western European allies' resolve, because 
of the nation's 'special relationship' with America. For this reason, Thatcher 
consciously endorsed British involvement in Europe. At the July 1975 
referendum on EEC membership, she successfully campaigned for a 'Yes' vote. 
State-owned industries and other subsidised British fIrms were a source 
of shame to Thatcher, as they distorted the operation of a free market, and 
large-scale public sector employment increased Britain's public expenditure 
requirements. Nationalisation, in her view, constrained the investment 
opportunities available for private companies, leading to capital being invested 
abroad. She surmised that less state intervention in the economy would 
enhance the competitiveness of British industry with the greater likelihood of 
private fInance being invested in Britain. At a speech to the Institute of 
Directors in Sydney in 1976, Thatcher expressed these sentiments : 'The 
growth of government has resulted in a substantial rise in public spending. 
Public ownership has been extended, and more and more taxpayers' money has 
been pumped into companies that no prudent banker could go on supporting 
for long'. 59 
The Right Approach to the Economy, published m August 1977, was 
the fIrst public statement of Thatcher's economIc strategy. State-owned 
industries were heavily criticised, with the long-term aim of reducing the 
'preponderance of State ownership and to widen the base of ownership' 
amongst individuals.60 It also placed the control of inflation at the forefront of 
Conservative policy, and argued for the introduction of 'cash limits' to control 
the spending and wage increases of nationalised industries and local authorities. 
The document accepted that 'wholesale cuts can cause quite unnecessary 
hardship, bitterness and unemployment', but concluded that regional policy and 
government subsidies destroyed as many jobs as they created. 
Nationalisation and regional planning represented one pillar of the post-
war consensus, but of greatest concern to Thatcher was the growth of trade 
union power. With the reduction of inflation as a vital objective, Thatcher 
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viewed trade Union wage demands as an inflationary impediment to achieving 
this goal. Furthermore, she passionately believed in Parliamentary sovereignty, 
and intended to jettison the corporatism of the consensus, which enabled 
pressure groups, like the trade unions, to influence government decision-
making. 
The Conservatives' ideas were concisely set out in 'The Stepping Stones 
Programme', finalised in January 1978. It proposed that the Conservatives 
should concentrate on linking the public's perception of trade unionism with 
socialism and the Labour Party, contending that future legislation should, 
'amount to an explicit rejection of socialism and a demand for change in the 
unions' role' .61 This reflected Thatcher's desire to limit trade union activities 
to the workplace, and undermine the unions' political support for the Labour 
Party. Nevertheless, the document caused consternation in the Shadow Cabinet, 
and the former General Secretary of the STUC, Campbell Christie, believes 
that the Conservatives were out of touch with public opinion until the 'winter 
of discontent' hardened anti-trade union attitudes amongst the public. 62 
In 1978, a report by Nicholas Ridley, MP for Cirencester and 
Tewkesbury, on the nationalised industries embellished this strategy. Ridley 
argued that the Conservatives should appoint private sector managers, who 
would be allowed to assert their 'right to manage' state-owned industries free 
from government interference. 63 He argued that once these heavily trade 
unionised industries became profitable they should be sold off to the private 
sector, and envisaged this taking the form of share issues amongst the existing 
workers, direct sales to the private sector, or share issues on the open market. 
Ridley concluded that the Conservatives should avoid conflict with the unions 
until they had become significantly weakened by the effects of this strategy. A 
draft of the Ridley Report was leaked to the Economist in May 1978, but the 
Conservatives denied that it was party policy.64 
Thatcher had very little knowledge of Scottish affairs, and relied 
heavily on the advice of William Whitelaw, the Shadow Home Secretary. 
Writing in her memoirs, Thatcher described herself as 'an instinctive 
Unionist',65 but she inherited Heath's devolutionist stance. On her first visit to 
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Scotland, as Conservative Party leader, in February 1975, Thatcher was mobbed 
by supportive crowds in Edinburgh, and declared that, 'The establishment of a 
Scottish Assembly must be a top priority,.66 She, however, had, 'little 
understanding of the component nationalisms which co-exist within British 
patriotism', and Nigel Lawson, MP for Blaby, encountered little difficulty in 
convincing her that, 'State Socialism ... breeds separatism' .67 He contended that 
the best means of providing devolution was through income tax cuts, and a 
UK-wide reduction in the role of central government.68 This set the tone for 
Thatcher's input to the 'Scottish question' throughout her time as Conservative 
Party leader. 
In Thatcher's eyes the consensus was morally bankrupt, and she warned 
of the dangers of increased state dependency. The welfare state was criticised, 
as Thatcher contended that benefits were lowering the incentive to work, and 
insisted that welfare spending had to be linked to economic growth.69 All 
areas of the public sector were viewed in a similar light by Thatcher, 'There 
is a need, of course, for a public sector but its scale should be limited by 
considerations as to what the private sector cannot itself do, and by what we 
can currently afford, bearing in mind that the public sector has to be paid for 
by the private sector' .70 Taken as a collective package, Thatcher's speeches 
were attempting to emphasise the limited capacity that the state possessed to 
influence events positively, as opposed to the unlimited scope that it possessed 
to inflict harm on the nation. 
These ideas represented a break from the Conservatives' traditional 
practice of shunning ideological doctrines,71 and Thatcher's brand of conviction 
politics derided the prospect of compromise. The party had always expressed a 
preference for private enterprise and low taxation, but the force with which 
Thatcher was extolling these virtues was unheard of amongst previous party 
leaders. However, David Willetts, a former member of Thatcher's Downing 
Street Policy Unit, argues that, 'it was still Conservatism that she was 
expounding' .72 
Indeed, Thatcher's ideology has been the subject of much debate 
between social scientists and political commentators. Shirley Robin Letwin, a 
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former Director of the CPS, has identified Thatcher's objective as the 
reestablishment of the English 'vigorous virtues'. She asserts that Thatcher 
sought to promote a set of virtues that individuals could aspire to, such as 
self-sufficiency, individualism, loyalty to friends and the nation. 73 These were 
to be given priority over the 'softer virtues' like kindness, humility and 
gentleness. If Britons were to adhere to these 'vigorous virtues' Thatcher 
believed that the UK would be transformed into an 'independent island power'. 
On the other hand, the journalist, Peter Riddell, does not consider that 
Thatcher had a coherent set of beliefs, and contends that her policies were, 
'an expression of Mrs Thatcher's upbringing in Grantham, her background of 
hard work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, duty 
and patriotism'. 74 In stark contrast, Andrew Gamble argues that Thatcher was 
the figurehead of a project 'to reestablish the conditions ... for the Conservative 
Party to resume its leading role in British politics'. 75 The tools for achieving 
this goal were the free market, and the institutions of the state, such as 
Parliament, and the police. 
Seizing the Ideological Initiative? : The 1979 General Election 
The Conservatives' 1979 manifesto was a modest document. Its main priority 
was to play down short-term expectations on an incoming Conservative 
government. Nevertheless, the manifesto emphasised that, 'This election may be 
the last chance' to reject the Labour Party, implying that Conservative policies 
could restore Britain to its former position as a 'Great Power' .76 Freedom was 
closely linked to this 'British inheritance', and the Conservatives alleged that 
Labour's socialist philosophy, 'prevents them from governing successfully in a 
free society and mixed economy'. 
The document emphasised that Britain had to play a full role in 
Europe. Militant trade unionists were heavily criticised, and Thatcher proposed 
introducing legislation to enforce trade union democracy. This was to be 
complemented by income tax reductions, and a wholesale reappraisal of the 
public sector and state-ownership. In order to ensure that the Conservatives 
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delivered their policy commitments, Thatcher promised to uphold the 
supremacy of Parliament at all times. The final sentence in the manifesto 
encapsulates the tone of the entire document, 'The years of make-believe and 
false optimism are over. It is time for a new beginning'. 
At the May 1979 General Election the Conservatives won with a 
majority of forty-three MPs,77 and Thatcher became the first female prime 
minister in British and European history. Yet, Thatcher remained an unknown 
quantity to the Scottish political establishment, and the post-war consensus 
remained largely unquestioned amongst Scottish civil society. Nevertheless, in 
the period between May 1979 and November 1990, Scotland was to be 
profoundly affected by Thatcher's overhaul of the post-war consensus. In the 
Scottish context, as this thesis explains, Margaret Thatcher became one of the 
most influential and controversial British prime ministers ever. 
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Chapter One 
'THE ARCHITECT'S WORK,?l THE SCOTTISH CONSERVATIVE AND 
UNIONIST PARTY, 1886-1990 
Writing in 1988 Margaret Thatcher proclaimed that, 'Conservatism has played a long 
and historic role in Scottish politics and the Tory Party has deep roots in 
Scotland ... Scots look to the Conservative Party once again today - we will not fail 
them'.2 The extent to which Thatcher understood Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
history is, however, open to debate. James Mitchell asserts that under Thatcher an 
assimilationist strand emerged in Scottish Conservative thinking challenging many 
'traditional unionist assumptions' whilst David McCrone contends that the Union was 
'not high on its agenda,.3 Furthermore, James Kellas believes that, 'Her ethnic 
nationalism ... was at odds with ... Unionism ... which was a very British ideology,.4 
Little research has been devoted to the Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
relationship with the post-war consensus. Gordon Brown and Douglas Alexander 
conclude that, 'The old settlement between Scotland and the rest ofBritain ... could not 
endure', because of Thatcher's, 'lack of commitment to social justice', and Richard 
Finlay describes Thatcher's bewilderment at Scottish support for, 'old-fashioned 
collectivist and statist notions'.s Finally, lain Hutchison states that under Thatcher, 
'The Conservatives appeared hostile to Scotland and its special circumstances,.6 
This chapter explains and interlinks the history and electoral performance of 
the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party with the establishment and development 
of the post-war consensus. Thereafter, the personalities and internal conflicts within 
the Scottish Conservative Party during Thatcher's premiership are scrutinised, and the 
reasons for the party's decline are outlined The section concludes by analysing the 
Conservatives' portrayal in the Scottish media, and the role played by Scottish 
Conservatives in Thatcher's removal from Office. 
Unionist Scotland? 1886-1939 
Prior to 1886, the Scottish Conservative Party was largely associated with the 
landowning class, the Moderate wing of the Church of Scotland and protectionism. 7 
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The Liberal Party dominated Scottish politics and an imperialist consensus existed. 
leading Scots to brand themselves as 'a race of empire builders' . 8 The introduction of 
an Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886 caused a split in the Liberal party,9 resulting in the 
emergence of Liberal Unionist candidates who, like the Conservatives, believed that 
Westminster should remain the sole legislative body in Britain. Many Liberal 
Unionists were committed to social refonn, and the radical Birmingham MP, Joseph 
Chamberlain, who precipitated the Unionist split in the Liberal Party, pressed for the 
introduction of an eight-hour day for miners and a pilot old age pensions scheme. IO 
Furthennore, Chamberlain briefly endorsed the concept of a 'federation of the United 
Kingdom', with a view to achieving 'imperial federation' .11 The Round Table 
Movement, a group of Oxford University graduates who assembled in South Africa 
after 1900, propounded federalism as the most desirable method of reducing the 
administrative burden on Westminster. One of its leading Scottish figures, F. S. Oliver 
wrote under the pseudonym of 'Pacificus' in the Times in an unsuccessful attempt to 
rally Unionists behind imperial federation. I2 
In 1912 the alliance between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives was 
transfonned into a new political force in Scotland through the creation of the Scottish 
Unionist party.I3 The Scottish Unionists had a distinctive party structure, with the 
self-financing Western Divisional Committee and Eastern Divisional Committee 
operating in an uncoordinated fashion, wielding greater power than the Scottish 
Unionist Association's central council.I4 A Chairman's Office also existed. but it 
lacked authority. In stark contrast, the centralised 'English model' was coordinated 
from Smith Square in London, and appointed salaried constituency staff. This 
structural disparity emphasised the unique Scottish character of the Unionists, made 
the party responsive to localised issues, and appealed to businessmen who could 
directly influence where their donations were channelled. 
According to Mitchell, 'Unionism is essentially a form of nationalism, in the 
sense that it is the ideology which favours the territorial integrity of the state'. 1 5 
Unionists combined loyalty to the British state with Scottish patriotism and these 
concepts were bound together by commitment to the British Empire and the Union. 
This can be equated with the concept of 'Unionist-nationalism',16 which Graeme 
Morton highlights as a feature of Scottish national identity between 1830 and 1860. 
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During this period the figures of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce, who were 
associated with the struggle for Scottish independence in the thirteenth century, were 
harnessed as Unionist icons. It was contended that their victories over the English had 
enabled Scotland to enter the Union as an equal partner of England. I7 Morton 
concludes that Unionist-nationalism 'died out in the 1860s', but its legacy can be 
identified in the rhetoric and ideology of the Scottish Unionists. Nevertheless, the 
widespread use of the Unionist title in Westminster elections did not disguise the 
existence of candidates and MPs who continued to describe themselves as 
Conservatives. 
During the 1920s, the Unionists by-passed the increasingly divided Liberals as 
Scotland's foremost political force. In doing so the party attracted growing support 
from the Scottish business community, the middle-class and civil society.18 Scottish 
civil society survived the Union of 1707, and comprises those institutions that operate 
in the public domain, but are not part of central govemment.19 These include the 
churches, the legal establishment, local government, the press and the education 
system. The support of civil society and the middle-class was reinforced by the 
Unionists' appeal amongst the Protestant working-class, stemming from the party's 
links with the Orange Order and Ulster Unionism.20 A dual form of Scottish and 
British national identity, therefore, developed, legitimising the existence of separate 
Scottish institutions. 
Unionist electoral success was partly motivated by the rise of the ILP and the 
Labour Party. Labour was perceived to be a threat because of its socialism, 
epitomised by the party's adoption of Clause IV in 1918,21 committing it to bringing 
Britain's staple industries and public services under state control. Furthermore, 
Labour actively courted the support of Scotland's Irish Catholic community, and after 
the Irish Free State was established in 1922, Labour's popularity amongst Irish 
Catholic voters grew significantly.22 
In municipal politics broad-based 'anti-socialist' alliances were created to 
keep Labour out of power.23 Candidates stood as Moderates, Independents and 
Progressives, campaigning against state provision for Catholic education, introduced 
in 1918.24 These anti-socialist groupings oversaw a significant expansion in cOWlcit 
housing, and of the 337,000 houses built in Scotland between 1919 and 1939, two-
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thirds were in the public sector,2S contradicting the goal of the radical Unionist MP 
for Perth and Kinross, Noel Skelton, who wished to create a 'property owning 
democracy,.26 
Interventionism had been prevalent in Scottish local government since the late 
1880s, and Unionists were often at the forefront of municipalisation. This created 
permanent public sector employment, as councils developed public utilities, such as 
gas and electricity.27 During his time as Mayor of Birmingham, Chamberlain, 
described this as a 'natural monopoly', asserting that, 'all monopolies which are 
sustained by the State ought to be in the hands of the representatives of the people, by 
whom they should be administered, and to whom their profits should go,.28 
As early as 1921, Walter Elliot, then MP for Lanark, identified a link between 
unemployment and ill_health.29 After his appointment as Under-Secretary for Health 
at the Scottish Office in 1924, Elliot created an experimental scheme providing free 
school milk for impoverished children in Scotland's seven largest cities and towns. 
This proved to be extremely successful, and was extended throughout Scotland in 
1929.30 In 1932, Elliot also wrote of the spirit of 'democratic intellectualism' that 
distinguished Scottish education from the English and Welsh education system.3! He 
contended that Scottish education was grounded on a philosophy that used principles 
and experience to question perceived facts, enabling it to provide a broad meritocratic 
learning experience. The foremost advantage of this tradition was that it helped to 
realise the educational potential of all individuals regardless of ability, equipping 
Scots for democratic life. 32 
Elliot became Scottish Secretary in 1936, and was promoted to the post of 
Health Secretary in 1938. He and Skelton emphasised the need to address the 
economic and social grievances of ordinary voters in order to counteract the appeal of 
socialism.33 The Unionists also began to include the newly enfranchised female 
electorate in their political rhetoric and organisation.34 In 1923 the Duchess of Atboll 
became the first Scottish woman MP, representing West Perthshire, and vocally 
opposing British neutrality in the Spanish civil war and appeasement. Her views were 
endorsed by the Conservative MP for East Aberdeenshire, Robert Boothby, whilst the 
Conservative MP for Stockton on Tees, Harold Macmill~ who had Scottish roots, 
propounded the benefits of state intervention.3s 
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Scottish local government was overhauled in 1929.37 This restructuring was 
controversial, as Westminster's intervention undennined the autonomy of Scottish 
local government, provoking an upsurge in nationalist feeling. 38 The Unionists sought 
to appease Scottish sentiments through administrative refonn, and in 1926 the post of 
Scottish Secretary was upgraded to a pennanent Cabinet position. Furthennore, a 
reorganisation of Scottish government took place in 1928, centralising control of 
Scotland's administrative boards at the Scottish Office.39 This provoked cross-party 
opposition, and Skelton attacked the prospect of Scottish affairs being overseen by 
civil servants, 'who perhaps know little about Scotland'. 40 
In 1928 the National Party of Scotland (NPS) was created 41 A devolutionist 
grouping also left the Cathcart Unionist Association in 1932, and its chief spokesman, 
Kevan McDowall, propounded the benefits of imperial federation.42 The Scottish 
Party was created by this Unionist faction and other right-wing nationalists. In 1934, 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), which combined the NPS and the Scottish Party, 
was fonned. Unionists, such as John Buchan, MP for the Scottish Universities, 
sympathised with this increase in Scottish nationalism, 'I believe that every Scotsman 
should be a Scottish Nationalist. .. Britain cannot afford, the Empire cannot afford ... a 
denationalised Scotland'.43 However, Buchan concluded that the best means of 
maintaining Scottish identity was through the transfer of the Scottish Office from 
London to Edinburgh. He was supported by Skelton, who spoke of the 'special duty' 
of Scottish MPs to place the interests of Scotland ahead of party politics. Elliot, 
announced the establishment of a Committee of Enquiry on Scottish Administration, 
in 1936, and when it reported back, in 1937, endorsed the Committee's 
recommendation that the Scottish Office should be relocated to Edinburgh.44 The new 
Edinburgh-based Scottish Office was named St Andrews House, and opened in May 
1939. 
During the 1930s, Britain experienced a severe recession, and Scottish 
unemployment averaged 21.9%.45 This was largely attributable to Scotland's over-
dependence on heavy industries, such as shipbuilding and engineering. Unionist-
supporting industrialists, such as Sir James Lithgow, attempted to coordinate a 
strategy to reduce the size of Scotland's heavy industries and establish light 
industries.46 In 1934, a Special Areas scheme to aid the distressed regions of west 
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central Scotland was created with Unionist sUpport.47 Between 1934 and 1937, £2.48 
million was spent in the west of Scotland and, in 1937, the Special Areas 
Commissioners were given the power to build factories, dispense loans, and cover the 
rent and rates of incoming firms. Europe's first industrial estate was opened at 
Hillington, near Glasgow, in 1937, and by the end of 1938 around 5,000 jobs in light 
industry had been created.48 The Unionists had, therefore, endorsed corporatism and 
state intervention as the most desirable method of addressing Scotland's economic 
difficulties. 
The Dawn of Consensus, 1939-1965 
The outbreak of war in 1939 led to an expansion of government activities throughout 
Britain. Thomas Johnston, Labour MP for West Stiriingshire, was Scottish Secretary 
between 1941 and 1945,49 and he chose to introduce a consensual approach to St 
Andrew's House, establishing corporatist bodies like the Scottish Council on Industry, 
and creating the North of Scotland Hydro Electric Board. 
The most significant war-time development was the publication of a ground-
breaking report on Social Insurance and Allied Services by Sir William Beveridge, in 
1942. Beveridge, a Liberal-orientated civil servant, embraced the need for central 
planning and state intervention following Britain's early reverses in the war. so His 
report stated that Britain had to overcome the 'five giants' of want, ignorance, 
disease, squalor and idleness.51 Beveridge's recommendations, founded on three 
assumptions, envisaged that the state would provide every family with children's 
allowances until a child reached fifteen, and a national health service funded from 
insurance payments and general taxation would be established. Finally, he asserted 
that his proposals would become unworkable if unemployment rose above 8.5%. The 
Glasgow Herald stated that, 'there can be little doubt that the report will prove a 
foundation for the future development of the social services', and 635,000 copies of 
Beveridge's report were sold 52 A blueprint for reform with widespread support 
amongst the electorate was placed at the disposal of Britain's political parties. 
Labour embraced Beveridge's recommendations with the greatest fervour, and 
Paul Addison concludes, 'When Labour swept to victory in 1945 the new consensus 
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fell, like a branch of ripe plums, into the lap of Mr Attlee'. 53 Labour created a 
National Health Service, financed out of general taxation, and free-at-the-point-of-
need. 54 It also endorsed the findings of the 1944 White Paper on Employment, 
contending that full employment should be a primary economic objective. 55 The 
nationalisation programme sought to bring many of Britain's staple industries and 
public services under permanent state contro1.56 
The Scottish Unionists, however, opposed Labour's model for a welfare state, 
and the creation of nationalised industries offended their belief in private enterprise. 57 
This hostility was partially attributable to the attitude of civil society, which was 
concerned that Labour's nationalisation programme would take industrial control 
away from Scottish businessmen, and into the hands of civil servants in London. The 
Scottish Unionists championed this cause, campaigning under the banner, 'Scottish 
Control of Scottish Affairs'. 58 Elliot also sought to exploit the activities of the cross-
party nationalist pressure group, the Scottish Convention. It held a 'Scottish National 
Assembly' in March 1947, and established a committee in 1949 which drafted 'The 
Scottish Covenant'. 59 This document was launched at a third 'National Assembly' in 
October 1949 attended by 1,200 people in the Church of Scotland's Assembly Halls 
in Edinburgh.60 The Covenant attracted two million signatures supporting Home Rule, 
but only two MPs signed it. 
This left the Covenant open to political exploitation, and at the 1948 Paisley 
by-election, John MacCormick, a former Glasgow University Nationalist, stood as a 
'national' candidate with Liberal and Unionist sUpport.61 The joint Liberal and 
Unionist declaration stated that, 'We believe that only in a free economy ... can there 
be that continuous increase in the production of wealth which alone can make 
possible a steady advance in the standard of living'. Furthermore, it vaguely asserted 
that, 'a measure of devolution in the government of Scotland is a matter of urgency', 
whilst propounding, 'Empire and Commonwealth unity'. This anti-socialist alliance 
was designed to galvanise Unionist-nationalism, but Labour comfortably retained the 
seat. 
The Unionist Party was in a position to emphasise its Scottish credentials 
because of its structural and fmancial independence from the Conservative Party in 
England, which contrasted with Labour's British constitution and centralisation of 
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power in London. Furthermore, the small electoral base of the SNP enabled the 
Unionists' to play the 'Scottish Card' ,62 and the disintegration of the Independent 
Labour Party CILP) weakened the Home Rule lobby in left-wing circles. After the 
Conservatives were re-elected in 1951, the party appointed a Royal Commission on 
Scottish Affairs in July 1952, and its limited recommendations saw the control of 
animal health, roads, bridges and ferries pass to the Scottish Office.63 A Scottish 
Standing Committee was established in 1957 to examine bills relating to Scotlan<L 
and a second Scottish Standing Committee was created in 1962.64 It was apparent that 
a consensus was developing on the pursuit of administrative devolution. 
This was an outgrowth of an emerging British political consensus, which 
Andrew Gamble describes as a, 'compromise between the ruling interests of capital 
and the demands of labour' ,65 embraCing full employment, free-at-the-point-of-need 
welfare and economic planning. A similar pattern emerged in Scottish local 
government, as Labour pursued a low rents policy, which the diverse Unionist 
groupings failed to reverse when in office.66 Following the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947 huge council estates and new towns were built throughout 
Scotland, and by 1966,47% of Scotland's housing was in the public sector compared 
to 27% in England.67 The Unionists believed that council house building illustrated 
their commitment to the working-class, but it worked against the party's long-term 
electoral interests. The Conservative Party in England was increasingly gearing its 
message towards homeowners, symbolising homeownership as social progression. 
However, in the short-term, the Scottish Unionists continued to thrive, and at the 1955 
General Election the party won 50.1 % of the popular vote, which is the largest share 
of the vote a Scottish party has ever recorded. 68 
An outcome of Labour's low rents policy was rates increases,69 and in May 
1953 a Scottish Valuation and Rating Committee was convened under Lord Som's 
chairmanship with the remit to review the valuation and rating system in Scotland. 
Having considered the alternatives of a local income tax, a site value tax, and a poll 
tax, it reported back in September 1954, opting to support the retention of the rates.70 
A poll tax, which was a flat rate, regressive charge that was levied as payment for 
local services, was rejected on the grounds that, 'the difficulty and expense of 
collection would be formidable', and the Committee objected 'in principle to 
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associating registration as a voter with liability to tax'. Som also proposed that rolling 
quinquennial revaluations should replace the annual revaluation process. This custom 
had been in practice in England and Wales since 1925, and the Committee argued that 
it would enable centrally provided local government grants to be more equitably 
distributed. The Committee's findings were translated into the Valuation and Rating 
(Scotland) Act 1956, introducing the legal requirement to hold quinquennial rating 
revaluations. 71 
Meanwhile, the British Empire had begun to disintegrate. India was granted 
independence in 1947 and, thereafter, other colonies gradually followed suit.72 
Decolonisation accelerated after the disastrous Suez crisis of 1956, and Harold 
Macmillan, who had replaced Anthony Eden as Prime Minister, spoke of a 'wind of 
change' in 1960, as British foreign policy was reorientated to accommodate the 
development of a Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Imperialism was 
incompatible with this changed international environment, and Britain assumed a new 
role as a supporting actor to America in the Cold War. As the British Empire 
reconstituted itself into the British Commonwealth, the Unionists were deprived of a 
vital ideological and populist pillar. Affinity with the imperial mission had been an 
influential factor in maintaining a British strand to Scottish national identity,73 and 
had acted in tandem with Orangeism in widening the Unionists' electoral appeal in 
Scotland. Unionist-nationalism lost credibility without the prop of imperialism. 
Scotland's economy had also begun to flounder in comparison to the buoyant 
British economy, and in 1957 Scotland had 10% of the UK's population, but 22% of 
its unemployed.74 The Unionists' and Labour's solution was regional planning. In 
1957 Ravenscraig steelworks was opened by the Motherwell-based steel magnates, 
the Colvilles, and in 1958 they were persuaded by the Conservative government to 
site a hot strip mill at the plant. 75 However, Macmillan also agreed to establish 
another small-scale strip mill at Llanwern in Wales, creating 500,000 tons of new 
strip capacity which, Macmillan admitted, could not be sustained without new 
industries being attracted to Scotland and Wales. Labour renationalised the steel 
industry in 1967, by which time, Colvilles was technically bankrupt, because of the 
debt that the Ravenscraig project had forced it to undertake. Regional policy was 
being dictated by the social priority of full employment rather than market-based 
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economic logic. 
The Unionists' vision of regional planning was heavily influenced by the 
Toothill Report of 1961. Its author, John Toothill of the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry), a successful Yorkshire-born business manager, 
advocated large-scale investment in education to rectify Scotland's dependence on 
heavy industry.76 He also proposed the decentralisation of research, development and 
physical planning, leading to the establishment of the Scottish Development 
Department in 1962. Electronics, engineering, motor car production and food and 
drink all experienced growth,77 but much of this employment was provided by 
multinational companies, which had their headquarters and research and development 
facilities outwith Scotland. 
In 1962, the Conservatives introduced state-funded student grants, entitling 
every British student to a minimum of £50 per year.78 At this time, 5.1 % of young 
Scots attended university, compared to 3.9% in England, and the Robbins 
Committee's Report on Higher Education, in 1963, called for access to university to 
be widened.79 Labour requested all Education Authorities to submit plans to move 
towards a fully comprehensive secondary school system in 1965 and, between 1964 
and 1974, the percentage of schoolleavers gaining certification increased from 27% 
to 66%. By 1970, 17% of Scottish school leavers were qualifying for university. Yet, 
Labour did not deliver its 1966 manifesto commitment to abolish private fee-paying 
schools and, in 1965,4.5% of Scottish pupils attended a fee-paying school compared 
to the British average of 7%.80 
An Identity in Turmoil: Scotland, 1965-1979 
In 1965, the Scottish Unionist Party label was discarded and replaced by the title of 
the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party.8} The internal structure of the party also 
changed, as the autonomous Divisional Councils were eradicated and replaced by 
regional councils under the control of the Chainnan's Office, which was renamed 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office.82 Furthermore, in a move that 
undermined the financial independence of the previously self-financing Scottish 
party, a single centralised Scottish fund, distributed from London, was established 
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This reorganisation was to have far-reaching effects, as after the abolition of 
the Divisional Councils, the party lost its responsiveness to localised issues, and 
businessmen were less willing to place large donations into the centralised fund The 
Unionists' network of full-time agents, which had given the party an organisational 
advantage in the central-belt, was now gradually dismantled Jimmy Allison, the 
fonner Scottish Organiser of the Labour Party, believes that these changes accelerated 
the party's electoral decline.83 Supporters of the restructuring asserted that access to 
the plentiful English finances would revive the party's perfonnance. 
Scotland's social and economic structure had also begun to work against the 
party's interests. A clear divide developed between the number of self-employed 
workers in Scotland and the rest of the UK, whilst Scottish capitalism contracted. 84 
Scottish society was becoming increasingly secularised, the Kirk was diluting its 
support for the Conservatives, and the party's links with the Orange Order had been 
largely severed. Furthennore, the previously pro-Unionist press had either folded, 
switched allegiance, or adopted a more critical stance towards the party.85 These 
factors combined with the decline of imperialism to strip Unionism of its populist 
connotations and fractured the bedrock of Unionist support. 86 
This resulted in the party becoming dominated by what Hutchison calls, 
'languid public school types', who presided over the erosion of the Conservatives' 
urban vote.87 To compound matters, the Scottish Conservatives began putting forward 
candidates in municipal elections, disbanding the loose anti-socialist alliance operated 
by the Unionists and adding to financial commitments. At the 1966 General Election, 
Labour won forty-six seats and the Conservatives fell to twenty MPS.88 One of the few 
urban seats to withstand the party's decline was Glasgow Cathcart, where Teddy 
Taylor, a lower middle-class, Scottish educated populist, enthusiastically canvassed 
council housing schemes, such as Castlemilk. Elsewhere Scottish Conservative 
activists failed to replicate his tactics. Women remained on the periphery of Scottish 
politics, with only two female Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1945 and 
1979. 
Under Labour the pace of regional planning accelerated further, with the 
Department of Economic Affairs situated at the hub of a planning network 89 In 
Scotland, the Regional Development Division of the Scottish Office was 
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supplemented by a Regional Economic Planning Board and a Regional Economic 
Planning Council. The impetus behind this process was added to by the steady growth 
in support for the SNP, and by 1971 all of Scotland was classified as an Assisted 
Area.90 The standard bearer for this approach was the Scottish Secretary, William 
Ross, and in partnership with the 'Scottish lobby' he exploited this expansion in 
regional policy. The Scottish lobby comprised figures from a cross-section of Scottish 
society who lobbied Parliament for government subsidies and employment 
opportunities.91 Political differences were expected to be put aside in the interests of 
Scotland, and if the demands of the Scottish lobby were not met it would highlight the 
growing threat of Nationalism. 92 These tactics were productive, and between 1960/61 
and 1980/81, regional preferential assistance to Scotland rose from just under £3 
million to almost £200 million. 93 
Another feature of the post-war consensus was a rise in trade union influence. 
The pursuit of full employment left the unions in a strong bargaining position due to 
the lack of excess labour, whilst nationalisation and economic planning politicised the 
wage bargaining process. Between 1964 and 1979, British trade union membership 
rose from ten million to more than thirteen million, and STUC membership broke 
through the one million barrier in 1977.94 
The post-war consensus became increasingly strained during the 1970s, as 
taxation, state intervention and public spending grew, whilst the economy stagnated, 
trade union militancy escalated and Scottish and Welsh Nationalism prospered Left-
wing politiCians, such as Tony Benn, MP for Bristol South East, advocated further 
nationalisation and economic planning to overcome the decline of British capitalism, 
but the New Right identified these policies as the root cause of Britain's difficulties. 
Edward Heath, the Conservative Prime Minister between 1970 and 1974, was 
confronted by two miners' strikes in 1972 and 1974, and chose to fight the February 
1974 General Election on the issue of trade union power.95 Labour won without a 
working majority by virtue of the party's strength in Scotland and Wales. Harold 
Wilson, the Labour leader, pledged to restore government relations with the unions, 
and create devolved Scottish and Welsh assemblies. Another election, in October, 
resulted in Labour holding a parliamentary majority of three MPS.96 In Scotland, the 
SNP won eleven seats, as the Conservatives dropped to sixteen MPS.97 
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After replacing Heath as Conservative Party leader, Margaret Thatcher 
appointed a committee of enquiry on Scottish party organisation, which reported back 
in 1977, proposing further integration with the British party. There was to be a 
Scottish Director of Organisation in overall control of administration, organisation 
and finance, who was to be directly responsible to Smith Square.98 Although the 
office of National Treasurer in Scotland was retained, the Scottish Conservatives' 
finances were to be controlled by the Treasurer's Department in London. In the face 
of a Scottish Nationalist revival, the party had opted to embellish the structure of the 
British party at the expense of its Scottish counterpart. 
Unemployment in Scotland rose from 4.6% in 1973 to 8% in 1979, and 
inflation peaked at 26.9% in 1975.99 Labour's 'Social Contract' with the trade unions 
was designed to counteract inflationary wage demands,IOO but in 1976 Labour had to 
seek financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), forcing the 
new Prime Minister, James Callaghan, to implement a package of public expenditure 
cuts. By 1977, Labour was a vulnerable minority government, reliant on the support 
of the Liberals to remain in power. The trade unions exploited Labour's weakness, 
and in the winter of 1978179 public sector workers undertook industrial action to 
break the wage restraints imposed by the Social Contract. Corporatism was 
discredited, prompting Isaac Kramnick, to pose the question, Is Britain Dying?tOl 
Meanwhile, in 1978, Scotland's public expenditure advantage over the rest of 
Britain became enshrined in the Barnett formula. The Chief Secretary at the Treasury, 
Joel Barnett, devised a scheme that divided comparable public expenditure, in areas 
such as health and education, to each constituent part of Britain according to the size 
of its population. t02 At the time of compiling the Barnett formula, Scotland held a 
23% public spending advantage over England, and Richard Rose contends that only 
16% of this figure was due to Scotland's greater social needs, attributing the 
remainder to the activities of the Scottish lobby.t03 The formula contained 
contradictions. If public expenditure increased then Scotland would marginally lose 
out to England, but if it fell, Scotland's share of spending would decrease at a slower 
rate than in England. As Labour attempted to constrain public expenditure in the 
wake of the IMF crisis, it was apparent that, in the short-term, the implementation of 
Barnett would defend Scotland's public spending advantage. 
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Indeed, events in Scotland combined with the 'winter of discontent' to unseat 
the Labour Government. Labour's Scottish devolution proposals failed to win 
sufficient support at the March 1979 Referendum (see chapter 6), and the SNP sided 
with the Conservatives in a Vote of No Confidence, forcing Callaghan to call a 
general election. Callaghan famously stated that it was 'the first time in recorded 
history that turkeys have been known to vote for an early Christmas' .104 In Scotland, 
the Conservatives won twenty-two seats, but the party's support in the central-belt 
continued to shrink, and Labour remained the largest party with forty-four MPS. I05 
The biggest losers were the SNP, which dropped to two MPs. 
The 'iron fist in the velvet glove,?l06 The Scottish Conservative Party, 1979-1987 
At the onset of Thatcher's premiership the Scottish Conservative Party contained a 
diverse assortment of capable and colourful personalities. According to Richard 
Finlay, by 1979 'the Scottish Tory leadership was predominantly drawn from the left 
of the party' .107 Most leading Scottish Conservatives maintained a patrician stance, 
and none more so than the Scottish Secretary, George Younger, whose family had 
made its fortune in the Scottish brewing industry.108 Younger was educated in 
England, and gained the tag of 'gentleman George' in 1963 after agreeing to stand 
down as prospective candidate in Kinross and West Perthshire, enabling Lord Home 
to take his place.I09 Younger was selected to fight the Ayr constituency, which he held 
at the 1964 General Election. l10 His defining characteristics were friendliness and 
courtesy, but Malcolm Ritkind, MP for Edinburgh Pentlands, describes him as 'a 
serious and ambitious politician' .111 
Rifkind had attended George Watson's fee-paying school in Edinburgh, and 
was an advocate of Jewish descent who believed that the party should avoid 
ideological doctrines. 112 On the other hand, Nicholas Fairbairn, MP for Kinross and 
West Perthshire, was a flamboyant, privately-educated lawyer,113 who was appointed 
as Solicitor General for Scotland in 1979. Allan Stewart, MP for East Renfrewshire, 
had studied and lectured at St Andrews University.114 He was a former Director of 
CBI (Scotland), and was the only Scottish Conservative MP associated with the New 
Right. Ian Lang, MP for Galloway, was an insurance broker, who had attended an 
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English public school, and strongly opposed devolution. 1 IS In addition to this, Bill 
Walker, MP for Perth and East Perthshire, was a maverick former management 
consultant on the right-wing of the party, but had no strong links with the New 
Right. 116 
Two other MPs are of note, because of the contrast that they reveal about the 
changing ethos of the party. Michael Ancram, MP for Edinburgh South, and heir to 
the twelfth Marquess of Lothian had been educated in England, 117 and was the first 
Roman Catholic to become a Scottish Conservative MP after being elected for 
Berwick and East Lothian in February 1974. In 1980, Ancram became Scottish 
Conservative Party Chairman. I IS In stark contrast, Commander Thomas Galbraith, 
MP for Hillhead, encapsulated the party's Unionist past. He had been elected in 1948 
and, after the 1979 General Election, held the only Conservative seat in GlasgoW.119 
Scottish Central Office employed only seven members of staff at the 1979 
General Election, and the Scottish Conservatives election expenses were exceeded by 
Labour for the first time. 120 Younger owed his appointment at the Scottish Office to 
Taylor's defeat in Cathcart and 'made no pretences to Thatcherite rigour'.l21 A 
significant factor in Younger's relaxed self-assurance was his close relationship with 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. 122 Whitelaw 
represented a northern English seat, but he was a Scottish landowner, who took great 
interest in the well-being of the Scottish party. He was a force of stability throughout 
Thatcher's premiership, endorsing her economic strategy whilst urging caution, and 
mediating in Cabinet disputes much to the disappointment of the 'wets'. This alliance 
between Younger and Whitelaw excluded the New Right from power in Scotland, and 
helped to prevent the closure of Ravens craig in 1982 (see chapter 2). 
The party held all of its seats following a boundary redistribution prior to the 
1983 General Election, and Thatcher won with a landslide British majority of 144.123 
This can be partly attributed to the Labour Party's internal disarray and left-wing 
manifesto, which Gerald Kaufman, MP for Manchester Gorton, described, as 'the 
longest suicide note in history' .124 There was a serious power struggle within the party 
between a left-wing faction, led by Tony Benn, and the party leadership, souring 
Labour's public relations.12S This rift was deepened by the growth of the Militant 
Tendency, which was a Trotskyist grouping that had infiltrated the party. These 
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difficulties were compounded by Labour's decision to appoint the ageing Michael 
Foot as party leader.126 
Senior right-wing Labour figures such as, Roy Jenkins, a former Chancellor, 
and David Owen, Callaghan's Foreign Secretary, dismayed by these developments 
decided to create the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in March 1981.127 The SDP 
formed an electoral alliance with the Liberals, who were led by David Steel, MP for 
Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles. In Scotland, the SDP was a relatively small party, but 
in March 1982, Jenkins won the Glasgow Hillhead seat from the Conservatives in a 
by-election, removing the Conservatives' last seat in Glasgow. Robert MacLennan, 
the MP for Caithness and Sutherland, and Dickson Mabon, the MP for Greenock, also 
defected from the Labour Party to the SDP. 128 Yet there was no groundswell of 
support for the party on a similar scale to England. Scottish Labour largely succeeded 
in rebuffing the efforts of the Militants, and neither the 'Bennites' nor the Militant 
Tendency succeeded in infiltrating the trade union or party establishment. In 1983 
Labour remained by far the largest Scottish party with forty-one MPs. 
That year Anna McCurley became the sole female Scottish Conservative MP 
to be elected during Thatcher's premiership, winning Renfrew West and Inverclyde. 
The most significant Scottish Conservative newcomer, however, was Michael 
Forsyth, MP for the newly created constituency of Stirling. Brought up in a council 
house in Arbroath he had entered St Andrews University as a socialist before 
graduating as a convert to the New Right. 129 He became Chairman of the Federation 
of Conservative Students (FCS) between 1976 and 1977, and developed close ties 
with the Adam Smith Institute (see Introduction).130 Forsyth sat on Westminster City 
Council between 1978 and 1983, pioneering competitive tendering (see chapters 4 
and 5), and creating a consultancy company to advise on privatisation.131 His work 
colleagues allege that he nursed ambitions of becoming Prime Minister, but Forsyth 
asserts that he entered politics because he was, 'determined to try to reverse the 
decline in Scotland and confront the dead hand of socialism' . 132 Thatcher encouraged 
Forsyth to stand for Parliament, and one of his first significant acts as an MP was to 
help found The No Turning Back Group (NTBG) in 1983, which Arnold Kemp 
describes as Thatcher's 'praetorian guard,.133 The only Scottish MP to join this Group 
was Stewart. 
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Younger continued to pursue a consensual line in Scotland and Christopher 
Harvie states that he was, 'a marked man' .134 Yet his alliance with Whitelaw proved 
to be a significant factor in convincing Thatcher to replace the rates (see chapter 5), 
and Whitelaw had pre-selected him as Michael Heseltine's replacement at Defence. 135 
Younger became the first Scottish Secretary to win a Cabinet promotion since Walter 
Elliot, when Heseltine left the Government, in January 1986 (see chapter 2). The new 
Scottish Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, did not have a close relationship with Whitelaw. 
Rifkind confesses that his personal style as Scottish Secretary was 'very different' to 
that of Younger, whilst Mitchell states that Rifkind's, 'view was that the best form of 
defence was attack'. 136 Rifkind did not fully enjoy Thatcher's trust because of his 
previous support for devolution (see chapter 6), and she confesses that she 'appointed 
him with mixed feelings' .l37 
The Fourth Estate? The Scottish Press and the Scottish Conservatives 
An increasingly fraught issue for the Scottish Conservatives was the growing 
antipathy of the Scottish press. During Thatcher's premiership almost seventy percent 
of newspapers that were read in Scotland were Scottish produced.138 At the 1979 
General Election, the Conservatives retained the support of the Glasgow Herald and 
the Scottish Daily Express.139 Labour relied upon the backing of the tabloid Daily 
Record, by far, the most popular Scottish newspaper, which placed its journalists at 
the disposal of the party during election campaigns.l40 Allison believes this was a 
significant factor in galvanising Labour support in Scotland, and the former Scottish 
Secretary of the Labour Party, Helen Liddell, was appointed as the Record's director 
of corporate affairs in 1988, four years after it had been purchased by the media 
tycoon, Robert Maxwell. 141 In stark contrast, the Conservative-supporting tabloid, the 
Scottish Daily Express, had been printed in Manchester since 1974, and its readership 
had dwindled. 
The English-based press were overwhelmingly supportive of Thatcher. She 
could rely on the backing of broadsheets like the Times, the Economist, and the Daily 
Telegraph, which was edited by Denis Thatcher's life-long friend William Deedes, as 
well as tabloids, such as the Sun, which had close ties with her Press Secretary, 
Bernard Ingham.142 Over the course of Thatcher's premiership she knighted the 
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editors of the Sun, the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, the Sunday Express, and the 
Financial Times. 143 However, her most significant relationship was with the 
Australian owner of News International Newspapers, Rupert Murdoch, who owned 
the Sun and the News of the World, and conveyed her beliefs in populist terms. 
Thatcher manipulated the monopolies and mergers rules to aid his purchase of the 
Times and Sunday Times in 1981.144 Nevertheless, her support for Murdoch 
contradicted her desire to limit the prevalence of sex and violence in the media. 145 
News International established a trade union free printworks at Kinning Park in 
Glasgow, in 1986, producing a separate Scottish edition of the Sun,l46 but this failed 
to increase the popularity of the Scottish Conservatives. 
In stark contrast to Thatcher's relationship with the Fleet Street press, the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was in regular conflict with the Government. 
Thatcher instinctively distrusted the BBC, because it was state-owned and publicly 
financed through a monopoly television licence. 147 Furthermore, Scottish Television's 
(STV) political reporting was not as sympathetic to the Conservatives as the British 
Independent Television News. 148 Indeed, STY's managing director, Gus Macdonald, 
was a prominent Labour supporter. 
Hutchison states that, 'the press grew ever more hostile to the 
Conservatives',149 as unemployment rose and Scotland's traditional industries 
declined (see chapter 2). At the 1983 General Election, the ScoUish Daily Express 
was the only Scottish daily newspaper to support the Conservatives, as the Herald 
backed the SDPlLiberal Alliance.1so Many Scottish Conservatives attributed this 
switch in allegiance to the arrival of Arnold Kemp, in 1981, as the Herald's editor, 
and these misgivings heightened, as Kemp became involved in initiatives, such as the 
Standing Committee on the Scottish Economy (see chapter 2).151 The Herald's 
economics correspondent, AIf Young, was a former Labour Party researcher,152 and 
its political correspondent, Murray Ritchie, regularly ran hostile anti-Conservative 
articles. The Herald had traditionally been one of the party's most staunch supporters, 
and Kemp asserts that it used to consult Scottish Unionist Central Office to approve 
its lead articles. The Herald's changed political allegiance, therefore, denied the 
Conservatives a mouthpiece to convey Thatcher's political message to the Scottish 
middle-class. 
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Shooting the Messenger: The Scottish Conservative Party, 1987-1989 
At the 1987 General Election the Scottish Conservatives dropped to ten MPs. 
Younger's majority in Ayr fell from 7,987 to 182, whilst Forsyth's majority in Stirling 
decreased from 5,133 to 548.153 Tactical voting was a significant factor in the Scottish 
election result, as the Scottish Conservatives' share of the vote only fell from 28.4% 
to 24%, but the party lost eleven seats. 154 
Labour had regrouped under the leadership of the Welshman, Neil Kinnock.lSS 
He expelled members of the Militant Tendency, reformed Labour's policies, and 
became more media consciOUS. l56 The Shadow Scottish Secretary, Donald Dewar, 
also provided an articulate and reasoned opposition to Scottish Office ministers. 
Allison, however, saw Dewar as 'aloof, 'indecisive', and unable to relate to working-
class Scots.157 Indeed, Allison believes that Dewar was an inferior politician to 
Rifkind and Forsyth. Nevertheless, Dewar was influential within civil society, and the 
party won fifty Scottish seats. 
Outwith Scotland, the Conservatives only lost ten MPs, and Thatcher won 
with a British majority of 102 seats.I58 The Glasgow Herald had focused on voicing 
opposition to Thatcher's policies,159 and informing its readers about the use of tactical 
anti-Conservative voting. Conservatives, such as the deposed MP for Bearsden and 
Strathkelvin, Michael Hirst, attached the blame for the Scottish Conservatives' dismal 
shOwing to the hostility and pro-devolution stance of the Scottish press. l60 MacInnes 
asserts that, 'to be truly Scottish was to be anti-Thatcher', and Ingham is convinced 
that the 'poisonous atmosphere' created by negative press coverage affected Scottish 
attitudes towards Thatcher and the Conservatives.161 In his view the Government's 
relationship with the Scottish press, 'was extremely difficult if not impossible'. On 
the other hand, Rifkind believes that the Scottish press is hostile to all governments, 
and contests that regional newspapers, such as the Dundee Courier, remained 
supportive of the Conservatives.162 
Nevertheless, a number of Scottish Conservatives, including the Glasgow 
lawyer Ross Harper, a business partner of Dewar, and Ian Sproat, the former MP for 
Aberdeen South, embarked on a takeover bid for the Glasgow Herald with the 
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endorsement of the party Chairman, James Goold. 163 Ingham insists that he was 
unaware of these activities, asserting that Kemp, who was a former colleague of his at 
the Guardian, was no more anti-Conservative than the rest of the Scottish press. 164 
The Herald's owner, Lonrho, was unwilling to sell, as its chief executive, Roland 
'Tiny' Rowland, was embroiled in conflict with the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) over the Al-Fayed brothers' takeover of Harrods. Goold then turned his 
attentions towards the Scotsman after it experienced a period of industrial action, but 
its Canadian owners rejected his advances. Throughout these negotiations, the 
Scottish Conservatives failed to appreciate that the Herald and Scotsman were 
reflecting civil society's opposition to Thatcher's policies. Middle-class Scots would 
not have been influenced by the press if its criticisms did not correspond with their 
experiences during Thatcher's premiership. 
On the other hand, the party's immediate problem following the 1987 General 
Election was its lack of credibility amongst the Scottish electorate, as Thatcher 
struggled to staff the Scottish Office. Stewart who had been dropped as Education and 
Industry Minister by Ritkind in September 1986, attributed the party's collapse to 
Scottish Office interventionism.165 After June 1987, he refused to serve under 
Rifkind, whilst Fairbairn and Walker were judged too unpredictable to be trusted with 
ministerial responsibilities. l66 This gave Thatcher the opportunity to promote Forsyth 
to the position of Health and Education Minister (see chapter 4), in the anticipation 
that he would become 'the real powerhouse for Thatcherism at the Scottish Office' .167 
By June 1987, the number of Scottish Conservative constituency agents had 
fallen to fourteen.168 SCUA responded to the General Election result by criticising the 
party's loss of Scottish identity (see chapter 6), calling for a return to the Unionist 
tradition of appointing the Scottish Secretary as party Chairman. In a survey of 
constituency chairmen, Scottish Central Office was criticised for its lack of separate 
Scottish campaign material and newspaper advertisements. Furthermore, SCUA 
recommended that its President should be elected and given responsibility for the 
party's professional staff, in order to repair links between the voluntary and 
professional wings of the party.169 The response of the professional wing was to 
reorganise Central Office in August 1987. There were to be five new directors with 
portfolios for finance, organisation, research, communication and campaigning, 
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entailing an increase in staffing numbers to twenty-five. MacKay was appointed as 
chief executive, and the Scottish party was empowered to retain all donations 
received in Scotland. This was intended to improve the Scottish Conservatives' 
waning finances and reduce its dependence on the British party. 
The Scottish Tory Business Group (STBG) was also formed,170 but this 
initiative was inhibited by the erosion of Scottish capitalism, which had been 
intensified by multinational takeovers (see chapter 2). In 1988, thirteen Scottish 
companies, including the Weir Group, the Argyll Group and the Macfarlane Group, 
donated a total of £173,250 to the Conservatives. Nevertheless, constituency parties 
were just under 40% short of their fund-raising targets,l71 resulting in continued 
financial reliance on the British party. Furthermore, this restructuring took place 
without any prior consultation with the voluntary wing, adding to its demoralisation. 
When questioned by the Sunday Times Scotland, in August 1990, the Deputy-
Chairman of the Scottish Conservatives, Bill Hughes, admitted that the Scottish party 
was 'only a branch office of the UK party ... We do not account independently and are 
not even registered for VAT in Scotland' .172 
An 'artificial row,?173 Scottish Conservative Party In-fighting, 1989-1990 
These changes had barely stabilised before another upheaval took place in 1989. 
Goold informed Thatcher, in January, that he intended to stand down as Scottish party 
Chairman, and she immediately identified Forsyth as his successor.174 However, 
Forsyth was not enthusiastic about this possibility, and Rifkind told Thatcher that 
Forsyth could not be spared from his ministerial duties. Rifkind proposed that the 
President of SCUA, Ross Harper, a member of the Scottish Tory Reform Group 
(STRG), of which Ritkind was President, should become the new Chairman. 
Perversely, Thatcher appointed thirty-four year old Forsyth as Chairman on 6 
July 1989, with a remit to improve the party's campaigning and propound Thatcher's 
ideology with greater vigour.17S On 7 July, the Glasgow Herald likened Forsyth to a 
'Boy on the burning deck' and, on 10 July, Murray Ritchie, branded him as 'Thatcher 
in drag,.176 Ritchie asserted that, 'Forsyth is a loner who seldom seeks advice and 
when he does, seldom takes it', whilst Harvie describes Forsyth as a 'self-proclaimed 
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'Thatcher sycophant' .177 Nevertheless, Forsyth contends that the strength of his 
friendship with Thatcher lies in their shared political outlook, and his willingness to 
argue with her. 178 
Forsyth was determined to improve relations with the voluntary wing of the 
party, but distrusted the constituency agents and most of the party professionals.179 He 
began to purge Scottish Central Office and appoint allies from south of the Border. 
Russell Walters, the deputy director of the New Right pressure group, the Economic 
League, was instated as chief of staff, and Simon Turner, the right-wing MP for 
Chingford, Norman Tebitt's, former election agent, became the director of 
organisation. ISO Walters now controlled access to the Party Chairman, whilst Turner 
administered the candidates' list, marginal ising the role of MacKay. On returning 
from holiday in the summer of 1989, MacKay found that the lock to his office had 
been changed, and all material unfavourable to the New Right had been removed. 181 
MacKay was transferred to the party's powerless Glasgow office eventually departing 
with a negotiated financial settlement preventing him from discussing these events. 
By the time of the 1989 Conservative conference the Scottish constituency agents had 
labelled the incomers as the, 'sinister brotherhood'. 
However, in December 1989, Walters resigned, as he struggled to cope with 
Scotland's hostile anti-Conservative press. 182 That month, Douglas Young, an 
executive in the City of London and former colleague of Forsyth's in the FeS, was 
appointed as campaigns and operations director. Yet Forsyth was disappointed to 
discover that Young had abandoned the New Right radicalism of his student days, and 
he performed poorly in public debates. Forsyth also launched an attack on the 
impartiality of BBC Radio Scotland in 1989, prompting Radio Scotland's head of 
news and current affairs, Jack Regan, to justify its reporting on the grounds that, 'the 
Scottish body politic is out of kilter and that will inevitably be reflected in our 
programme' .183 
Another ill-fated venture proved to be the publication of the Scottish 
Conservative. Forsyth believed that this publication would by-pass the hostile Scottish 
press if it could achieve a circulation rate of between 40,000 and 50,000. In the 
Scottish Conservative's first issue, in the winter of 1989, Fairbairn described the 
Scottish press as, 'little Scotlanders ... yearning to return to those far-off days when 
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Scotland was an independent oatmeal republic with a squabbling parliament presiding 
over abject poverty' .184 He failed to appreciate that it was in the interests of the 
Scottish press to emphasise their distinctiveness from English-based newspapers, to 
maximise readership in Scotland. Furthermore, the Scottish press were the ideal 
medium through which civil society could convey its antagonism towards Thatcher. 
Devolution was also a popular issue amongst the Scottish media, as it was likely to 
create additional employment within the industry. The Scottish Conservative ceased 
production after a few expensive editions, and Ingham states that he distrusted 
Forsyth's methods of generating publicity.I8s 
In 1989, David McCrone asserted that, 'Thatcherism in Scotland is unpopular 
not simply because its political game-plan to roll back the state is inappropriate, but 
because it no longer has a distinctive social base within which it can 'naturalise' .. .its 
political project'. 186 Between 1979 and 1989 support for the Scottish Conservatives 
amongst those in professional and managerial employment fell from 46% to 41 %, 
whereas the party attracted the votes of between 50% and 60% of this grouping on a 
British basis. IS? Significantly, Scottish Conservative support amongst skilled non-
manual workers dropped from 46% to 31 %, compared to over 50% elsewhere in 
Britain. 
Self-employed and factory workers, formed the bedrock of working-class 
Conservative support in England, where the party won almost 40% of these 
individuals' votes. There were, however, fewer self-employed workers in Scotland, 
and the Scottish Conservatives could only rely upon the votes of under 20% of skilled 
manual workers. Sectarianism no longer had a serious impact on Scottish politics and, 
by 1990, the Conservatives could only command the support of 34% of Kirk members 
(see chapter 6). The Protestant working-class deserted the Scottish Conservatives in 
growing numbers and, by 1992, only 24% of manual Protestant workers voted 
Conservative compared to 39% in 1979. Under Thatcher, the Unionist tradition in 
Scottish politics accelerated towards extinction. 
Whitelaw left the Government, in January 1988, after a serious stroke,l88 and 
this was a considerable loss to Thatcher, as he was no longer able to mediate between 
senior Cabinet figures or to curb her growing reliance on unofficial advisers. The 
Glasgow Herald concluded that, 'Thatcher is arguably much more cautious in deed 
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than in word but she is prone to excess, a weakness she may now be more likely to 
indulge,.189 Backbench discontent with Thatcher's leadership emerged in 1989, as 
inflation increased (see chapter 2), and differences arose over the poll tax (see chapter 
5), and Europe (see chapter 2). 
Denis Thatcher tried to persuade his wife to step down on her tenth 
anniversary as Prime Minister, in May 1989, and was convinced he had succeeded 
until Whitelaw informed Thatcher that her departure would 'split the party'. 190 
Ritkind believes that Thatcher should have heeded Denis's advice and departed 
Downing Street, 'trailing clouds of glory' . 191 At the June 1989 European elections the 
party slumped to its worst election showing since 1928,192 and the resignation of 
Nigel Lawson, in October 1989 (see chapter 2), highlighted Cabinet discontent over 
her confrontational leadership style and the use of unofficial advisers. 
These pressures resulted in the first ever challenge to Thatcher's leadership, in 
December 1989, as Sir Anthony Meyer, a 'wet' aristocrat who represented Clywd 
North-West in Wales, stood against her. 193 Thatcher asked Younger to be her nominal 
campaign manager, and she easily won the contest, but thirty-three MPs sided with 
Meyer and another twenty-seven abstained. 194 Younger guaranteed that Thatcher 
would be more receptive to backbench opinion in the future, and encouraged her to 
dispense with her advisers.195 Thatcher did begin to meet backbench MPs on a more 
regular basis, but retained her advisers. The Glasgow Herald concluded that, 'the 
triumph can only be regarded as tepid ... she may well have to face another challenge 
next year, and then the challenger may well be a more formidable figure' .196 This was 
an indirect reference to Heseltine who had been a persistent critic of Thatcher's anti-
European attitudes and the poll tax since leaving the Government in January 1986.197 
He represented the greatest threat to Thatcher's authority. 
Meanwhile, Forsyth's appointment as Scottish Chairman had revealed serious 
divisions in the Scottish Conservative Party, leading to bitter in-fighting. Shortly after 
Forsyth took up office, the Sun published an unsubstantiated story about Ross 
Harper's private life, forCing him to resign as President of SCUA. l98 Jack Irvine, the 
. editor of the Scottish edition of the Sun alleges that the tabloid's national editor, 
Kelvin Mackenzie, informed him after Forsyth's instatement that it was acceptable to 
'put the boot in' to Rifkind 199 
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Scottish Conservatives in the left-of-centre STRG were disconcerted by these 
developments, viewing them as a prelude to the ousting of Rifkind and his 
replacement by Forsyth.2oo Thatcher's allies were heavily suspicious of the STRG, as 
its British counterpart was patronised by staunch opponents of Thatcher, such as 
Michael Mates and Heseltine. The STRG's Vice-Chairman, Andrew Burnett was 
close friends with Mates' researcher, and its outspoken Chairman, Arthur Bell, was 
branded as, 'the stupidest man in the Scottish Conservative Party', by Forsyth. 
Furthermore, the Conservative Group leader on Lothian Region, Brian Meek, was 
joint Vice-President of the STRG and, as a columnist in the Glasgow Herald, was 
able to convey his misgivings over Forsyth's chairmanship.201 
At the 1990 Scottish party conference Walker began to lobby for Rifkind's 
dismissal. The conference gave Rifkind a standing ovation, but this anarchy continued 
into the summer, as the Government passed Scottish law reforms. Contrary to his 
belief in the free market, Forsyth gave Walker his tacit support to revolt against the 
curtailment of Scottish Lawyers' monopoly on conveyancing. The rebels included 
Stewart, who was determined to remove Rifkind for personal and ideological reasons. 
Rifkind had to accede to their demands, as the Bill was short on parliamentary time. 
Forsyth was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with his dual role as party 
Chairman and Scottish Office minister and, in August, these feelings intensified, as 
Young departed with a substantial pay_off.202 This highlights one of the ironies of 
Forsyth's chairmanship, as despite his staunch belief in the constraint of public 
expenditure, he consumed vast sums of party finance via resignation payments and 
public relations projects. 
Rifkind describes Forsyth as a 'very difficult' and 'abrasive' colleague, whose 
chairmanship was 'very bad for the party,.203 With the support of Younger, Whitelaw 
and the STBG, he demanded the immediate removal of Forsyth on the grounds of 
disloyalty.204 Forsyth departed on 7 September 1990, and was replaced by Lord 
Sanderson of Bowden. Nevertheless, Thatcher promoted Forsyth to Minister of State 
at the Scottish Office, giving him control over every significant department other than 
Industry. Thatcher concludes that, 'This combination of the Left and the traditional 
establishment of the Party to rebuff Thatcherism in Scotland was a prelude to the 
formation of the same alliance to oust me as leader of the Conservative Party a few 
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weeks later'. 20S 
Point of Departure: Thatcher's Fall From Power 
On 1 November 1990, Geoffrey Howe issued his resignation over Thatcher's 
hardening anti-European stance. The Conservative Party's constitution provided the 
opportunity for a leadership election each November,206 and Thatcher expected a 
challenge from Heseltine. Therefore, after a meeting with Whitelaw, and at the 
prompting of Ingham, she agreed to bring forward the final date for a leadership 
contest by two weeks, to test Heseltine's resolve.207 On 13 November, Howe 
delivered an unexpectedly devastating resignation speech. Thatcher was visibly 
shaken, and Lawson describes Howe's speech as, 'the most devastating speech I, or I 
suspect anyone else in the House that afternoon, had heard uttered in the House of 
Commons,.20S Heseltine saw this as an ideal opportunity to challenge Thatcher, and 
put his name forward for a leadership ballot on 14 November. However, Thatcher was 
confident that she would prevail, and that her victory could be used to pacify the 
party's internal divisions. 
Younger was appointed, once again, as Thatcher's campaign manager, but 
John Campbell states that he, 'was not the right man for the job', because he was a 
Scottish Conservative grandee who knew very few English MPS.209 However, in many 
respects, Younger's consensual, gentlemanly manner was ideal, as he was unlikely to 
alienate potential supporters, whilst his position on the left of the party highlighted 
Thatcher's ability to accommodate individuals of a different viewpoint to herself. 
Yet, Younger was notably less active or enthusiastic on this occasion, disappointed 
that Thatcher had not heeded his advice to dispense with her advisers.210 Moreover, 
he had become Chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland, in January 1990, leading to 
him spending much of his time in Edinburgh.2l1 To further compound matters, 
Thatcher's Parliamentary Private Secretary, Peter Morrison, was poorly organised and 
lethargic,212 leaving Thatcher reliant upon her most entrenched supporters in the 
NTBG, who were less likely to appeal to wavering backbenchers. 
Lang, like many other Conservatives, was never contacted by Thatcher's 
campaign, adding to the impression that she was taking victory for granted. Thatcher 
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exacerbated these difficulties by giving an ill-advised interview to the Times, branding 
Heseltine as a corporatist who would return Britain to 'the bad old days' of the post-
war consensus, and concluding that, 'You've seen the crumbling of more extreme 
forms of that philosophy in the Soviet Union' .213 These comments illustrated the 
extent to which she was out of touch with Conservative backbenchers, and displayed 
Thatcher's hardening intolerance of alternative strains of Conservatism, further 
polarising attitudes towards her. At the climax of the campaign, Thatcher opted to 
attend a pre-arranged Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris to 
mark the end of the Cold War, in order to illustrate her confidence and 
professionalism.214 In stark contrast, Heseltine's supporters campaigned energetically, 
promising a fundamental review of the poll tax if he became leader. 
Thatcher was still in Paris when the result was announced on the evening of 
20 November. She secured 204 votes to Heseltine's 152, whilst sixteen MPs 
abstained, but Thatcher was four votes short of the 15% margin of victory that the 
ballot rules required She immediately declared her intention to enter the second 
ballot,215 but at Westminster, a growing number of Conservatives were calling for her 
to stand down. Younger had stipulated prior to the ftrst ballot that he would withdraw 
his assistance if she did not win an immediate victory, and was convinced that her 
position was untenable.216 Furthermore, Whitelaw relayed a message to Downing 
Street expressing his belief that Thatcher could no longer command sufficient support 
to remain party leader.217 
That evening Thatcher consulted her Cabinet colleagues to rally support, but 
Rifkind informed her that she could only win a 'pyrrhic victory' in the second ballot, 
as so many MPs had already voted against her, and most of his Cabinet colleagues 
delivered a similar message.2IS Rifkind is convinced that Thatcher would never have 
stood down voluntarily, and states that the factors that made her 'great' also made her 
·bloody minded and obstinate'. In contrast, Forsyth and other members of the NTBG 
urged her to remain resolute, but on returning to Downing Street the next morning 
they were denied entry.219 Thatcher describes the advice of her Cabinet as a 
'betrayal' ,220 but she was not compelled to accept their logic, and could have fought 
the second ballot. 
The most significant input came from Denis Thatcher, who wanted her to 
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resign as an undefeated Prime Minister.221 On 22 November, Thatcher withdrew from 
the contest in the hope that another candidate, who shared her values could defeat 
Heseltine and continue her legacy. The Chancellor, John Major, stood as her anointed 
candidate, in the second ballot, and defeated Heseltine. In Scotland, the Glasgow 
Herald concluded that, 'Thatcher's bellicosity, her determination to confront, her 
homespun verities, are not as relevant now as they were in the eighties when the 
enemies were so largely within', whilst the Daily Record celebrated her fall from 
power with an editorial entitled, 'Jobless at last'.222 The Thatcher era was over, and 
her predecessor, James Callaghan, summarised Thatcher's demise in succinct fashion, 
'Those who live by the sword, shall perish by the sword' .223 
Towards Extinction? An Overview of the Scottish Conservative Party under 
Thatcher 
The Thatcher era was electorally disastrous for the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Party, as it declined from twenty-two MPs to ten. Younger succeeded in 
pacifying Scotland, but his 'confident Conservatism' was built upon his friendship 
with Whitelaw and a steady sUpportbase.224 The party's internal inaction during 
Younger's tenure at the Scottish Office resulted in a decline in the Scottish 
Conservatives' electoral organisation, and he became Defence Secretary at a 
fortuitous time before the 1987 General Election and the introduction of the poll tax. 
His successor, Rifkind could not rely on the support of Whitelaw, and Younger does 
not appear to have filled this void. Rifkind had to endure the party's electoral collapse 
in June 1987, and Thatcher's attempts to undermine his authority through the 
appointment of Forsyth as party Chairman. This created growing internal and external 
Scottish Conservative anarchy, at a time when the party was in desperate need of 
unity and leadership, further discrediting the Scottish Conservatives in the eyes of the 
electorate. 
Another difficulty was the unrepresentative nature of the party's Scottish MPs. 
In 1979 half were educated in English public schools or the Scottish fee-paying 
sector. By 1987, this figure had risen to seven out of the party's ten MPs, whilst fewer 
were industrialists or businessmen in comparison to their Unionist predecessors. 225 
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The Scottish Conservatives' support increasingly became confined to rural areas, and 
prosperous city suburbs. This was not a unique feature of the 1980s, as the party had 
been losing its grip on urban constituencies since the 1960s, but this process was 
completed during Thatcher's premiership. A similar trend also developed in English 
politics, but there were more rural constituencies in England, and the commuter-based 
suburbs of southern England proved a rich source of support. 
Moreover, figures like Norman Tebbit had a populist appeal in southern 
England, which the Conservatives had lacked, in Scotland, since Teddy Taylor's 
defeat in 1979. Forsyth was one of the few Scottish Conservatives from an ordinary 
background, but his abrasive character and strong support for the closure of declining 
heavy industries, such as Gartcosh,226 alienated voters in a country that was suffering 
widespread unemployment. Forsyth's appointment as Scottish Conservative Chairman 
severely damaged the party's public image. 
The Scottish Conservatives continued to be financially dependent on the 
British party, despite its efforts to encourage self-sufficiency after 1987, and this 
reliance grew as indigenous Scottish capitalism was eroded by mergers and 
multinational takeovers. Furthermore, the Scottish Office was increasingly dependent 
on English Conservative support to enact Scottish legislation. After 1987, English 
Conservatives began to attend Scottish Questions, attacking the Scottish Office's 
'slush fund' ,227 whilst Lawson derided Scotland's 'culture of dependence' (see 
chapter 2). 
Ironically, these criticisms could have been equally applied to the Scottish 
Conservative Party. However, they conveyed the impression that the Conservatives 
were 'anti-Scottish', which was reinforced by the party's staunch opposition to 
devolution. This situation was compounded by the diminishing number of Scottish 
Conservative MPs, and Thatcher's alienation of the Scottish middle-class. The 
Scottish media accentuated these difficulties through its political coverage, and many 
Scottish Conservatives came to blame the press for the decline in middle-class 
support for the party. 
However, the party failed to appreciate that it was in the commercial interests 
of the Scottish media to emphasise its distinctiveness from its counterparts south of 
the Border. Moreover, the press were the ideal medium through which civil society 
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could express its opposition to Thatcher's policies, whilst appealing to and reflecting 
Scottish middle-class grievances over public sector reforms. The divergence between 
the Scottish and English press is illustrated by News International's decision to 
produce a Scottish edition of the Sun after 1986. 
In England, the Sun had been an integral factor in advancing Conservative 
support amongst the working-class, but its Scottish edition made little impact on the 
huge readership of the Labour-supporting Daily Record. This highlights the collapse 
of the Unionist working-class vote, which had been rapidly declining since the 1960s, 
as widespread unemployment and secularisation combined to alienate the Protestant 
working-class from the Scottish Conservatives. The ultimate failure of the 
Conservative message in Scotland resulted in the Sun's decision to switch its 
allegiance to the SNP in January 1992.228 
Nevertheless, the prominence of individual Scottish Conservatives remained 
constant throughout Thatcher's premiership. Whitelaw was a vital source of advice 
and stability until ill-health forced him to leave the Cabinet, and his resignation 
exposed Thatcher's aggressive leadership style, destabilising the Government. 
Younger became the first Scottish Secretary to gain promotion since 1938, and also 
acted as nominal campaign manager in both of her leadership contests. On the other 
hand, Forsyth was a close colleague, and Thatcher associates the campaign to remove 
him as Scottish party Chairman with her fall from power. Finally, Thatcher believed 
that Rifkind was her 'sharpest personal critic' within the Government, 229 and his 
advice helped to convince her to stand down as Prime Minister. 
Yet, the most striking electoral development during the Thatcher years in 
Scotland was the collapse of the Conservatives' supportbase in prosperous middle-
class suburbs, such as Bearsden and Strathkelvin. This can be partially attributed to 
the use of tactical anti-Conservative voting, but much of the blame for the Scottish 
Conservatives' decline must be laid upon the Scottish party, which allowed its 
electoral machinery to decay and lost touch with the Scottish middle-class and civil 
society. Thatcher's restructuring inflicted most damage on the party's supportbase, 
because it had negative implications for middle-class Scots employed in the public 
sector. However, the Scottish Conservatives largely endorsed Thatcher's political 
outlook and made very few policy initiatives, contradicting Finlay's assertion that the 
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Scottish party leadership, 'were well versed in the older Unionist notion that Scotland 
was distinctive'. 230 
The poll tax, was one of very few Government reforms that was influenced by 
the Scottish Conservative Party, and its unpopularity was pivotal in Thatcher's fall 
from power. Scottish Unionists like Elliot and Skelton had been influential in the 
ideological development of Conservatism, ensuring that Scottish interests were not 
overlooked. Under Thatcher, however, the Scottish Conservatives were dependent on 
reforms that were designed for English circumstances, adding to the perception that 
they were an English party (see chapter 6). In stark contrast, Scottish Labour figures 
such as, John Smith, the MP for Monklands, Robin Cook, the MP for Livingston and 
Gordon Brown, the MP for Dunfermline East, were at the heart of Labour Party 
policy-making, ensuring that Scottish issues were addressed. 
Under Thatcher, the Scottish Conservative Party was devoid of Unionist 
populism or New Right fervour, and financially and politically dependent on the 
British party. This left the Scottish party ill-prepared to withstand the political 
pressures that Thatcher's attack on the post-war consensus generated, propelling the 
Scottish Conservatives towards electoral Armageddon in 1997. As the following 
chapter explains the seeds of the party's electoral downfall were sown during the 
economic difficulties of the 19805. 
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Chapter Two 
SINK OR SWIM? THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY UNDER THATCHER 
Writing in her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher states that, 'The balance sheet of 
Thatcherism in Scotland is a lopsided one : economically positive but politically 
negative'.} Debate over Thatcher's impact on Scotland has tended to focus on either 
the economy or the 'Scottish question'. Thatcher presided over an unprecedented rise 
in unemployment, and transformed the nature of the Scottish economy. Her 
restructuring was designed to break the post-war consensus on economic 
management, and spanned the entire course of her premiership. This chapter seeks to 
illuminate Thatcher's economic reforms, and the extent to which they deviated from 
the post-war consensus. 
It will include analysis of Scotland's response to Thatcher's economic 
strategy, and the effect that this had on support for the Scottish Conservatives. 
Furthermore, this section examines the debate over entry to the European Monetary 
System (EMS), and briefly refers to the psychological significance of the Falklands 
War. Thatcher's reforms have been dissected into three separate phases on a similar 
basis to the time-chart used by Andrew Gamble in The Free Economy and the Strong 
State. The first period runs from May 1979 until March 1982, the second spans the 
years between April 1982 and June 1987, and the final phase covers developments 
between June 1987 and November 1990. 
Scottish historians have focused heavily on Thatcher's economic policies. 
Richard Finlay equates the magnitude of her restructuring with the Industrial 
Revolution. 2 Christopher Harvie contends that revenue from the oil industry in 
Scotland, 'was keeping her in business', 3 which accurately highlights the importance 
of North Sea oil in boosting Britain's balance of payments. However, he contradicts 
himself by stating that, 'even oil could not prevent a reduced manufacturing sector 
putting the country increasingly in deficit with the rest of the UK'. Moreover, 
Harvie's analysis overlooks the amount of regional aid that Scotland was receiving 
from the Treasury, and the large subsidies that were spent on supporting uneconomic 
state-run industries in Scotland. 
In contrast, Michael Fry contends that the Scottish Office focused 
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disproportionately on, 'that 2 per cent of the workforce employed in manual 
occupations in old, state-supported industries' ,4 and attributes this to the influence of 
these industries within the Labour movement. This displays a lack of sensitivity 
towards Scotland's industrial heritage, which was entrenched in the heavy industries 
of steel, shipbuilding and coal. Furthermore, state-owned plants, such as Ravenscraig, 
had been brought to Scotland's depressed regions because of the private sector's 
inability to create employment without financial assistance from the state, and there 
was widespread fear that the closure of these industries would further increase 
Scotland's high rate of unemployment. Finally, James Mitchell provides a thorough 
examination of Scotland's economic difficulties, but fails to mention the growth in 
the electronics and service industries. 5 
Swamping the Decks: The Scottish Economy, 1970-1979 
Edward Heath was the frrst politician to attempt to overturn the post-war economic 
consensus, by exposing the nationalised industries to competition and limiting state 
intervention.6 Heath, however, reversed his policies in the face of rising inflation, 
unemployment and industrial relations unrest. 7 Scotland was at the heart of these 
events. In 1971, Heath nationalised Rolls Royce's aerospace division, which had 
factories in Hillington and East Kilbride, in order to stave off bankruptcy and, in the 
wake of a trade union organised 'work-in', he agreed a rescue package for Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders.8 Heath's change of tack was also enshrined in the Industry Act of 
1972, which introduced Regional Development Grant (ROO) and Regional Selective 
Assistance (RSA).9 ROO was to be payable at differing percentages on all capital 
expenditure on new assets in manufacturing, mining and construction, whilst RSA 
provided loans on favourable terms to manufacturing industry.l0 Finally, Heath 
imposed a statutory incomes policy between November 1972 and February 1974,11 as 
the Conservatives struggled to control inflation. 
Britain entered the EEC in 1973, and Heath was influential in the negotiations 
leading to the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. 
The ERDF awarded grants to Britain's Assisted Areas, and its activities 
complemented the work of the European Social Fund (ESF), which had been created 
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by the Treaty of Rome. After 1972, 50% of its grants were to be dispensed to Assisted 
Areas. A referendum on EEe membership was held in 1975, and 58.4% of Scots 
voted in favour of remaining within the Community, compared to 68.7% in 
England. 12 
Meanwhile, economists attributed Britain's economic difficulties to 
'stagflation', which saw the economy trapped in a cycle of low growth and rising 
unemployment. 13 This theory surmised that over the course of time, the more that the 
state spent on subsidising nationalised industries and uneconomic private companies, 
the less impact that this finance had in creating new employment. 14 In fact, its only 
guaranteed effect was to increase inflation, and encourage greater income tax 
demands. By 1973174, the public-sector-borrowing-requirement (PSBR) had reached 
£4.5 billion, which represented 6% of GDP. 15 
Nevertheless, Scottish confidence was buoyed by the location of the first 
commercial North Sea oil field in 1970, which came on-stream in 1975.16 Labour was 
returned to power in 1974 on a manifesto pledging further nationalisation and state 
intervention, and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was created in 1975 with 
powers to assist, participate in and establish industries. 17 A similar body, the National 
Enterprise Board (NEB) was also established with a remit to intervene throughout the 
UK. IS Unemployment rose above one million in August 1975, peaking at 1.62 million 
in July 1977, and rapidly rising inflation forced the Labour Government to seek 
financial assistance from the IMF, in September 1976.19 It was compelled to cutback 
on public expenditure, and by 1978, inflation had fallen from 26.5% to 8%. Harold 
Wilson and James Callaghan were unsure of Britain's role within the EEC, because of 
its determination to constrain the output of heavy manufacturing industries, such as 
steel. Britain, therefore, did not enter the EMS, which was established in 1979, and 
included an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) designed to harmonise exchange 
rates.20 Scottish attitudes grew increasingly hostile towards Europe, and in April 
1979,50% of Scots favoured withdrawal from the EEC.21 
Scottish unemployment averaged 6.4% between 1973 and 1979, compared to 
7.1% in northern England, 3.2% in south-east England, and the UK average of 4.8%.22 
This was the first time since 1945 that unemployment had broken the one million 
barrier, increasing the perception that Britain was in a process of chronic economic 
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decline. Thatcher made significant political capital on the subject of Britain's high 
unemployment rate. She famously commissioned the advertising agency, Saatchi and 
Saatchi, to convey the party's message to the electorate, and in the summer of 1978 it 
unveiled a billboard depicting a queue of unemployed workers under the heading, 
'Labour's Not Working,.23 Thatcher rejected the concept of full employment, and her 
1979 manifesto made no direct pledge to reduce unemployment. However, she gained 
power in May 1979 on the premise to reverse the perceived decline in Britain's 
economy, which her campaign had intrinsically linked to the rise in unemployment 
and inflation. 
Swimming Against the Tide: The Scottish Economy, May 1979 to March 1982 
Thatcher wasted no time in making her government's intentions clear, as Geoffrey 
Howe introduced a stringent budget in June 1979, intended to lower inflation and 
deliver the Conservatives' manifesto commitment of tax cuts. Howe, however, only 
managed to accommodate a drop in income tax from 33% to 30% by raising indirect 
taxes, such as VAT, which nearly doubled from 8% to 15%.24 The announcement of 
new money-supply targets accompanied these measures.25 Public expenditure was to 
be cut by £1.5 billion, and where annual cash limits were in force they were tightened 
to reduce planned expenditure by a further £ 1 billion. Exchange controls were also 
slackened for companies investing abroad, and individuals travelling and living in 
foreign countries.26 In October 1979 they were abolished, and between 1979 and 1983 
£35.4 billion was exported from Britain.27 
The direction in which Howe had chosen to steer the British economy. as it 
lurched towards recession, was unprecedented in the post-war era, as he placed 
control of inflation ahead of reducing unemployment. A critical tool in lowering 
inflation was the use of interest rate increases and, by November 1979, interest rates 
had reached 17%.28 The Government was consciously cutting off demand from both 
the state and the consumer in order to facilitate a drop in inflation, regardless of the 
implications that this had for industry. Yet, between May 1979 and May 1980, 
inflation rocketed from 10% to 22%, and it hovered around 12% throughout 1981.29 
The 1980 Budget introduced the Medium-Tenn-Financial-Strategy (MTFS), 
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which was designed to fix public spending and monetary targets over the course of 
several years. 30 It was the brainchild of Nigel Lawson, and after a period of reluctance 
Thatcher was converted.3l The MTFS, however, proved to be an ineffective monetary 
gauge, as the money supply increased at nearly double the rate predicted by the 
Treasury in 1980. Nevertheless, Lawson believes that it provided a strong framework 
for controlling public expenditure. 32 
Due to the world economic downturn between 1979 and 1981, the already 
unprofitable nationalised industries were further damaged by a lack of demand and 
dismal productivity levels. This resulted in government subsidies to these industries 
increasing to bridge the shortfall in demand. In 1979/80 the British Steel Corporation 
(BSC) made the largest loss in its history of £1.8 billion, and £96 million of this 
figure was attributable to Scottish plants.33 Thatcher's response was swift, replacing 
the chairman of BSC, Charles Villiers, with Ian MacGregor, in May 1980.34 
MacGregor, a Scot, had enjoyed a successful business career in North America, and 
rode out the 1980 steel strike to introduce sweeping cuts and reforms to BSC. In the 
wake of the 1980 steel strike, 20,000 British steelworkers lost their jobs, as 
MacGregor rationalised BSC with Thatcher's blessing.3s By October 1980, Craigneuk 
steel foundry, near Motherwell, opened at a cost of £7.2 million two years earlier, had 
reduced its workforce by a quarter. 36 
A less politically sensitive target was the NEB, and on 19 June 1979 the 
Industry Secretary, Keith Joseph, ordered the NEB to sell assets worth £100 million.37 
This signalled the beginning of several sell-offs of state-owned shares in industry, as 
the government's shares in companies such as, Fairey Holdings and Amersham 
International, were sold between December 1979 and February 1982, receiving 
proceeds of £91 million. Differing proportions of other government shares in 
companies like International Computers Limited (ICL) and British Petroleum (BP), 
were disposed of for the sum of £782 million. These measures were intended to 
improve the public sector balance of payments (PSBP), as the sale of government 
shares was classified as negative public spending. The NEB merged with the National 
Research and Development Corpomtion in late 1981 to fonn a British Technology 
GrOUp.38 Without the additional finance from these sell-offs Thatcher would almost 
certainly have had to make concessions over her economic restructuring. 
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Indeed, Thatcher's efforts to limit public expenditure were not isolated to 
Britain. Britain's contribution towards the BEC budget had steadily risen, and by 1980 
it was paying around £1,000 million a year more into the Community than it was 
getting in exchange.39 Thatcher wanted Britain's budget contribution reduced, in 
order to cut expenditure, and to win a tangible victory in foreign affairs that could be 
used to boost her popularity. In the negotiations between June 1979 and May 1980 
Thatcher continuously told European leaders that, 'It's my money I want back', and in 
May 1980 she reluctantly accepted a rebate of £760 million per year. 40 
Another area in which Thatcher strove to make savings was regional aid. 
According to figures such as, Lawson and Norman Tebbit, workers in areas of high 
unemployment should either move to find work or accept lower wages to attract 
industry to their region.41 The Conservatives' primary aim was to reduce the coverage 
of regional aid from 44% of the UK's working population to 27.5%.42 Joseph 
proposed reducing the rate of RDG in Development Areas from 20% to 15%, and 
abolishing it completely in Intermediate Areas, whilst as many Special Development 
Areas as possible were to be downgraded to Development Area status. 
In 1979 the whole of Scotland was classified as an Assisted Area.43 Joseph, 
however, was intent on removing aftluent areas such as the Borders, as well as 
prosperous cities like Edinburgh from Assisted Area status. George Younger fought 
Joseph's decision and succeeded in winning Scotland a temporary reprieve lasting 
throughout the worst of the recession. It was agreed that those areas with 
Development status were to be downgraded to Intermediate Area standard from 
August 1980, and that they would remain as Assisted Areas until August 1982. 
Paradoxically, the Conservatives' attempts to reorganise regional aid 
increased Special Development Area coverage in Scotland After 1982, Younger 
boasted that 70% of Scotland's population stayed in Assisted Areas, 53% of which 
were in Special Development Areas.44 This message from the Scottish Office was out 
of kilter with Thatcher's economic objectives for Britain, and inhibited her attempts 
to alter economic thinking in Scotland. Regional preferential assistance in Scotland 
for the year 1981182 was at its highest ever, totalling £235 million, or about 25% of 
the British total. 45 
Scotland had been one of the weakest economic regions in Britain throughout 
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the post-war period, but its employment structure was very similar to that of the UK. 
By 1979, 30% of total Scottish employment was in manufacturing, compared to 31 % 
for the UK, and services accounted for 59% of Scottish jobs, compared to the UK 
figure of 60%.46 However, in 1977, public sector jobs stood at 34.3% of Scottish 
employment, as opposed to 30% in England.47 Furthermore, between 1976 and 1981, 
Scotland was the only area in Britain, outwith southern England, to record a 
substantial expansion in public sector employment, experiencing a 3.5% growth.48 
This growth was reflected in Scottish local government, or in sectors such as 
education and the NHS. Moreover, in 1975 as little as 41 % of Scottish manufacturing 
employment was indigenously-controlled, whereas, in 1979, only 14.1 % of British 
manufacturing employment was in foreign-owned companies.49 Scotland was, 
therefore, more reliant than the rest of the UK on public sector employment and 
inward investment, but it was not uniquely disadvantaged by its industrial structure. 
Nevertheless, the combination of Thatcher's economic strategy, high oil 
prices, the resultant strong pound, and the worldwide recession served as a quadruple 
whammy to Scotland's economy. Between 1979 and 1981 Scottish manufacturing lost 
11 % of its output and 20% of its jobs, and in October 1980, 246,000 Scots were 
registered as unemployed. 50 British manufacturing suffered to an even greater extent, 
as its output dropped by 14% between 1979 and 1981.51 The West Midlands was 
particularly badly affected, and its annual GDP fell by 4.6% between 1978 and 
1981.52 
John Campbell asserts that Thatcher believed that, 'the high pound was a good 
thing' for patriotic reasons, and she was convinced that, 'it would administer a 
healthy shock to industry'. 53 On the other hand, Bob Rowthom contends that Thatcher 
intentionally increased unemployment in order to 'atomise the working class' .54 
Rowthorn's line of argument is ill-judged, as Lawson had assured Thatcher, in July 
1978, that the Conservatives' economic policies would not increase unemployment, 
and job insecurity also heightened amongst the middle-class.ss In reality, Thatcher 
intended to enable greater numbers of individuals to experience social progression 
through private enterprise, and she viewed job insecurity as a useful device in 
improving efficiency and productivity. 56 
By May 1981 total Scottish unemployment had risen to 288,200, while the UK 
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quota had struck 2.13 million by December 1980. In Strathclyde, unemployment 
reached 15.8% in 1981, whilst Merseyside had the highest unemployment rate in 
Britain at 16.4%.57 Thatcher intensified the outrage at these statistics by altering the 
method of calculating unemployment, to minimise the unemployment figures. 
Throughout the course of her premiership there were twenty-eight changes to the 
method of calculating unemployment. This created the perception that Thatcher did 
not care about the effects of her economic policies, and Campbell asserts that, 'her 
sympathy always seemed to imply a moral failing on the part of the unemployed,.58 
Nevertheless, other western nations experienced similar difficulties, and by 1982 
Britain had an unemployment rate of 9.8%, compared to 9.6% for the EEC, and 9.5% 
in America. 59 
A feature of these economic difficulties was the collapse of many of the 
industries brought to Scotland by regional aid. The Invergordon smelter, and the 
Linwood car plant, were just two of the employers that fell victim to the recession. In 
the case of Linwood, Younger and Joseph offered PSA·Citroen substantial financial 
assistance to continue production in February 1981, only for the French company to 
decline their offer.60 Furthermore, at the Invergordon smelter, Younger won 
Thatcher's approval to offer Alcan a rescue package worth £25 million over five 
years,61 but the smelter's owners rebuffed his offer and the plant closed in December 
1981. Finlay proclaims that, 'The crutches of state intervention were taken away ... and 
no amount of sermons could convince the patients that it was good for them,.62 Yet, 
both of these examples highlight the Government's deviation from its strategy of non-
intervention in the economy. 
Furthermore, when RBS was threatened with takeover by the Standard 
Chartered Bank and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Scottish 
Industry Minister, Alex Fletcher, preserved RBS's Scottish independence by having 
the matter referred to the Monopolies Commission. Fletcher and Younger both agreed 
that Scotland had to retain a strong indigenous financial sector if Scottish businesses 
were to receive the required SUpport.63 The Scottish Office was supported by the 
Trade Secretary, John Biffen, and the takeovers were blocked on the grounds that they 
were against the Scottish public interest. Once again the Scottish Office was at odds 
with Thatcher's economic strategy, mobilising the 'Scottish lobby' (see chapter 1) to 
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frustrate the ambitions of the financial markets, and to defend a symbol of Scottish 
autonomy. 
One of the few areas of Scotland to avoid the worst of the recession was 
Grampian, where the discovery of North Sea oil cushioned the impact of the 
recession. By 1980 the UK was self-sufficient in oil, and by 1983 it was producing 
50% above its requirements.64 Whilst no Scottish companies were involved in the 
highly lucrative oil pumping business, some Scottish-owned firms like the Wood 
Group were highly successful in supplying engineering and drilling expertise to the 
industry. In 1982, the Wood Group's turnover stood at £80 million employing a 
workforce of 2,600.65 Further north, in the Shetland Islands, the SuBorn Voe oil 
terminal was opened by the Island Council in 1981 at a cost of £ 1.2 million. 
By 1983 the number of on and offshore employees in Britain stood at 70,000 
directly, and 20,000 indirectly. The value of oil soared from £5.69 billion in 1979 to 
£14.43 billion in 1982, and by 1981 the UK trade surplus was £6,628 million.66 At the 
CBl's 1980 conference, CBI (Scotland) urged Thatcher to use oil revenues for the 
regeneration of UK industry, but its interventionist pleas were ignored. During the 
first economic phase of Thatcher's premiership, the profits from North Sea oil helped 
to prop up the ailing British economy, preventing Thatcher's economic strategy from 
bankrupting the Exchequer. 
Another area that experienced growth was electronics. By spring 1981 around 
100 electronics companies were located in Scotland, providing about 40% of the 
European microchip business.67 These firms tended to come from outwith Britain, 
and were located in regions such as Fife, and the Lothians. The Conservatives placed 
great emphasis on these new developments, highlighting the electronics industry as an 
example to the rest of the Scottish economy. During the early 1980s, Scotland 
produced 79% of UK, and 21% of western European output of integrated circuits.68 
These enterprises created an entirely new gender division in the Scottish labourforce, 
as women came to be the staple employees of the industry, with wages being little 
more than half their Californian equivalent. 
In the face of economic dislocation and widespread unemployment, the 
Government's response was to portray this as a necessary evil which would lead to a 
healthy, modernised economy. Thatcher was convinced that without undergoing this 
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'major operation', Britain's economy would never be competitive again: 'When the 
wealth-creating conditions in our economy are right, when there is confidence about 
the value of money, when there is a realism in wage bargaining that leaves a 
satisfactory reward for enterprise ... wealth will be created, wealth will be spent, and in 
being spent will provide the jobs' .69 This resolute stance was significantly influenced 
by her scientific outlook on economics,70 leading her to believe that the application of 
the correct formula to the economy would ensure success. 
Thatcher's economic strategy, however, encountered substantial opposition 
from within her own party, and the struggle between the 'Wets' and the 'Dries' 
became a battle of wills (see Introduction). Thatcher filled the key economic positions 
in the Cabinet with supporters of her economic strategy, and a decisive clash took 
place at the 1980 Conservative conference. Amid much public clamour for the 
Government to alter its economic strategy, Thatcher delivered one of the most crucial 
political speeches of her career, uttering the famous words, 'You tum if you want to. 
The Lady's not for turning'.7l In Thatcher's eyes, the debate over economic strategy 
was a direct challenge to her leadership, and she was determined to adhere to her 
chosen course regardless of the consequences. 
Professor Alan Walters, who was a keen monetarist, was appointed as 
Thatcher's chief economic advisor in January 1981,72 and under his direction, she 
followed her conference speech with action in the 1981 Budget. To the astonishment 
of almost every conventional British economist, Howe presented a Budget which 
slashed public spending and raised indirect taxation, thus tightening the money supply 
even further.73 Income tax remained unchanged, but Howe did not raise personal tax 
allowances and thresholds in line with inflation, which implied an increase of £1.9 
billion in income tax. Moreover, excise duties were raised by £2.S billion, a 
supplementary petroleum duty designed to milk North Sea oil profits was introduced, 
and a one-off 'windfall' tax on the booming banking sector was implemented. 74 As 
unemployment reached 2.48 million,7s the Government had made the unprecedented 
decision of placing control of the money supply ahead of counteracting the fall in 
demand. 
The Glasgow Herald proclaimed that, 'The control of inflation must remain 
the principal economic aim of the Government', but the Daily Record described 
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Howe's package as, 'a mean, nasty, petty, small-minded Budget,.76 The sense of 
astonishment that the Budget generated was articulated by 364 distinguished 
economists, who sent a letter of protest to Thatcher. They contended that, 'Present 
policies will deepen the depression, erode the industrial base of our economy and 
threaten its social and political stability,.77 Thatcher, however, swept these protests 
aside: '1 do not greatly care what people say about me ... This is the road I am resolved 
to follow... I ask all who have the spirit... to stand and join with me as we go 
forward' .78 By May 1981 Conservative support in Scotland had dropped to 18%, and 
by October Thatcher was officially the most unpopular Prime Minister ever, 
according to UK-wide opinion polls.79 The 1981 Budget vividly demonstrated 
Thatcher's resolve to continue with her economic strategy, and Campbell identifies it 
as 'The key turning point' so in the fortunes of her first administration. 
Nevertheless, the Government did not strictly adhere to free market 
economics, and intervened to create the preconditions for private sector growth. One 
of its first initiatives, in the 1980 Budget, was to introduce enterprise zones in 
depressed regions. These zones were the brainchild of Howe, and operated free of all 
capital and income taxes, business rates and industrial levies. 81 In Scotland, an 
enterprise zone was allocated to Clydebank and, by May 1983, 120 firms had been 
attracted to the zone.82 Another enterprise zone was established at Invergordon in the 
summer of 1982, as the Government attempted to compensate for the closure of its 
aluminium smelter. Unfortunately the Clydebank development created job 
opportunities for only 1,300 people, in an area that had been devastated by the 
collapse of the shipbuilding industry, and the closure of Singers' sewing machine 
factory.83 CBI (Scotland) was in favour of this Government initiative, but the STUC 
stated that, 'The creation of industrial shanty towns .. .is no way to regenerate our 
economy'. 84 
Another flagship policy actively encouraged inward investment with a view to 
replacing declining heavy industry. Invest in Britain (liB) and Locate in Scotland 
(liS) were established in 1981 to aid this process.85 LiS operated from the offices of 
the SDA, 86 offering financial incentives to foreign companies interested in investing 
in Scotland, while liB provided that function on a UK basis. In 1981/82, thirty-two 
new companies were attracted to Scotland by LiS, creating an estimated 4,500 jobs 
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and securing 3,500 more.87 Furthermore, in 1981, the Loan Guarantee Scheme was 
introduced, which enabled bank loans of up to £75,000 to be made available to 
businesses which were unable to obtain loans under normal banking criteria.88 The 
Government guaranteed 80% of each loan, and in 1981, 1,200 small firms were 
started up in Scotland. However, in 1981, the self-employed only accounted for 2.4% 
of the Scottish workforce, compared to 4.3% in England.89 
The continued existence of the SDA ran contrary to almost all of Thatcher's 
free market beliefs, and it bore a striking resemblance to the NEB. However, the SDA 
remained in place after lobbying by Scottish Office ministers, and it was converted to 
encouraging the growth of private enterprise.90 Once again, the Scottish Office was 
protecting a corporatist institution that was at odds with Thatcher's economic 
rationale, and by 1981,21% of managers and administrators in Scotland were in the 
state sector, compared to 14% in England. This infuriated CBI (Scotland), and in 
November 1980 its Director, John Davidson, argued that, 'Private industry is taking 
the full force of the essential steps to control inflation, while in its own field, the 
Government is flinching from the clear objectives it has set others'. 91 Between 1979 
and 1982, the SDA spent £275 million Therefore, in Scotland, far from breaking with 
the post-war consensus, Thatcher acquiesced at the Scottish Office's request by 
creating and retaining additional layers of bureaucracy and cost. 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party suffering from internal divisions, struggled to 
capitalise on Thatcher's economic difficulties. Labour's solutions were contained in 
its 'Alternative Economic Strategy'. 92 Michael Foot laid out the general principles 
lying behind it in a speech on 19 November 1981, 'Keynesian reflation has proved its 
effectiveness too often to be dismissed by the Government's ignorant and silly 
jibes ... If the Government chooses, it can mobilise the resources of this country to any 
extent it wishes. Remember what we did in the war'. 93 Foot portrayed the image of a 
backward looking Labour Party attempting to apply failed solutions to even more 
chronic economic problems. Labour remained strongly committed to the economic 
objectives of the post-war consensus, and Foot asserted that Britain, 'must return to 
full employment. .. We must replace the demoralisation and despair which stalk the 
country'. Under Foot's leadership, Labour lacked the electoral credibility to 
effectively challenge Thatcher's economic strategy. 
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The first phase of Thatcher's economic restructuring had devastated 
Scotland's economy on a scale not seen since the 1930s (see chapter 1). 
Unemployment engulfed the whole of Britain, and inflation spiralled out of control. 
Thatcher had partially succeeded in displacing the post-war consensus on economic 
management, but she had also acquiesced with the Scottish Office's interventionist 
policies and retained corporatist institutions. The Government's attempts to contain 
public spending and reduce the money supply coincided with the deepest world 
recession since 1945, accelerating the decline of Britain's heavy industries and 
manufacturing sector. Ironically, it was the revenue from North Sea oil which kept the 
economy afloat, and the internal disarray of the Labour Party that enabled Thatcher to 
emerge from this trauma unscathed. Out of this economic turmoil a chance 
development arose in March 1982. There was a storm brewing in the South Atlantic. 
Staying AOoat : The Falklands ConOict and Economic Restructuring, 
March 1982 to June 1987 
The Falkland Islands had been a British colony since 1833.94 Its population was 
almost exclusively British, and wished to remain under British rule. Argentina had a 
long-standing claim on what it called the Malvinas and, after the emergence of a 
military dictatorship in December 1981, it invaded the Falklands on 2 April 1982.95 
Thatcher's response took many by surprise, as between April and May she despatched 
a taskforce to reclaim the Islands. British forces registered a famous victory, and the 
war ended on 14 June 1982.96 The STUC's General Secretary, James Milne, 
contended that, 'If the rights of 1,800 Falkland Islanders are worth spending £3 billion 
on, the rights of 350,000 unemployed Scots are worth some spending on too'. 97 
The Falklands triumph tapped a rich seam of dormant British nationalism that 
Thatcher associated with her efforts to restructure the economy, overturn the post-war 
consensus and restore British 'greatness': 'We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. 
We have instead a newfound confidence - born in the economic battles at home and 
tested and found true 8,000 miles away'.98 Thatcher found herself transformed from 
the most unpopular Prime Minister on record, to a great war leader. In Scotland the 
response to the Falklands' triumph was less jingoistic,99 but only a minority of Scots 
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expressed opposition to the war. This victory marked a turning point for Thatcher, 
and the beginning of her second wave of reforms, which lasted until June 1987. 
An equally important economic event had taken place in March 1982, as 
Howe's fourth budget began to move away from strict monetarist theory.lOO The 
MTFS was downgraded from a four to three year estimation, and its monetary targets 
were no longer regarded as sacrosanct. Interest rates were also cut by half a percent 
from the figure of 13.5%, and Howe reduced the national insurance surcharge that 
required employers to pay additional national insurance contributions.10l This had a 
first year cost to the Treasury of £1 billion 102 Howe also reduced income tax 
modestly by raising personal allowances and thresholds by 14%, rather than the 12% 
needed to compensate for inflation. Moreover, in July 1982, Howe abolished all 
higher purchase controls. This Budget was designed to appeal to core Conservative 
voters, as the world recession began to bottom out, and by May 1983 inflation had 
fallen to 3.7%. It was apparent that Thatcher was beginning to distance herself from 
monetarism as her thoughts turned towards the next general election. 
By the summer of 1982, southern England was showing signs of economic 
recovery,t03 but Scotland, Wales and much of northern England, were not so 
fortunate. Unemployment continued to rise, and the manufacturing sector remained 
heavily depressed. In 1983, for the first time since records began, British 
manufacturing imports exceeded manufacturing exports. 104 A vivid symbol of 
Scotland's industrial decline was the steel industry. Ravenscraig had represented a 
symbol of hope when it was establish~ but by August 1982 its future looked 
increasingly uncertain. 
BSC was intent on reducing its workforce to 43,000,105 and Ravenscraig was 
the least profitable of all Bse's plants. Ravenscraig's iron ore was £10 to £15 per ton 
dearer, partly because of the longer rail haulage distance, and partly because British 
Rail charged BSC twice as much per ton per mile for haulage compared to Llanwem. 
Between July 1979 and September 1982 Ravenscraig's workforce had fallen from 
6,400 to 4,400,106 and BSC contended that half of all overtime at the plant was 
attributable to absenteeism. The EEC also encouraged BSC's rationalisation process 
by imposing restrictions on the steel output of member countries.107 
In August 1982, BSC announced that 360 jobs were to go at Ravenscraig, and 
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it was widely rumoured that the plant's strip mill was designated for closure. The 
STUC, the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC), Scottish Council (D&I), and 
COSLA all campaigned for Ravenscraig's retention. They were joined by the newly 
formed Standing Committee for the Defence of the Scottish Steel Industry 
(SCFDSSI), and the Scottish opposition parties in condemning any attempt to remove 
Scotland's steel-making capacity. The STUC highlighted Ravenscraig's position as 
the largest electricity customer in Scotland, and the plant's financial contribution as 
the largest ratepayer in Strathclyde Region. Furthermore, it warned that between 
10,300 and 13,600 jobs, indirectly linked to Ravenscraig, could be lost if the plant 
closed. The Glasgow Herald asserted that, 'Ravenscraig must be saved', and the 
Daily Record ran the striking headline, 'MISERY OF MRS T' .108 
It was the reaction of the Scottish Conservatives, however, that swung the 
argument in Ravenscraig's favour. Younger privately threatened resignation if the 
plant closed, and Michael Ancram declared that, 'The closure of Ravenscraig 
steelworks .. .is not acceptable to my party .. .I believe Scotland has an industrial future 
but that, and the ability to attract new industry here, depends on having steel-making 
capacity in Scotland' .109 Thatcher, influenced by her close colleagues William 
Whitelaw and Howe, agreed to retain Ravenscraig. 110 Nevertheless, the steel mill's 
low capacity furnaces were badly in need of investment, rendering Ravenscraig's 
reprieve a short-term victory. The retention of Ravenscraig was a political concession 
to the Scottish lobby by Thatcher, who had no economic grounds on which to justify 
her decision. Once again, in a Scottish context, Thatcher was adhering to the 
corporatist consensus that she had pledged to eradicate. 
In spite of continuing economic difficulties and record unemployment, 
Thatcher's post-Falklands popularity was confirmed with a landslide majority at the 
1983 General Election. Labour focused on unemployment, which had risen to three 
million in May 1983, but was unable to overcome its internal divisions, and Thatcher 
became the first post-war Prime Minister to be returned to power after presiding over 
a record increase in unemployment. 
In the wake of her emphatic triumph, Thatcher continued to move away from 
monetarist economics. Howe became Foreign Secretary, and his replacement as 
Chancellor was Lawson. Lawson continued to focus on lowering inflation and public 
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expenditure, and his first budget, in 1984, indirectly reduced income tax. lll However, 
on occasions, the Government's cost cutting programme ran contrary to its goal of 
stimulating private enterprise. In 1984, the Trade and Industry Secretary, Tebbit, 
attempted to merge the American offices of LiS with those of IiB.112 LiS had 
established offices in America in 1982, and Scottish Conservatives were outraged by 
Tebbit's proposal. Scottish Office ministers, with the support of the Scottish lobby, 
successfully campaigned for the retention of the offices. 
This was yet another example of Thatcher abandoning her economic strategy 
to appease the Scottish Office, and between 1981 and 1987, LiS helped to attract 
more than £ 1. 8 billion of investment to Scotland, creating and safeguarding over 
400,000 jobS.113 Tebbit would have been better advised to turn his attention towards 
abolishing the SDA, with its corporatist constitution and substantial budget of £136 
million by 1986. The continuing existence of the SDA guaranteed a strong state 
presence within the Scottish economy, whilst undermining Thatcher's attempts to 
implement free market policies, and reduce public expenditure. 
The Government's streamlining process accelerated in November 1984, 
leading to further changes in the regional aid map and related reductions in the rate of 
grant. 114 A cost-per-job limit was introduced, and grants towards modernisation and 
equipment replacement were abolished. 115 The overall result of this review was a 
30% reduction of the proportion of the British working population benefiting from 
automatic RDGs. These reforms were designed to reduce projected nominal spending 
by a further 40% by 1987/88. 
In Scotland, the regional aid review did not have as sweeping an effect as 
elsewhere in the UK. The percentage of Scotland's working population covered by 
the Assisted Area map fell to 65%, and, as a result of the review, only 50% of the 
working population was entitled to ROO. In 1985/86 Scotland received £41.6 million 
in RSA and £107.5 million from the new ROO scheme.1l6 The severity of these 
cutbacks was cushioned by the fact that Intermediate Areas, and the territory covered 
by the Highlands and Islands Development Board (IDDB) remained eligible for aid 
from the ERDF. Nevertheless, CBI (Scotland) forwarded a resolution at the CBI's 
1985 conference expressing its anger at the Government's reductions in regional aid 
spending. 117 
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The most striking initiative of Thatcher's second term was the acceleration of 
the privatisation programme, which provided sufficient income to continue 
constraining public expenditure whilst delivering income tax cuts. It was also 
intended to expand popular capitalism through share-ownership, and weaken the trade 
unions' collective bargaining power by transferring the heavily unionised nationalised 
industries into private ownership. 1 IS Thatcher saw share-ownership as the ideal 
mechanism for transferring power to the individual, and away from the state. She 
contended that individual shareholders were in a better position to scrutinise the 
efficiency and profitability of these former nationalised industries, as commercial 
decisions relating to their viability were no longer politicised by state-ownership.119 
She also realised that shareholders would have to study the performance of the stock 
exchange and global markets when assessing investment opportunities. Thatcher 
hoped that this would deter them from voting for Labour's programme of state 
intervention and tax increases, which had the potential to disrupt share prices. At the 
1987 General Election, 38% of Conservative supporters had invested in shares, 
compared to 14% of Labour voters. 120 
Thatcher followed Nicholas Ridley's proposals by disposing of the most 
attractive state-owned industries through the sale of shares on the open market (see 
Introduction). British Telecom (BT) in 1984, British Gas (BG) in 1986, and British 
Airways (BA) in 1987 were the most high-profile privatisations of Thatcher's second 
term. Fifty percent of the Government's shareholding in BT was sold for £3.9 billion 
in November 1984, and the entire BG network fetched £5.6 billion in November 
1986.121 Indeed, the Government under-priced the shares in order to expand share-
ownership as widely as possible. l22 BT had almost trebled its pre-tax profits from 
£317 million to £936 million between 1980 and 1982, and BA had turned losses of 
£140 million in 1980 into a yearly profit of £214 million. In effect, the Government 
was losing strong financial assets, while retaining less profitable nationalised 
industries like BSC. By February 1987, 600,000 employees had been transferred to 
the private sector, and around 90% of them bad become shareholders in the 
companies for which they worked. 123 
Shirley Robin Letwin contends that Thatcher intended to increase the financial 
legacies of individuals and families through this policy,124 but the reality of 
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privatisation was very different. The number of individual shareholders in Britain rose 
from three million in 1979 to nine million in 1987, but the overall proportion of 
shares owned by individual shareholders declined over this period.125 A central 
criticism of the privatisation programme focused on its social costs, as it enabled 
individual shareholders to make a profit at the expense of those workers who had 
been made redundant by the Government in its attempts to make these industries 
saleable. This expanded unemployment, failed to reduce public spending, and added 
to state dependency, as the burden of social security payments dramatically increased 
(see chapter 4). 
Opposition to the Government's privatisation programme was not confined to 
other political parties. In November 1985, Harold Macmillan offered a stinging 
rebuke by comparing the Government's strategy with selling the 'family silver' .126 
This voice from the days of consensus fell on deaf ears, but Macmillan's intervention 
emphasised the extent to which Thatcher was deviating from post-war Conservative 
thinking. The privatisation programme sought to reduce economic dependence on the 
state, whilst revitaiising entrepreneurial activity, and Letwin accurately concludes that 
privatisation was about, 'changing both the reality and the perception of the 
relationship between government and the governed'. However, in 1983 only 25% of 
Scots favoured more privatisation compared to the British figure of 44%.127 
A recovery took place in southern England during the second phase of 
Thatcher's reforms, with inflation steady at 5%.128 On a UK-wide basis, however, 
unemployment remained stubbornly hi~ peaking at 3.13 million in the summer of 
1986.129 In July 1986 the number of unemployed workers in Scotland stood at 
358,988.130 Of particular concern was the proportion of the unemployed that was 
constituted by the young. In October 1985, 16% of Scottish males and 24% of females 
out of work were under twenty years of age. Strathclyde was the worst affected region 
of Scotland, with an unemployment rate of 17.8% in 1986.131 Elsewhere, 
unemployment stood at 17.6% in north-east England, and 19.3% on Merseyside. In 
stark contrast, outer London had unemployment levels of 8.5%. The widening of the 
existing North/South divide was one of the defining features of Thatcher's second 
term in office. 
Scotland's industrial decline continued to be reflected by the steel industry. In 
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August 1985 BSC guaranteed Ravenscraig's future for another three years, but 
proposed the closure of Gartcosh cold mill, near Coatbridge, Lanarkshire. 132 Gartcosh 
had been built in 1961 to provide Scotland with an integrated steel-making capacity, 
and it was Ravenscraig's largest single customerY3 BSC contended that Gartcosh was 
the least economic of all its cold mills because of the plant's remoteness from its 
markets. Only 2.8% of Gartcosh's cold-reduced sheet was sold in Scotland, and the 
plant required £20 million of investment if it was to be elevated to the standard of 
BSC's other cold mills. 134 BSC dismissed speculation that Ravenscraig's viability was 
reduced by Gartcosh's closure, despite the fact that Ravenscraig's hot rolled coil 
would have to be transported to Shotton in north Wales. 
A broad-based campaign was launched to save Gartcosh, but without one 
crucial factor; Scottish Conservative support. lain Lawson, Anna McCurley and 
Hector Munro were the lone Scottish Conservative voices to be raised against the 
decision,135 and Lawson defected to the SNP as a result of the closure. The STUC, 
Scottish Council (D&I), COSLA, the SCFDSSI, and the Scottish Churches Council all 
fought to reverse BSC's decision. Furthermore, the Glasgow Herald stated that, 
'Scotland's steel industry has not been murdered but it may have been fatally 
wounded by a cold, calculating blow' .136 In contrast, Thatcher taunted the STUC over 
its protestations: 'I cannot help commenting ... upon the irony that the STUC should be 
setting itself up as the defender of steel-making at Ravenscraig when a year ago 
during the miners' strike (see chapter 3) you were seeking to stop production,.137 The 
plant shut on 31 March 1986. 
According to Mitchell, the closure of Gartcosh strengthened perceptions that 
Thatcher and the Conservatives were anti-Scottish,138 but, in reality, this was one of 
the first times in her premiership that she had publicly dismissed the representations 
of the Scottish lobby. Nevertheless, a myth developed, perpetuated by figures such as 
Jim Sillars of the SNP, that 'Unemployment is deliberate. The policies that create it 
can be just as deliberately undone and replaced by those that will guarantee everyone 
ajob' .139 
Thatcher's lack of compassion towards the unemployed antagonised working-
class Scots, whilst alienating civil society and the middle-class. Since the 1960s many 
middle-class Scots had risen from working-class backgrounds through the pursuit of 
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education (see chapter 4), and they rejected her assertion that private enterprise was 
the best means of generating social progression. These attitudes combined with 
Scotland's greater share of professional public sector employment to unify civil 
society's diverse groupings against Thatcher's economic strategy. In July 1986, the 
STUC and Strathclyde Region decided to establish a Standing Commission on the 
Scottish Economy, comprising representatives of Scotland's local authorities, 
academics, the voluntary sector, industrialists, the media, trade unionists and 
clergy. 140 
Another outcome of the Conservatives' economIc restructuring was the 
takeover of many Scottish-owned firms. In the period between 1985 and 1987, 
external takeovers cut the amount of capital controlled by Scottish-registered 
commercial and industrial companies from £4.67 billion to £2.27 billion. 141 These 
takeovers tended to focus on the most efficient and profitable Scottish companies, as 
those taken over controlled 37% of Scotland's turnover but 49% of its profit income. 
Over this period names synonymous with Scottish capitalism, such as Arthur Bell and 
the House of Fraser all moved outwith Scottish ownership. The overwhelming 
majority of these firms came to be controlled by British or foreign conglomerates 
operating from the City of London. 
Although these companies found it easier to gain access to finance for 
expansion many cut back on their workforces. This process was a direct result of 
Britain's growing integration into the global economy, and the STUC recommended 
the establishment of a Scottish Takeovers Watchdog Body. 142 Thatcher, however, was 
content to allow market forces to prevail, surmising that the further the Scottish 
economy became bound into the international marketplace, the less socialism would 
prosper. This leads Michael Bleaney to conclude that Thatcher's 'perspective is still 
very much that of a structural rejuvenation of British capitalism', and between 1979 
and 1985, the value of overseas assets owned by British companies rose from £12 
billion to almost £90 billion. 143 
As Scotland's heavy industries moved towards extinction the service sector 
expanded. Between 1979 and 1985 the service industries were the only sector of the 
Scottish economy to record steady growth, as 60,000 new jobs were created. 144 
Scotland attracted 16,000 new retail jobs between 1979 and 1985, and over the same 
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period, employment in education, health and other related areas rose by 29,000. 
Banking and finance saw the largest percentage increase, as its workforce expanded 
by 21,000, and the number of self-employed workers also rose by 32,000. 
Furthermore, Scotland's share of public administration jobs remained higher than the 
British average, and part-time employment rose by 76,000 between 1979 and 1985, 
leading to a rise in the female labourforce in Scotland. 145 
This failed to compensate for the huge contraction in Scottish manufacturing, 
which saw Scotland lose 3.9% of its manufacturing jobs between 1981 and 1985, 
compared to the British figure of 2.2%. By 1986, manufacturing employed 412,000 
workers compared to 605,000 in 1979, and the STUC proposed the establishment ofa 
Scottish International Trading Agency to stimulate new export markets. l46 Thatcher 
contended that these job losses had resulted in British manufacturing output rising by 
over 10% between 1983 and 1987, and she highlighted that, by 1987, the self-
employed accounted for 11% of Britain's labourforce. 147 Nevertheless, Finlay states 
that, 'The invisible economy of finance and services was not readily understood by a 
population which had been reared on the notion of a Scotland which paid its way by 
producing ships, engines and the like'.I48 
Electronics continued to flourish in Scotland. By 1983 around 43,000 people 
were employed in the electronics industry, and it accounted for 9.9% of Scottish 
manufacturing employment.149 These companies tended to be foreign multinationals, 
as only 17% of electronics employment was in Scottish-owned companies. Scotland 
became a prime location as it combined access to both UK and European markets 
with low wage costs and high financial incentives for inward investors. Electronics, 
however, suffered a slump between 1985 and 1986 after an expected boom in the 
personal computers market failed to materialise. Yet, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Scottish branches of US-owned multinationals fared better than their 
American bases. 
North Sea oil continued to play an important role in the economy and, by 
1984, revenues from the industry reached over £20 billion. ISO Its significance was 
reduced by economic recovery in southern England, but in Scotland it remained a 
critical source of employment. In Grampian oil developments directly and indirectly 
provided over a quarter of all jobs in the region, and by 1986 it was estimated that 
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40,000 jobs elsewhere in Scotland depended on the indUStry.ISI Consequently, when 
oil prices slumped between 1985 and 1987 there was a serious knock-on effect in the 
north-east of Scotland's economy. In the first quarters of 1985 and 1986 there was a 
162% increase in notified redundancies in Grampian, compared with a drop of 25% 
for the rest of Scotland. Is2 Companies that supplied expertise and equipment to the 
industry were also hit very badly. In August 1986 VIE offshore rig and platfonn yard 
in Clydebank announced that more than half of its core workforce of 350, and most of 
its 870 short-tenn contract workers were being made redundant. 
Meanwhile, European issues continued to trouble Thatcher, and provided the 
most serious c~is of her second tenn. The Westland affair centred on the debate 
between Thatcher, the Trade and Industry Secretary, Leon Brittan, and the Defence 
Secretary, Michael Heseltine, over whether a European consortium or an American 
company should be supported in their bids for Westland pIc, which provided Britain's 
military helicopters. Is3 Westland favoured the American bid, and Brittan accepted the 
company's right to take a commercial decision free of government interference, but 
Heseltine wanted ownership of Westland to stay within EurOpe.IS4 Thatcher agreed 
with Brittan but, in December 1985, Heseltine informed the press that Thatcher had 
not permitted a Cabinet discussion on the matter. Thereafter a series of leaked letters 
appeared, and Heseltine eventually resigned on 6 January 1986. Heseltine contended 
that Thatcher had deliberately ruled out the European option because of her anti-
European views but, on this occasion, his argument had little foundation. Thatcher 
was simply adhering to her belief in non-intervention in private commercial matters, 
and Heseltine was encountering great difficulty in mobilising a credible European 
consortium. In this instance it was Thatcher's single-minded style of government that 
was at fault, not her economic logic. 
The debate over Britain's EEC budget contribution also consumed much of 
Thatcher's energy. A permanent agreement was eventually reached, in June 1984, on 
the grounds that the British rebate would consist of 66% of the difference between 
what Britain paid into the Community and what the Community spent in Britain. 
Scotland received £616 million from the ERDF between 1977 and 1987, accounting 
for around 25% of the British total. 155 Furthermore, in 1986, Scotland obtained £14 
million from the ESF, which was more than any other region in Britain. It was 
84 
apparent that Thatcher had got value for money in Britain's budget rebate, but the 
European grants acted as an impediment to her attempts to reduce dependence on 
public expenditure. 
Buoyed by the success of her confrontational tactics, Thatcher now believed 
that Britain was in a position to play a leading role in the Community, 156 and she 
enthusiastically supported plans for a European single market. In 1986, Britain had a 
trade deficit of £10 billion with the rest of the EEC. 157 To Thatcher the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and people across the EEC was a logical 
extension of her free market restructuring. Yet, she inexplicably failed to anticipate 
the expansion that this would require in the functions and remit of the European 
Commission.15S The new President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was 
also intent on widening the single market to include future monetary union. 
Thatcher failed to foresee this development, and was convinced that she had 
safeguarded British sovereignty by altering a clause in the Treaty of Rome that 
referred to 'irrevocable' monetary and economic union. She replaced this phrase with 
economic and monetary 'cooperation', when the Treaty was re-drafted in December 
1985 to include the Single European ACt. 159 In any case, she believed that Britain 
could opt out of further monetary integration by remaining outwith the ERM. The 
Single European Act reached the statute book in 1986, and a European single market 
was to come into force from 1992. 
Under Neil Kinnock's leadership, Labour dropped its opposition to 
membership of the EEC, scaled down its nationalisation plans, and abandoned its 
pledge to restore Britain to full employment. Labour, however, remained committed 
to public-ownership and state intervention in the economy, and by the 1987 General 
Election, Labour had committed itself to cutting unemployment by one million in two 
years. l60 This reflationary package was to be paid for through government borrowing, 
and by dispensing with income tax cuts. 161 Speaking at the 1987 Scottish 
Conservative conference, Thatcher described this as an 'iceberg manifesto' with 'one-
tenth of its socialism visible, nine-tenths beneath the surface'. 162 
By June 1987, much of Scotland remained to be convinced of the merits of 
Thatcher's economic strategy. The success of the City of London, and the 'Big Bang', 
which deregulated the stock exchange in October 1986, seemed very distant from 
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economic reality in Scotland. This point was heavily emphasised, in January 1987, by 
the closure of the Caterpillar vehicle plant, in Uddingston, Lanarkshire. 163 Thatcher's 
second phase of restructuring had widened the economic divide between northern and 
southern Britain, and had resulted in the continued erosion of Scottish manufacturing 
industry. Electronics, financial services, and the retail industry all witnessed growth, 
but the jobs created in these sectors were not in sufficient abundance to replace those 
lost in manufacturing. Privatisation had marked an acceleration in Thatcher's efforts 
to promote popular capitalism, but the Scottish electorate were reluctant to support 
her economic vision. 
Hutchison states that, 'There was not the surge in consumer- and service-
generated wealth and growth experienced in England ... With lower per capita income, 
spending in the high streets was lower, so service sector job formation, so significant 
in England, was much less pronounced in Scotland' .164 Yet, his otherwise excellent 
analysis overlooks the North/South divide. In reality, Thatcher was exposing all of 
Britain to market forces, and, in the short-term, Scotland, Wales and northern 
England were least best placed to adapt to the demands of the free market. 
Nevertheless, Scotland continued to receive the highest sum of regional aid in the 
UK, and Thatcher made concessions to the Scottish Office through the retention of 
Ravenscraig, and by permitting the continued existence of the SOA and liS's 
overseas offices. The post-war consensus remained more heavily entrenched in 
Scotland than elsewhere in the UK. 
The input of the Scottish lobby, however, was less influential than during 
Thatcher's first term, which created growing resentment amongst civil society. 
Hundreds of thousands of unemployed working-class Scots, many of whom were 
young, were disillusioned by Thatcher's ambivalence towards their plight. Her 
policies were geared towards those individuals who remained in work, contending 
that once the conditions for economic growth, which included the personal attitudes 
of Scots towards enterprise, were in place then recovery would occur. She also 
pointed to the Government's success in reducing the PSBR to £4 billion.16s 
The Conservatives' 1987 General Election manifesto called for an 
acceleration of the Government's economic policies, and a greater injection of market 
forces. The electorate in Scotland, however, remained committed to the economic 
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policies of the post-war consensus, and in 1987, 64% of Scots favoured spending on 
public services, as opposed to 12% who wanted further tax cutS. l66 On election day in 
June 1987, the Daily Record's front page was emblazoned with the message, 'Today 
Scotland votes for its future ... but for the Scots who have no jobs there is no future. 
For them there is no future with Mrs Thatcher' .167 
An Unpredictable Current: Scotland's Changing Economy and the Debate over 
the EMS, June 1987- November 1990 
On 11 June 1987, Scotland gave its verdict on Thatcher's two terms in office, as the 
Scottish Conservatives lost eleven seats. Thatcher triumphed with a comfortable 
British majority, and this result ushered in the final phase of her economic 
restructuring that was to end in November 1990. 
Thatcher's victory had been built upon the economic resurgence that southern 
England experienced prior to the 1987 General Election, and by 1988 British GDP 
was 21% higher than it was in 1979.168 This recovery had been facilitated by a credit 
boom that bore little association with monetarist theory, and the use of credit cards 
became widespread, as the British economy's revival became dependent on consumer 
borrowing and spending. Individual bank: loans trebled in number between 1984 and 
1988, and consumer debt doubled over this period. 169 This contradicted Thatcher's 
moral assertion that, 'you never buy anything you can't afford to buy', and runs 
contrary to Letwin's argument that Thatcher's policies were designed to encourage 
the growth of individual and family savings. 170 
The credit boom was a direct outcome of her income tax cuts, the expansion 
of share-ownership and private sector wage increases (see chapter 3). Yet, there was a 
logic to this process, as individual consumers began to shoulder a greater proportion 
of the burden of debt that previous post-war governments had generated through 
borrowing in order to stimulate economic recovery. Furthermore, individuals who had 
substantial debts to repay were less likely to be in a financial position to engage in 
strike action, which reinforced Thatcher's efforts to castrate the trade union 
movement (see chapter 3). 
Bleaney contends that the Government viewed, 'reflation simply as an 
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abandonment of its strategy'. 171 Yet, the 1987 Budget had reflated the economy with 
over £5 billion,172 which combined with the credit boom, and the over-active housing 
market to create a danger of overheating in the south-east of England's economy. 
One year after the 'Big Bang' in October 1987, the world stock markets crashed. 173 
Nevertheless, Lawson was intent on delivering the Conservatives' manifesto 
commitments, and the 1988 Budget was out of kilter with Britain's economic needs. 
Standard income tax was reduced to twenty-five pence in the pound, and the 
top rate fell to 40%.174 Personal allowances were raised by twice the rate of inflation, 
and corporation tax and inheritance tax were cut. 175 The top one percent of earners 
saw their tax bills reduced by a combined figure of £1,880 million, whereas the 
bottom 70% only gained by a combined total of £1,730 million. 176 Sixty percent of 
the 1988 tax cuts went to south-east England, which reinforced the North/South 
divide. 
The Daily Record attacked the Budget for being, 'SIMPL Y TOO LITTLE', 
and the Scotsman praised the Government's economic progress, whilst challenging 
Lawson to give more help to the poor. 177 Shadow Chancellor, John Smith described 
the Budget as, 'immoral, wrong, foolish, divisive and corrupting', while the SNP MP 
for Banff and Buchan, Alex Salmond, took the unprecedented step of interrupting 
Lawson's speech to label the Budget an 'obscenity' .178 This monetary package did not 
meet Britain's economic requirements. Personal consumption was boosted when the 
economy was already expanding too rapidly, prolonging the post-election boom, but 
storing up serious problems in the long-term. 
Lawson maintains that, 'to move the centre of debate away from how much to 
increase public spending, we had to keep the basic rate of income tax at the centre of 
the political debate,.179 By the spring of 1989 inflation had risen to over 9%:80 as a 
result of increased consumer spending and the buoyant housing market in south-east 
England. This ignition of inflation was partly facilitated by Lawson's insistence on 
tying the pound as closely as possible to the Deutschmark (OM). During 1985, he had 
switched the emphasis of economic policy from control of the money supply to 
stabilising the exchange rate with that of other leading industrial nations. 181 He 
intended that Britain should join the ERM in the near future and, between March 
1987 and March 1988, committed large amounts of Sterling to ensure that the pound 
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kept pace with the DM.182 
Interest rates rose from 7.5% in May 1988 to 15% in September 1989 in order 
to prevent the pound gaining any further strength, but Thatcher refused to 
countenance devaluation. 183 However, most of these increases only took place at half 
a percent each time, blunting their impact on the world's currency markets. Lawson 
had declined to increase interest rates more rapidly, because he wanted Sterling to 
remain in touch with the DM. This strategy combined with Britain's growing balance 
of payments deficit, which reached £ 14 billion in 1988, to undermine the progress 
made during Thatcher's second term. 184 
Privatisation remained a top priority and, in November 1987, Kenneth Clarke, 
the Trade and Industry Secretary, announced plans to sell-off the BSC. In January 
1988 the Government also put forward highly contentious proposals for the 
privatisation of the Scottish Transport Group (STG).185 The STG included the 
Scottish Bus Group, and Caledonian MacBrayne ferries,l86 which operated lifeline 
services for Scotland's island communities. Malcolm Rifkind opted to transfer 
responsibility for Caledonian MacBrayne to the Scottish Office, which involved 
under-writing its annual losses of £6 million. Once again, Thatcher had sanctioned 
Scottish Office intervention that slowed Scotland's transition towards a free market 
economy,187 and many opposition MPs questioned the logic in selling off valuable 
assets at a time when the financial markets were struggling. 
Furthermore, Scotland's electricity industry was privati sed in July 1989.188 
The North of Scotland Hydro Board and the South of Scotland Electricity Board were 
transformed into two vertically integrated companies called Scottish Hydro Electric 
and Scottish Power. A single publicly-owned company, Scottish Nuclear, was made 
responsible for the operation of nuclear power stations.189 In December 1990 the 
National Grid was sold for £5 billion, and Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro Electric 
took over their responsibilities in May 1991. Water privatisation took place south of 
the Border in December 1989, and the Government received £S.l1 billion from this 
sell-otI l90 Speaking in February 1988, Rifkind described the privatisation of 
Scotland's electricity boards and the STG as, 'the largest single boost to Scottish 
private enterprise in the twentieth century' . 191 Yet, in accordance with Scottish Office 
wishes and with Thatcher's compliance, water was to remain a public sector utility in 
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Scotland. Writing in 1991, Allan Massie asserted that, 'native capitalism must be 
imbued with new vigour' .192 
The most controversial privatisation in Scotland involved the £2.5 billion sale 
of BSC in December 1988.193 Prior to BSC's privatisation it had made profits of £ 190 
million for the first six months of 1987/88:94 Ravenscraig's position, however, 
remained precarious and, in November 1987, with privatisation imminent, Rifkind 
sought to clarify Ravenscraig's prospects. The Scottish IndusUy Minister, Ian Lang, 
alleges that Kenneth Clarke and the DTI were determined to shut the steelworks, but 
Rifkind emphasised that he could not accept its closure. 195 On 1 December 1987, at a 
meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee, Rifkind was outvoted by thirteen to one 
over the retention of Ravenscraig, but Thatcher agreed to a compromise. 
BSC guaranteed the continuation of Ravenscraig's strip mill until the end of 
1989, declaring that the plant would remain in operation for up to seven years 'subject 
to market conditions'. 196 Rifkind hailed this as • superb news', but the plant's 
exhausted coke ovens were not granted the £24 million modernisation that they 
required. 197 BSC's appraisal for prospective investors of its current capabilities also 
singled out Ravenscraig as a liability. Ravenscraig had been given a stay of execution 
by Thatcher, but as it entered the private sector the political leverage that the Scottish 
Office and Scottish lobby once possessed largely disappeared. 
In 1987/88, Scotland received £43.2 million in the form of ROO, but ROO 
was abolished as of31 March 1988.198 RSA remained in place, and it was intended to 
absorb any eligible demand for industrial expenditure. Furthermore, the Government 
simplified application procedures for small firms, and introduced new grants to aid 
their modernisation and expansion costs. This review switched the entire emphasis of 
regional aid away from large-scale capital intensive projects, and was designed to cut 
costs while encouraging indigenous entrepreneurship. 
Scotland's lack of private enterprise caused great consternation amongst 
Conservatives during Thatcher's third term. Speaking in Glasgow, in November 1987, 
Lawson identified the existence of a 'culture of dependence' in Scotland, the result of 
excessive public expenditure, which sheltered Scotland from market forces, and was 
responsible for its economic difficulties. l99 Mitchell contends that Lawson's 
comments 'encourage the view that Conservatism, particularly in its Thatcherite 
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form, is anti-Scottish', but writing in 1986, Sillars had derided the 'begging bowl 
mentality' of the Scots, which expressed almost identical sentiments to those of the 
Chancellor in a Nationalist context.2OO Nevertheless, Lawson's comments ran the risk 
of appearing anti-Scottish, which did little to improve the Scottish Conservatives' 
electoral prospects. 
Yet, the Barnett formula remained in place (see chapter 1). According to 
Rifkind, Thatcher was irritated by Scotland's spending requirements, but he advised 
her that it would be impossible to bring public expenditure down to English levels 
without severe cuts, which would result in serious short-term hardship.201 Thatcher 
accepted Rifkind's analysis and the Barnett formula was retained. This illustrates 
Thatcher's continuing willingness to accept the wisdom of the Scottish Office, and 
demonstrates that her economic strategy was not intentionally anti-Scottish. 
Scotland's economy began to recover in the final phase of Thatcher's 
premiership, and unemployment gradually fell. Between January 1987 and November 
1988 Scotland's unemployment rate dropped from 15.5% to 10.6%.202 Northern 
England experienced a more limited economic revival, and between January 1987 and 
November 1988 it saw unemployment drop from 16.4% to 11.1%. Nevertheless, 
unemployment in Scotland and northern England remained well above the UK 
average of 7.3% and, by November 1988, south-east England's unemployment rate 
was as low as 4.6%. 
An influential factor in reducing unemployment was the work of LiS, which 
attracted £800 million of investment to Scotland between 1987 and 1989.203 
Nevertheless, Scotland lagged behind other parts of the UK, such as Wales, in its 
ability to attract inward investment. Scotland's enterprise zones continued to operate, 
and in the period after 1982, two additional zones were established in Tayside, in 
1984, and in Inverclyde, in 1989.204 By December 1988 total employment in 
Scotland's enterprise zones stood at 8,300, which represented 8.5% of the British 
figure. The Government devoted £472 million to enterprise zones between 1981 and 
1988, and spent an additional £188 million on infrastructure. This was a more cost-
efficient method of creating employment in depressed areas than regional aid, 
encapsulating the Government's shift in emphasis from direct job creation to the 
stimulation of private enterprise. 
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There was no recovery in Scottish manufacturing industry,20s but service 
employment expanded to embrace the growth in consumer spending. By 1989, 
Scotland's service sector provided jobs for around 1.3 million workers, which was 
equivalent to 68% of total Scottish employment, and financial and business services 
employed a workforce of 176,000.206 Furthermore, by 1990, the Scottish tourist 
industry employed 185,000 people, and generated an estimated income of £1.8 
billion. 207 
Electronics remained the most successful component of Scotland's economy, 
and in 1989 Silicon Glen assembled 35% of Europe's personal computers, 25% of the 
world's autotellers and 12% of semi-conductors. The oil industry also stabilised after 
1988 and, by 1990, employment in companies wholly related to North Sea oil 
exploration in Scotland stood at 64,000,208 and oil related sales comprised 6% of 
Scottish manufacturing gross output in 1989. Nevertheless, this did not improve the 
electoral popularity of the Scottish Conservatives, or Britain's balance of payments 
deficit, which increased to £23 billion in 1989.209 
Civil society's disillusionment with Thatcher's economic policies was 
expressed by the Standing Commission on the Scottish Economy, which continued to 
espouse the economic policies of the post-war consensus. It blamed the 
Conservatives', 'polarised "market versus intervention" view of industrial policy' for 
undermining the strength of both the Scottish and the British economy.2IO This broad-
based consensus against the Government's economic strategy highlighted civil 
society's growing unease, and contradicts Gamble's assertion that, 'no effective 
alternative was canvassed' .211 On the contrary, the activities of the Standing 
Commission provided a uniquely coordinated alternative to Thatcher's policies, 
which her opponents elsewhere in Britain failed to replicate. 
At the forefront of the Conservatives' plans to reinvigorate Scottish capitalism 
was an entirely new body, Scottish Enterprise, the impetus for which had not corne 
from the Scottish Office, but from Bill Hughes, the chairman of CBI (Scotland).212 
Impatient with the level of resistance to her policies in Scotland, Thatcher had 
concluded that the SOA was a barrier to the success of her economic strategy. Hughes 
was, however, convinced that the SDA had to be replaced with a Scottish body 
possessing interventionist powers, and embracing Thatcher's enthusiasm for private 
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enterprise. 
In October 1987 he produced a compromise solution by proposing the 
replacement of the SDA, with a new agency that still required direction from within 
Scotland. Scottish Enterprise was to incorporate training, economic and 
environmental functions, and was to be accountable to the Scottish Office.213 In 
contrast to the SDA, Scottish Enterprise was to operate through local enterprise 
companies run by businessmen, which Hughes contended would increase its 
sensitivity to the movements in Scotland's economy. LiS was to be transferred from 
the SDA to Scottish Enterprise, and the IDDB was to become Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise. 
It was agreed that Hughes should put forward his ideas to Thatcher on behalf 
of CBI (Scotland) with Rifkind, given his uncomfortable relationship with her, 
playing a supporting role.214 AIf Young was contacted, and he was impressed enough 
with Hughes' vision to run a favourable article in the Herald. Hughes' proposals were 
favourably received at a meeting at Chequers, and in December 1988 the plans for 
Scottish Enterprise were presented in a White Paper. In July 1989, Hughes was 
appointed as Deputy Chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party. The STUC gave 
guarded support to the creation of Scottish Enterprise, but when Scottish businesses 
were surveyed, in March 1990, only 12% believed that Scottish Enterprise would 
bring 'much improvement' to business proSpects.2lS The new bodies took over their 
responsibilities on 1 April 1991. 
The creation of Scottish Enterprise represented a success for the corporatism, 
and pragmatism of the Scottish lobby. Hughes recognised that Thatcher was 
determined to abolish the SDA, but he convinced her to establish Scottish Enterprise 
by emphasising his personal business credentials, and by couching his proposal in the 
language of the free market. In effect, Thatcher bad agreed to the establishment of 
another high spending government agency, which had limited support amongst 
Scottish business. There was no equivalent organisation in England, and its only 
genuine concessions to Thatcher's economic strategy were its emphasis on private 
enterprise, and the involvement of local business people. Douglas Mason despaired 
that Scottish Enterprise, 'appears to be as firmly wedded as its predecessors to the 
notion that entrepreneurial spirit springs from a filing cabinet'. 216 
93 
The defining issue of Thatcher's third term in office was the debate over 
Britain's role in Europe. In July 1988, Delors called for 'the beginnings of European 
government', and he predicted that, within a decade, 80% of laws affecting the 
economy and social policy would be passed at a European and not a nationalleve1.217 
Thatcher was appalled, and in a speech in Bruges, in September 1988, she offered 
him a stinging rebuke, 'We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state 
in Britain ... only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-
state exercising a new dominance from Brussels' .218 Intent on delivering his version 
of Europe, regardless of Thatcher's opposition, he published the Delors Plan in spring 
1989, which set out his vision of European economic and monetary union. Delors 
envisaged this taking place in three stages, the first of which involved all member 
states joining the ERM.219 
In Scotland, the Nationalists supported independence within the EEC. Sillars 
contended that, 'With an independent Scotland within the Community, the charge of 
separatism disappears', and he concluded that independence could not be achieved 
outwith the EEC.22o Scotland benefited from generous European grants throughout 
Thatcher's premiership and, in 1988, Campbell Christie ensured that the STUC's 
Congress defeated a motion attacking the Single European Act. 221 After 1987 the 
Scottish political establishment turned its attention to Europe as an alternative source 
of political influence and public finance. The arguments of the Scottish lobby were 
productive in Brussels, in contrast to its increasing exclusion from economic decision-
making in Britain. 
Thatcher's conflict with the European Commission was complicated by 
divisions in the Cabinet, as Lawson and Howe emphasised that Britain could not 
simply opt out from the integration process. They proposed that Thatcher gave a 'non-
legally binding' undertaking to enter the ERM by the end of 1992.222 Furious with 
indignation she only consented after Lawson and Howe threatened to resign. 
Moreover, the Madrid summit, in June 1989, produced another concern for Thatcher, 
as plans for a European Social Charter were announced. This 'socialist charter' was to 
include provisions such as a European minimum wage, which ran contrary to 
Thatcher's belief in a liberalised labour market 223 In July 1989 she replaced Howe 
with the relatively unknown Treasury minister, John Major, in order to reassert her 
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authority over the Cabinet. 224 
Yet, the disagreements with Lawson over economic policy remained. This 
tension had been heightened by the reappearance of Thatcher's chief economic 
advisor, Alan Walters, in July 1989.225 He ratcheted up tension over Europe by 
publicly criticising Lawson's approach to the ERM and interest rates. This 
undennined Lawson's position as Chancellor, and events climaxed in the autumn of 
1989 after Walters published an article criticising exchange rate management and the 
EMS. In October Lawson resigned, citing Thatcher's method of running the 
Government through policy advisors as his main reason.226 Lawson was replaced by 
Major, on the assumption that he was opposed to entering the ERM,227 and the Home 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, was promoted to Foreign Secretary. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 further unsettled Thatcher's 
Cold War inspired attachment to the EEC, and she asserted that this development 
accelerated moves towards a federal Europe.228 The European issue was now splitting 
the party.229 Unknown to Thatcher, during his short period as Foreign Secretary, 
Major had been converted to support the EMS.230 By April 1990, both Major and 
Hurd were strongly convinced of the merits of the ERM. 
Yet in Scotland, Ravenscraig remained at the centre of political debate. After 
privatisation the plant operated to the best of its abilities, and its productivity levels 
consistently outperfonned those of Llanwem,231 but its decrepit infrastructure 
prevented it from becoming commercially viable. British Steel pic (BS) had only 
guaranteed the continuation of Ravenscraig's hot strip mill until the end of 1989, and 
the plant's 3,200 strong workforce were given an extended Christmas break, as the 
order book was rundown.232 Furthennore, Llanwem began a conversion process to 
enable it to handle Ravenscraig's workload.233 In May 1990 the Chairman of BS, 
Robert Scholey, announced the impending closure of the hot strip mill in the first half 
of 1991.234 
Rifkind questioned the commercial strategy behind the closure, and called for 
a campaign to force BS into a U_turn.235 The Trade and Industry Secretary, Nicholas 
Ridley, was furious at Rifkind's intervention, and the London Evening Standard ran a 
lead article, branding Scots as the 'subsidy junkies' of the UK, under the headline, 
'Ravenscmig Must Close'. 236 Nevertheless, the Scottish lobby mobilised, once again, 
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to campaign for the retention of Ravenscraig. The most adventurous of its ploys was 
to attempt to get Sir Kenneth Alexander, a left-wing academic, elected onto the board 
of BS in July 1990.237 Alexander was defeated, but he secured twenty million votes 
for his nomination. The SCFDSSI lobbied the European Parliament for support, while 
Campbell Christie contended that BS's decision contravened EEC competition policy, 
and conflicted with the its objective of increasing steel specialisation. Another 
economic argument focused on Britain's growing balance of payments difficulties, 
and it was contested that the loss of Ravens craig's manufacturing capacity could only 
deepen this problem. 
On 20 October a rally was held in Motherwell, at which Gordon Brown, Alex 
Salmond, Bishop Joseph Devine, and the Rev. Norman Shanks all spoke in defence of 
Ravenscraig.238 Salmond's presence caused significant tension, because of the SNP's 
decision not to cooperate with the wider campaign. The Nationalists had their own 
political agenda, as they called for Labour to support Ravenscraig's case over those of 
the English and Welsh plants, in the knowledge that Labour as a British party could 
not possibly do SO.239 As if to highlight the SNP's narrow outlook, steelworkers from 
Teeside, Sheffield, Rotherham and the West Midlands attended to show their 
solidarity with Ravenscraig's cause.24O The hot strip mill closed in April 1991, and the 
plant ceased operation in June 1992. The decision to locate Ravenscraig in 
Motherwell had been devoid of market-based commercial logic, and after the plant's 
privatisation its closure was inevitable. 
Yet, there was a dimension to this process that eluded Thatcher. By criticising 
and disposing of British nationalised industries, Thatcher was unintentionally 
weakening the ties of the post-war Union. Employment in state-owned industries had 
helped to justify Scotland's allegiance to the British state. This evaporated as a result 
of the privatisation programme, and many Scots began to question their British 
identity as the British state increasingly withdrew from Scotland's industrial 
landscape. Between 1979 and 1992, the percentage of Scots favouring more 
privatisation fell from 34% to 18%, and the percentage who supported further 
nationalisation increased from 24% to 27%.241 Thatcher failed to appreciate that if 
Scotland was to rely on private enterprise, with minimal financial support from the 
Exchequer, then it had little reason to remain part of the UK. 
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Labour capitalised on the Conservatives' difficulties, and Kinnock attacked 
the Conservatives' in-fighting over the ERM. Aided by Gordon Brown, Smith drew 
up a set of policies geared towards 'Economic Equality' .242 Labour pledged to 
introduce a national minimum wage, and to set income tax at fifty pence in the pound 
for the wealthy.243 Perhaps the most striking conversion came over the party's 
European stance, as Labour favoured entry to the ERM, and was intrigued by the 
opportunities offered by the Social Charter. 244 
While Labour grew in confidence, European issues were threatening to 
combine with difficulties over the poll tax (see chapter 5) to destroy Thatcher's third 
term. Thatcher's only remaining ally in the Cabinet, Ridley, was forced to resign in 
mid-July 1990, after a tactless outburst against the Germans in an interview with the 
Spectator on European monetary developments. 24s After Ridley's departure the 
debate over entry to the ERM accelerated towards a decisive conclusion. Thatcher, 
devoid of Cabinet allies and dependent on the success of her inexperienced 
Chancellor, bowed to his decision to alter requirements for entry to the ERM. Major 
stated that inflation only had to show indications that it would reach German and 
French levels,246 and Britain joined the ERM on 5 October 1990. 
By this stage inflation stood at 10.9%, which was well above the EEC average 
of 5.5%, and interest rates were as high as 14%. Thatcher insisted that Britain entered 
the widest band of the ERM, in order to retain a degree of flexibility, but this was a 
small concession.247 European integration was gathering pace and, in Rome, at the 
end of October attempts were made to embark on the second stage of the Delors Plan. 
This led to a commitment to permanently fixing exchange rates by January 1994, but 
no concrete plans for a single currency. Nevertheless, Delors predicted that a single 
currency would be in operation by the year 2000, and Thatcher's opposition to his 
federalist ambitions was summarised by the famous line, 'No.No.No'.248 Entry to the 
ERM had done little to weaken Thatcher's Euro-sceptic stance, but it proved to be the 
final act of her economic restructuring. 
Back on Course? An Overview of Thatcher's Economic Restructuring 
in Scotland 
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As Thatcher departed Downing Street for the final time she could reflect that the post-
war consensus on economic management had been irreparably ruptured. The pursuit 
of full employment was no longer a political or economic priority, and direct state 
subsidies to industry had been jettisoned. Thatcher had streamlined regional aid, and 
pursued fiscal policies that were intended to stimulate private enterprise. In Scotland, 
her economic strategy had led to a decline in manufacturing industry, and greatly 
increased levels of unemployment. A similar process occurred in northern England, 
which widened the existing economic divide between northern and southern Britain. 
Much of Scotland's heavy manufacturing industry had been in a process of 
long-term decline, and it was inevitable that these industries would continue to 
contract. Thatcher's management of this process provoked most criticism, as her 
abortive attempts to control the money supply through large interest rate increases and 
public expenditure cuts accelerated the decline of this sector. Ironically, Thatcher 
used the receipts from North Sea oil to support the British economy during this 
transitional phase. After 1987, Scotland's economy began to adapt to this 
realignment. By 1990 unemployment had fallen to 7.8%, and in northern England this 
percentage stood at 8.8%, but in south-east England only 4.4% of workers were 
jobless.249 Scotland's economy became geared towards retail, tourism, financial 
services, electronics and oil, but these industries failed to fully replace the jobs lost in 
manufacturing. 
The entire economy became increasingly reliant on consumer borrowing and 
spending to generate growth, which aided the expansion of the retail and financial 
services' sectors. This was a direct contradiction of the monetarist doctrine that 
Thatcher had briefly implemented during her first term, and conflicted with her 
personal belief in the moral importance of financial responsibility. Nevertheless, by 
pursuing this strategy, Thatcher was able to place less emphasis on demand 
management, as she continued to cut income tax, and contained public spending at 
39.5% ofGDP.250 Between 1979/80 and 1988/89 the PSBR fell from 4.8% ofGDP to 
-3% of GDP,2S1 but overall taxation demands rose, as Thatcher switched from direct 
to indirect taxation. The use of indirect taxation had a disproportionate effect on the 
unemployed and low paid, and between 1979 and 1986 the share of income received 
by the wealthiest 20% of the population rose from 38% to 42%, whereas the poorest 
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20% experienced a cut from 7.1% to 6.3%.252 
Furthermore, the amount of outstanding consumer debt trebled from just under 
£16 billion in December 1982 to £46.9 billion in December 1989. Overall living 
standards in Scotland increased by 30% between 1981 and 1989,253 but these gains 
were not applicable to the unemployed and low paid, and Thatcher took the 
unprecedented decision to focus her policies on those who remained in work. The 
decline of manufacturing industry created an entirely new problem, as Britain 
developed a substantial balance of payments deficit. Trade in manufactures swung 
from a £5 billion surplus in 1978 to a £5.4 billion deficit in 1986.254 It was more 
challenging to export services than manufactured goods, and one advantage of the 
European single market was that it enabled financial services to be utilised throughout 
Europe. 
The expansIon of share-ownership through the privatisation programme 
encapsulated Thatcher's departure from post-war economic management. Thatcher 
portrayed privatisation as a form of economic emancipation, empowering the 
individual to exercise choice within the marketplace, but the Scottish electorate was 
considerably less enthusiastic than voters elsewhere in Britain. The proportion of 
shares held by individual shareholders declined throughout Thatcher's premiership, 
and many individuals used the Government's share flotations as, 'a one-way option to 
make a profit' .255 There were also social costs to this process, as the streamlining of 
nationalised industries and services prior to their sale resulted in job losses. 
Moreover, as Thatcher disposed of state-run industries, Scotland became more reliant 
on inward investment, and by the end of Thatcher's premiership around 70% of 
Scotland's industrial sector was controlled outwith Scotland 256 
Between 1987 and 1989, inward investment in Britain rose from £9.4 billion 
to £18.6 billion, by which time, it accounted for 4% ofGDP.2S7 Commercial decisions 
were increasingly taken outwith Scotland and the UK, but Thatcher was unconcerned 
by this process, as the City of London thrived in its role as a centre of global finance. 
The takeover of Scotland's leading companies by foreign conglomerates created 
resentment in Scotland, and did little to promote the free market. This contradicted 
Thatcher's argument that the removal of state subsidies and the sale of nationalised 
industries would create investment opportunities for British businesses, and between 
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1979 and 1985, private companies located in Britain shifted £50 billion of production 
and capital overseas. 258 
The only arena in which Thatcher sought to challenge global economic 
developments was within the EEC. Even on this front, she was opposed to European 
monetary and financial integration, because she believed that it would impede the 
successful operation of a competitive free market by infringing on the economic 
sovereignty of member states. There is little doubt that Thatcher felt uncomfortable 
with the growing power of the EEC, but she strongly endorsed the economic benefits 
of the European single market. Thatcher seriously misjudged the long-term 
implications of the Single European Act, as she operated on the assumption that she 
could veto any European developments that she disapproved of. Therefore, Britain's 
membership of the EEC and the pursuit of inward investment combined with 
Thatcher's domestic reforms to greatly increase Scotland's dependence on global 
capital. Gamble accurately concludes that, 'The British economic space lost any 
coherence it still possessed as a national economic space during the Thatcher 
decade' .259 
In Scotland, however, the popular perception emerged that the Government's 
policies were anti-Scottish. This was largely as a result of Scotland's unemployment 
rate, which averaged 11.6% between 1979 and 1988,260 but this argument represented 
a fundamental misunderstanding of Thatcher's economic strategy. Manufacturing 
employment fell by 33% over the course of Thatcher's premiership,261 but the 
depressed regions of northern England also experienced severe economic hardship, 
and received less public expenditure than Scotland. In effect, all peripheral regions of 
Britain that had been previously sheltered from market forces by regional aid and 
state-run industries, were at a short-term disadvantage, as their poor infrastructure, 
high levels of unemployment and low populations inhibited the growth of consumer-
orientated employment. 
Nevertheless, Thatcher did not pursue a radical programme of spending cuts 
and closures in Scotland, and during Younger's time as Scottish SecretaIy, she 
continued to offer government subsidies to industry. Younger's conciliatory style, and 
connections with civil society combined with the Cabinet support of Howe and 
Whitelaw to ensure that Scotland's circumstances were taken into account. The 
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pivotal phase of Thatcher's restructuring in Scotland was her second term in office. 
Younger's influence waned during this period, and he refused to support the retention 
of Gartcosh. Negative Scottish perceptions of Thatcher became entrenched, as 
Scotland's economy continued to decline and unemployment rose, whilst southern 
England witnessed a recovery. 
After 1987, the insensitive comments of the Chancellor and English 
backbench MPs, who criticised public expenditure in Scotland, added to Ritkind's 
difficulties. Ritkind was given the responsibility for privatising electricity and bus 
transport in Scotland, which Younger had avoided, and he was also under greater 
scrutiny from Thatcher after the 1987 General Election. Nevertheless, Ritkind 
safeguarded the Barnett formula, established Scottish Enterprise, expressed public 
outrage at Caterpillar's decision to leave Uddingston, and prevented the closure of 
Ravenscraig in 1988. Yet, Thatcher's harsh rhetoric, which Letwin believes was 
intended to stimulate 'the vigorous virtues' (see Introduction), had little appeal in 
Scotland and did not correspond with all of her actions. 
The 'dependency culture' argument exaggerated Scotland's economic 
weakness, as it failed to take into account Scotland's contribution to the Treasury in 
the form of North Sea oil revenues. Thatcher's poliCies in her first term would have 
bankrupted the Exchequer without the receipts from North Sea oil, and if North Sea 
oil was added to Scottish GOP in the 1980s it would have reduced Scotland's public 
spending deficit from around 9% ofGDP to 1.8% by 1989/90.262 The number of self-
employed workers in Scotland also increased from 146,000 in 1979 to 221,000 in 
1989,263 but this was not on the same scale as in southern England. Another trend was 
the contraction in Scottish capitalism, which was accelerated by external takeovers 
and inward investment In the past Scottish industrialists had formed a pivotal 
component of civil society, but as their numbers dwindled so did their influence 
within civil society. 
Indeed, the Scottish Conservatives' unpopularity prompted Massie to pose the 
question, 'Can Scotland be cured of socialism?,264 Yet, his assumption that Scotland 
was a socialist nation displays a fundamental misunderstanding of Scottish society. 
The central difference between Scotland and other depressed regions of Britain was 
that it possessed a civil society with the power to express its economic grievances. 
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Since 1945, education had been increasingly used as a means of social and economic 
advancement in Scotland, rather than private enterprise (see chapter 4), and this made 
significant sections of the Scottish middle-class and civil society hostile to Thatcher's 
economic strategy. Civil society was directly affected by her public sector spending 
cuts, and the restrictions that Thatcher imposed on public sector employment 
opportunities. Heightened job insecurity also affected the Scottish middle-class and, 
'Sleepless nights cost votes'. 265 Privatisation was unpopular, as it tended to result in 
job losses, which had a disproportionate effect in Scotland because of its greater 
reliance on public sector employment. 
The Scottish lobby continued to exercise influence during the initial phase of 
Thatcher's restructuring, but thereafter its influence gradually waned. This 
undermined the mechanisms of the post-war Union, which had enabled Scotland to 
successfully lobby Westminster for additional public spending and employment 
opportunities. Therefore, some observers, such as Massie, conclude that Scotland was 
socialist, but, in reality, Scottish civil society had embraced the post-war consensus to 
a greater extent than the English establishment. 
Thatcher permitted the Scottish Office to operate according to a separate 
economic timetable, which prolonged the longevity of post-war economic 
management in Scotland, but in the long-term she believed that Scotland's economic 
needs were indistinguishable from those of the UK. Nevertheless, Thatcher failed to 
appreciate that Scotland had entered the Union because of its perceived economic 
benefits. Her attack on the post-war consensus denied civil society positions of 
economic influence, which weakened the economic ties that justified Scotland's 
allegiance to the British unitary state. 
The Scottish middle-class and civil society's disillusionment combined with 
working-class alienation over mass unemployment to create a Scottish consensus that 
opposed Thatcher's economic strategy. The recovery that occurred in Scotland, after 
1987, failed to alter attitudes because of other political developments, such as the 
implementation of the poll tax and the campaign for devolution, which served to 
highlight the differences between the English and Scottish electorate (see chapter 6). 
Indeed, civil society's growing attraction towards devolution can be partially 
attributed to a desire to create an institution that could shelter Scotland from the 
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effects of Thatcher's economic strategy, whilst ensuring that Scotland maintained its 
public expenditure advantage by remaining within the UK. A similar strain of logic 
can be applied to civil society's increasingly positive attitude towards the EEC, as 
European grants proved a welcome source of subsidy in the face of Thatcher's 
reductions in regional aid. 
When questioned in April 1989, 71 % of Scots stated that they would prefer to 
live in, 'a country in which public interests and a more managed economy are more 
important', compared with 21% who saw as their ideal, 'a country in which private 
interests and a free market economy are more important'. 266 This contradicts Michael 
Forsyth's assertion that one of Thatcher's greatest achievements was to 'change the 
way people thought' ,267 and illustrates the extent to which she had failed to alter 
economic thinking in Scotland. Civil society and the vast majority of Scots remained 
attached to state intervention and public spending as it had a proven track record of 
ensuring Scotland's economic and social well-being within the UK. 
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Chapter Three 
SLAYING THE DRAGON: THE ONSLAUGHT ON THE SCOTTISH TRADE 
UNION MOVEMENT 
In her inaugural conference address as Conservative Party leader in 1975, Margaret 
Thatcher challenged the consensus on industrial relations, 'If we are told that a 
Conservative Government could not govern because certain extreme leaders would 
not let it, then general elections are a mockery, we have arrived at the one-party state 
and parliamentary democracy in this country will have perished'. 1 Thatcher's assault 
on the power of the trade union movement was a feature of her attempts to dismantle 
the post-war consensus. This chapter analyses Thatcher's industrial relations reforms, 
and their impact on the trade union movement in Scotland. The Scottish dimension of 
the 1984/85 miners' strike is examined, whilst the STUC and its response to 
Thatcher's reforms fonns an integral part of this section. Owing to the British nature 
of the trade union movement, this chapter will also include analysis of events south of 
the Border. 
The trade union movement has been largely neglected by Scottish historians in 
their analysis of the Thatcher years. Hamish Fraser covers the Thatcher years from a 
British perspective, but fails to illuminate Scottish developments. 2 The most 
comprehensive coverage, at the time of writing, can be found in Keith Aitken's 
history of the STUC, The Bairns 0' Adam (1997), which interlinks political 
developments with the fortunes and influence of the STUC during Thatcher's 
premiership. It also provides excellent coverage of the 1984/85 miners' strike in 
Scotland. While John Foster and Charles Woolf son have focused on individual 
disputes, neither has attempted a broad overview of Scottish industrial relations 
during the Thatcher years. Gregor Gall has examined trade unionism in Scotland since 
the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' work-in, and concludes that, 'trade unionism and 
industrial relations in Scotland are part of wider phenomena and processes found 
elsewhere and throughout Britain'. 3 
Nevertheless, Michael Fry fails to comment on Thatcher's trade union reforms 
or the miners' strike, and Christopher Harvie and James Mitchell do not examine 
Thatcher's industrial relations policies in any depth.4 lain Hutchison correctly asserts 
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that, 'The STUC carefully kept links with other elements in Scottish public life, so 
retaining esteem', whilst Richard Finlay states, 'There was a growing sense among 
many Scottish trade unionists and activists that the English working class had sold the 
pass' .5 
Writing in Industrial Nation (1999), William Knox analyses the changing 
composition of trade unionism in post-war Scotland, which includes developments 
during the Thatcher years. Knox asserts that, 'Mass unemployment and anti-union 
legislation' were Thatcher's 'chosen weapons' in her attempt to break the trade 
unions and reduce inflation.6 This implies that Thatcher intentionally sought to 
increase the number of unemployed workers, and his analysis overlooks the impact of 
the worldwide recession between 1979 and 1981. Any government during this period 
would have experienced an economic downturn and rising unemployment unless it 
resorted to heavily subsidising industry. This would have created inflationary 
pressure, which Thatcher had pledged to reduce, and would have damaged her 
credibility in the City of London and amongst Conservative voters, who expected an 
acceleration of Labour's reluctant monetarism. 7 Knox also fails to stress the political 
importance of the 'winter of discontent', which created favourable preconditions for 
trade union reform. 
An 'estate of the realm,8: The Trade Unions, 1968-1979 
The post-war consensus on industrial relations was based on free collective 
bargaining between unions and employers.9 In 1968 the Donovan Commission 
endorsed the continuation of free collective bargaining, but Labour's 1969 White 
Paper, In Place of Strife, proposed the introduction of ballots, and a compulsory 
conciliation period of twenty-eight days before strike action could be called.10 These 
proposals, however, were jettisoned after a Trades Union Congress (TUC) revolt. 
Thereafter, the number of working days lost to strike action in Britain rose from 
6,846,000 in 1969 to 29,474,000 in 1979, leading journalists and economists to label 
militant trade unionism as the 'British disease' .11 
The defeat of the Heath administration in 1974, as a direct result of his 
attempts to restrict trade union powers through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and 
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contain public sector wage costs, was a disturbing experience for most 
Conservatives.12 Heath was forced to declare a state of emergency five times between 
1970 and 1974,13 which created the perception that the unions represented a threat to 
the British state. Furthermore, James Callaghan's Labour Government was fatally 
damaged by the 'winter of discontent' (see chapter 1). Many powerful figures within 
the Conservative Party, such as Sir Ian Gilmour, believed that a sustained programme 
of anti-union legislation could not be undertaken without the unions bringing Britain 
to a standstill.14 
Nevertheless, Thatcher was determined to curb inflation and to embark upon a 
monetarist economic strategy. Net profit rates in British manufacturing industry had 
fallen from 14% in 1964 to 4.8% in 1979,15 convincing Thatcher that trade union 
wage demands were squeezing profit margins. She argued that if profit rates fell, 
businesses would either close or cut their workforces, and insisted that collective 
bargaining should be determined by productivity and profit levels. 16 While in 
opposition, the Conservatives called for public sector pay bargaining to correspond 
with market conditions. 17 
Thatcher also pledged to jettison Labour's incomes policy, which required 
close cooperation between the government, trade unions and employers. IS In 
Thatcher's eyes, incomes policies represented an impediment to the successful 
operation of a free market economy, and this analysis was closely linked to the 
Conservatives' decision to abandon any commitment to full employment (see chapter 
2). At the heart of Thatcher's outlook lay a desire to re-assert the sovereignty of 
Parliament, and to exclude the unions from government decision-making. The 
Conservatives' trade union strategy was enshrined in The Stepping Stones Programme 
(see Introduction), which represented a rejection of corporatism, and voluntary trade 
union regulation. Thatcher believed that this would cure the 'British disease' and help 
restore Britain to its former position as a leading economic power. Campbell Christie, 
however, remains convinced that Thatcher did not have a pre-conceived strategy for 
tackling the trade union movement. 19 
Wielding the Sword: The First Steps of Reform, 1979-1984 
On entering office Thatcher entrusted James Prior, a renowned 'wet', with the 
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Employment brief, because of his conciliatory nature.20 The Conservatives contended 
that the trade unions had been infiltrated by left-wing extremists, who used strike 
action as a political weapon to further the aims of socialism. Prior portrayed the 
Government's intentions as an attempt to introduce greater democracy to the trade 
unions, and make them more accountable to their memberships. 21 At the 1979 
General Election the number of British trade unionists who voted Conservative rose 
from 17.1% in October 1974 to 27.1 %, and union democracy was judged to be a 
popular issue amongst trade union members.22 During Prior's tenure as Employment 
Secretary Thatcher was able to consolidate her government's position without 
encountering a backlash from the trade unions. 
The 1980 Employment Act was, in Prior's opinion, as far-reaching as the 
Government could hope to proceed, but many Conservatives considered that it was 
not rigorous enough.23 Trade union recognition procedures were abolished, and unfair 
dismissal and maternity leave rights were restricted.24 Secondary picketing was made 
unlawful and secondary industrial action was opened up to claims for damages by 
removing immunities. The Act also introduced an associated code of practice on 
picketing, which laid down a maximum of six pickets as being reasonable. This was 
intended to prevent mass picketing, during which large numbers of striking trade 
unionists would attempt to persuade employees not to attend work during an 
industrial dispute. 25 Mass picketing had been successfully deployed during the 19605 
and 1970s, and the Conservatives argued that it represented a form of intimidation 
against individuals who wished to continue working. 
Another focal point of the legislation was the 'closed shop', which prevented 
non-union members working at some plants and factories. 26 The Act placed 
restrictions on the closed shop by giving Industrial Tribunals the power to decide if 
exclusion from a trade union was 'reasonable,.27 Compensation up to £16,000 was to 
be made payable if a union was found to be liable. Moreover, the legislation required 
new closed shops to gain the approval of at least 80% of the workers within it in a 
ballot, and made state funds available to finance the cost of these secret postal ballots. 
This clause contradicted Thatcher's intention of reining-in public expenditure, 
but by giving rank and file trade unionists a greater input to union affairs she hoped 
that militant leaders would be silenced by their own membership. Thatcher believed 
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that trade union demands should no longer be appeased, and was convinced that the 
public would support her in tackling union power.28 The 1980 legislation signalled 
Thatcher's intention to assert the sovereignty of Parliament, and increase the power of 
the state in industrial disputes. The Government, however, was not yet prepared for a 
full-scale confrontation with the unions. When faced with the prospect of a miners' 
strike, in February 1981, Thatcher increased subsidies to the National Coal Board 
(NCB) to avoid a dispute.29 
The Glasgow Herald was supportive of the Government's intentions, but 
questioned the manner in which Thatcher had chosen to handle the reforms, and the 
Daily Record, speculated that the Bill could worsen industrial relations.30 The sruc 
was the legislation's most outspoken critic. It had been in existence since 1897, and 
operated independently from the London-based ruc, with its own constitution and 
distinctive structure. 31 Scottish trade unions, such as the Educational Institute of 
Scotland (EIS) existed, but the vast majority of unions were organised at a British 
level. The STUC played a full role within this British union network, and possessed 
the autonomy of action that, for example, its counterparts in Wales did not enjoy 
within the rue's regional framework. 
James Milne derided the Employment Bill as, 'the start of a programme which 
will make British industrial relations a considerably more bloody battle field than it is 
at present' ,32 arguing that further legal restrictions on picketing would add to the 
confusion that normally surrounded an industrial dispute. Other clauses, such as those 
referring to the closed shop, were attacked as needlessly confrontational. The 
discriminatory nature of the legislation, which denied workers in new firms their right 
to claim for unfair dismissal was highlighted, and the Government accused of sexism, 
as the Act denied women in very small firms their right to return to work after 
pregnancy, and limited this right in larger firms. 
The trade union movement called a Day of Action on 14 May 1980, 
coordinated by the STUC in Scotland, involving trade unionists taking strike action 
for one day in protest at the Government's industrial relations policies. The response 
in Scotland was the most enthusiastic in the whole of Britain, with 20,000 
demonstrating in Glasgow and 12,000 in Edinburgh. 33 These tactics had been 
successfully employed by the unions in their campaign against the 1971 Industrial 
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Relations Act, but Thatcher chose to dismiss the representations of the trade union 
movement, and Murray Ritchie described the protest as a 'charade'?4 
South of the Border, the press continued to lobby for further industrial 
relations reforms,35 and in September 1981, a Cabinet reshuflle saw Prior replaced by 
Norman Tebbit. He was entrusted with the task of upping the scale and pace of 
industrial relations reform, and was responsible for the implementation of the 1982 
Employment Act. It increased the amounts of compensation payable for dismissal on 
account of a closed shop to £250,000 for the largest unions, and liability to claims 
was made retrospective to 1974.36 Current closed shops were compelled to hold 
periodic ballots to validate their position, and the definition of a trade dispute was 
also narrowed to one between workers and their employers 'wholly or mainly' about 
terms and conditions of employment. 
This opened up union funds to suits for damages where action was not covered 
by immunities, which removed the privileged legal status enjoyed by the unions since 
1906. Furthermore, the Act outlawed industrial action against non-union companies, 
and clauses in contracts requiring the use of union labour. This was designed to make 
the UK a more attractive destination for multinational companies, many of which 
refused to recognise trade unions. Moreover, the Bill legally permitted employers to 
selectively dismiss strikers without notice, and opened up unions to injunctions 
restraining them from 'unlawful' industrial action. This made unions liable to large 
fines for being in contempt of court, as well as sequestration of their assets. By 1986 
unions had been fined over £1 million for various contempts. 
The importance of the Act stemmed from the unequivocal support that it 
extended to employers who were engaged in an industrial dispute. Furthermore, the 
legislation had a clear ideological vision, as by outlawing strike action against non-
union companies the Government believed that it was creating conditions that would 
stimulate the growth of private enterprise. Between 1980 and 1982, the number of 
working days lost to industrial action in Scotland fell from 1,447,000 to 634,000.37 
This was above the British average, but below the level of militancy in north-east and 
north-west England.38 Tebbit put the Government's case simply, 'I hope it can be 
agreed that strikes destroy jobs, and that the reckless pursuit of inflationary wage 
demands destroys jobs'. 39 This legislation, an integral part of the Government's 
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industrial relations strategy, was intended to force ordinary trade unionists to accept 
the predominance of market forces in wage bargaining. Thatcher described this 
paradigm shift as 'new realism'.4O 
Milne was outraged by the new legislation, 'Their intention is to cripple the 
ability of working people, through their unions, to defend their living standards ... We 
have over a century's fighting history behind us, and he [Tebbit] will not succeed' .41 
The STUC saw the legislation as part of a concerted effort to 'cripple' the trade 
unions, arguing that the Bill was deliberately intended to destabilise existing union 
membership and encourage individuals to leave unions.42 In addition to this, the ruc 
believed that the Act was unfair, as it gave employers the right to sack employees 
taking industrial action without the workers concerned having any recourse to an 
industrial tribunal. Finally, the political nature of the legislation came under attack, as 
it enabled employers to sue unions for large sums of damages in cases of 'unlawful' 
industrial action. 
The Glasgow Herald's political editor, Geoffrey Parkhouse, described the 
legislation as Thatcher's 'biggest gamble' since becoming Prime Minister, and 
warned her against provoking a trade union backlash.43 However, writing in 1983, 
Tony Lane stated that despite the 'widely-held prejudice and ignorance', contained in 
the Act, 'there can be little doubt of its popularity,.44 He equated 'new realism' with 
the 'philosophical anarchism' which runs so strongly in the British working class 
wherein all forms of compulsion are deeply resented' . 
The psychological effect of the legislation was important, but it was 
complemented by the impact of the Government's economic strategy. Mass 
unemployment (see chapter 2) led to falling trade union membership and job 
uncertainty amongst existing members. Between 1980 and 1983 union membership 
fell by 1.8 million, and the number of days lost to strike action in Britain dropped 
from 11,964,000 to 3,754,000.45 Finlay explains that, 'Competition was against not 
just other companies, but also fellow workers as a means to ensure that their position 
was safe',46 further undermining job security and workplace solidarity, which had 
previously formed the backbone of trade union strength. 
Against this backdrop the ruc asked each affiliated member to donate ten 
pence towards a campaign against 'Tebbit's Law', eventually placing a £1 million 
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campaign fund at its disposal.47 The campaign foundered in Scotland, however, 
because of insufficient co-operation between the ruc and the sruc, illustrated by 
the poor response to 'Union Day' north of the Border. A mass public relations assault 
had been planned across the UK for 10 June 1982, but the London centre from which 
the exercise was being conducted did not provide the sruc with adequate campaign 
materials,48 wasting an opportunity to widen support for the campaign. The unions 
had failed to anticipate Thatcher's proactive industrial relations reforms, and were 
unable to effectively counter her assertion that the unions were to blame for Britain's 
economic difficulties. 
By the time of the next piece of industrial relations legislation, in 1984, 
Thatcher had won a landslide victory at the 1983 General Election, and Tebbit's brief 
had been entrusted to Tom King. The 1984 Employment Act focused directly on the 
relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party. There was a degree of 
continuity in the Bill, as it introduced further electoral provisions to trade union 
democracy. The Act stipulated that all members of a union executive be elected by 
secret ballot at least every five years, and inserted a clause requiring that a secret 
ballot be held to approve industrial action.49 Moreover, the categories of those entitled 
to sue a union for damages were broadened. Most importantly, the legislation stated 
that all union political funds had to be compulsorily re-approved by ballot, and this 
process was to be repeated at intervals of not more than ten years. 50 Finally, the 
regulations covering the use of union political funds in pressure group and electoral 
activity were tightened. 
This legislation represented a two pronged attack on the Government's behalf 
The trade unions had provided 98.4% of Labour's campaign funding at the 1983 
General Election,51 and the Act was a calculated attempt by the Conservatives to 
undermine Labour's main source of finance. Indeed, the wholesale democratisation of 
the industrial disputes process was intended to further impede the process of calling 
industrial action. Thatcher had received the support of 27.3% of British trade 
unionists at the 1983 General Election, many of whom were skilled workers 
benefiting from the transition to a free market economy. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
wage differentials between skilled and non-skilled workers had narrowed 
substantially. Under Thatcher, however, this situation was reversed, as demand for 
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unskilled labour fell and skilled workers were given greater financial incentives to 
improve productivity. 
Thatcher surmised that the growing acceptance of 'new realism' amongst 
these trade unionists would be accelerated by the secret ballot provision, which she 
hoped would minimise the political and financial links between Labour and the 
unions. The 1984 Employment Act sought to strike a blow against the internal 
organisation of the trade union movement and the Labour Party, further marginalising 
socialist influence in Britain. According to King voluntary self-regulation was no 
longer an option for the trade unions, 'We have put the trade unions on trial. If we 
don't get from them the right response ... then we shall not hesitate to act'. S2 
The failure of the STUC's opposition to the 1980 and 1982 legislation 
conditioned its response to the 1984 Employment Act. By this stage the trade union 
movement felt under siege, as it contended with the miners' dispute. de-
industrialisation, and falling membership numbers. A major concern of the STUC and 
Labour arose over the clause in the Bill requiring trade unions to justify their political 
expenditure. The STUC had contributed to major initiatives, such as the Campaign 
Against Privatisation,53 but these were now jeopardised by the new legislation, and it 
condemned the Act as unwarranted interference in trade union affairs. Throughout the 
post-war consensus, the trade unions had relied upon the state's acceptance of 
voluntary union regulation, but under Thatcher the power of the state was harnessed 
to impose legal restrictions on trade union activities. 
In this changed climate it was imperative that the unions learned to adapt, and, 
on this occasion, Thatcher was outmanoeuvred The trade unions succeeded in 
increasing the number of unions affiliated to the Labour Party, and much to 
Thatcher's surprise, turnout in these ballots was, on average, over 60%.54 
Furthermore, the percentages in favour of retaining subscriptions to the Labour Party 
did not fall below 59% in the 1985/86 ballots. By implementing the 1984 
Employment Act Thatcher had unintentionally legitimised Labour's main source of 
funding, and helped to boost links between ordinary trade unionists and their 
leadership. At the 1987 General Election the trade unions provided 92.6% of Labour's 
campaign funding. 
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Crossing the Rubicon: The 1984/85 Miners' Strike 
The 1984 Employment Act was heavily overshadowed by the 1984/85 miners' strike. 
In Scotland, the coal mining industry had contracted significantly since 1945, and by 
1984 the main mining areas were situated in pockets of Fife, Ayrshire and the 
Lothians. As a result of this, Scotland was only of peripheral significance in the 
dispute compared with areas such as Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire. Moreover, the 
strike took place on a British stage, and its repercussions were felt throughout the 
British trade union movement. Nevertheless, there was a Scottish dimension to the 
dispute. 
The coal industry had been on the wane since the inter-war period, and after 
its nationalisation, in 1947, the industry became increasingly reliant on public 
subsidies. ss From 1977, the Labour Government compelled the state-run electricity 
industry to purchase coal from the NCB, regardless of its price, in order to sustain the 
industry but, by 1978179, there were only sixteen active pits in Scotland. S6 In 1983/84 
the NCB made a loss of £250 million, and in Scotland the industry was losing £13.96 
for every ton of coal that it produced compared to the British figure of £6.61.57 This 
dependency on the Exchequer was loathed by Thatcher, and prompted her decision to 
move Ian MacGregor from the chairmanship of BSC to the NCB in September 
1983.58 
Thatcher believed that MacGregor, renowned for his confrontational style, 
was the ideal man to tackle the leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). 
Arthur Scargill. S9 ScargiU was a Y orkshireman, who epitomised the type of trade 
union leader disliked by Thatcher. He was an avowed Marxist, and after his election 
to the leadership of the NUM in 1981, Scargill openly voiced the opinion that 
Thatcher's government should be overthrown by extra-parliamentary action. 60 
Thatcher had only narrowly avoided conflict with the NUM in 1981, and Scargill's 
presence heightened the prospect of a dispute. 
After the Conservatives' victory at the 1983 General Election, MacGregor's 
appointment at the NCB and the NUM's imposition of an overtime ban that autumn, 
confrontation loomed. Thatcher's economic strategy lay at the heart of the dispute, as 
Scargill refused to accept the NCB's proposals for a reduction of 64,000 jobs at 
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'uneconomic' pits.61 Alleging that Thatcher was intent on privatising the NCB, 
Scargill contended that there was no such thing as an uneconomic pit, and called for 
more investment by the Exchequer. Indeed, Thatcher was convinced that 
rationalisation was essential if the NCB was to reduce its losses and become 
competitive with a long-term view to privatisation. 
John Campbell argues that Thatcher viewed the miners as, 'the stormtroops of 
that backward-looking socialism which she was in politics to destroy', but had to say 
'warm words' about the industry to counter Scargill's allegation that she aimed to 
annihilate the industry.63 Indeed, Denis Thatcher's comments in Below the Parapet 
appear to justify Campbell's analysis, as he states, 'The general view was "We'll beat 
the buggers".64 Thatcher was intent on withstanding any trade union challenge to her 
economic policy, and offered generous redundancy packages, in an attempt to meet 
the NCB's objectives.65 Therefore, unlike the miners' strikes of 1972 and 1974, this 
was a defensive strike by the NUM on the issue of pit closures rather than on wage 
demands. 
The dispute began on 1 March 1984 after the Yorkshire Area Executive of the 
NUM announced strike action in response to the NCB's closure of Cortonwood 
colliery.66 MacGregor unveiled his plans for rationalisation on 6 March, and that same 
day, the Scottish Area of the NUM responded to MacGregor's proposals to cutback 
750,000 tonnes of Scotland's 5.9 million tonne capacity by calling strike action.67 The 
National Executive of the NUM gave the strikes in Scotland and Yorkshire official 
approval on 8 March. The procedure used to call the strikes soon became eagerly 
debated, as the NUM endorsed a policy that required each constituent area to declare 
strike action independently. This avoided a national ballot, which required 55% of the 
membership to approve industrial action, as Scargill could not be assured of attaining 
a majority.68 Through these actions the NUM left itself open to accusations of 
circumventing the accepted democratic process. The NCB lost no time in exploiting 
the NUM's decision, as it alleged that widespread intimidation had taken place in the 
constituent area ballots. 69 
Campbell states that Scargill and his Scottish deputy, Mick McGahey were, 
'militant left-wingers looking to break another Tory Government' ,70 but his analysis 
fails to highlight the differences between them. McGahey was a loyal member of the 
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Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), whilst Scargill's Marxism was too 
individualistic for the CPGB. 71 Harvie, contends that Scargill's enthusiasm over the 
conflict contrasted with McGahey's reticence, and Joe Hill, the former Assistant 
Scottish Organiser of the Labour Party, was informed by McGahey that Scargill had 
'utter domination' of the NUM.72 
Initially, the Scottish pits were slow to engage in strike action, and two out of 
three shifts at Polkemmet colliery in West Lothian continued to work but,73 by mid-
March, all Scottish NUM members were on strike. The most reluctant striking miners 
were located at Bilston Glen in Midlothian, a 'super pit' which had been guaranteed 
survival because of its rich coal seams. Indeed, by mid-August, eighty of the ninety 
Scottish miners who had returned to work were employed at Bilston Glen. 
Nevertheless, the most significant blow to the NUM was the decision of a few areas, 
such as Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, to continue working,74 which greatly 
bolstered the NCB and the Government's argument that a majority of miners opposed 
the strike. 
These regions had benefited from the NCB's decision to introduce an area 
incentive payment scheme in 1977, which saw the most modem and productive pits 
receive improved bonus payments.75 The miners in these areas were, therefore, 
displaying 'new realism', as they had more to lose from going on strike than those in 
less productive regions such as South Wales and Scotland. The Glasgow Herald 
concluded that the dispute 'says little for the "new realism" of the unions or for the 
Government's efforts to legislate for better industrial relations', and the Daily Record 
asserted that, 'both sides must accept that anything which might jeopardise the future 
of coal would be folly'. 76 
During the strike's initial stages Thatcher adhered to Nicholas Ridley's 
strategy, and attempted to create the illusion that the dispute was a matter that solely 
concerned the NCB and NUM.77 The Government was prepared for a conflict and, 
after 1981, had built up coal reserves in anticipation of a challenge by the miners,78 a 
tactic promoted in the Ridley Report. The miners' strikes of 1972 and 1974 had led to 
power cuts throughout Britain and the introduction of a three day working week in 
order to conserve power supplies,79 and Ridley argued that the Conservatives had to 
be prepared for a challenge by the NUM if the Party regained office. The dispute fell 
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under the remit of Peter Walker, the Energy Secretary, a prominent 'wet', who was 
adept at handling the media, which compensated for MacGregor's shortcomings in 
this field. so Walker contended that the coal industry's only means of survival was the 
acceptance of the NCB's rationalisation programme. 
The Scottish Office initially took a low profile in the conflict. George 
Younger was determined to keep a semblance of order, and his main line of argument 
surrounded the economic consequences of the strike: 'if coal prices are made higher 
by industrial action, that must reduce the potential market for coal and jobs arising 
from the mining of coal... the NUM's actions have done a great deal of damage to the 
Scottish coalfield'. 81 The Government maintained a non-interventionist facade into 
the early summer of 1984, but the reality behind the scenes told a different story. 
Thatcher discouraged the NCB from utilising her employment legislation, as she 
feared that such a belligerent gesture could result in the steelworkers, dockers and 
railway workers calling strike action in support of the miners. 82 Her approach rested 
on Ridley's belief that the trade union movement's strength was reliant upon its unity 
and, if the unions were divided, a Conservative government could prevail in a single 
union dispute. 
As the summer drew to a close, amid continuing intimidation and violence, 
Thatcher became more overtly involved in the dispute. Her tactic was to simplify the 
strike as a conflict between 'good' on the Government's side, and 'evil' with regards 
to Scargill and the NUM. Younger signalled this change in tone with a speech on 11 
July 1984, 'There is no industrial case ... This is an affront, an insult and a mortal 
danger to our democratic freedoms. It is based on force by strong against the weak'. 83 
Thatcher also attempted to equate the dispute as a matter of national pride and 
security, and spoke of the miners as 'the enemy within' .84 Law and order now became 
the watchword of the Government, and Thatcher approved huge policing operations, 
on a scale that had previously been unseen in Britain, in order to prevent the NUM's 
flying pickets closing collieries that continued to work. 
She also channelled the full resources of the security services against the 
NUM,8S vindicating Andrew Gamble's argument that Thatcher was mobilising the 
power of the state to achieve her political and ideological goals. Indeed, Thatcher's 
strong rhetoric was partially justified by Scargill's receipt of $1,137,000 from the 
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Soviet Union, 86 and his ill-judged decision to seek money from the Libyan dictator, 
Colonel Gaddafi, in October 1984.87 Libya continued to sponsor terrorist attacks in 
Britain, and openly provided financial support to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
After the IRA's attempt to assassinate Thatcher at the Conservatives' Brighton 
conference this represented a public relations disaster for the NUM.88 Thatcher was 
now in a position to associate the miners' strike with 'the global struggle against 
Communism and terrorism'. 89 
Ravenscraig steelworks provided the conflict's flashpoint in Scotland. This 
stemmed from the reluctance of ISTC members to refuse deliveries of coal, which 
were essential to keep the plant's blast furnaces operational.90 Significantly, the 
steelworkers' stance encompassed every aspect of the 'new realism' cultivated by 
Thatcher. Ravenscraig had only narrowly avoided closure in 1982 (see chapter 2), and 
its workers were unwilling to jeopardise their employment by letting the plant's 
furnaces burn out. The steelworks was the NCB's largest customer in ScotlancL and 
the Glasgow Herald continually emphasised the threat that the dispute posed to 
Ravenscraig.91 At the first ever fonnal meeting between the STUC and the Prime 
Minister on 5 September 1985, Thatcher stated that she was 'a great fan of 
Ravenscraig' .92 
As members of the 'Triple Alliance', which had been revived, in 1981, by the 
railway workers, miners and transport unions, the ISTC was bound to assist the 
miners' cause in some way. This was resolved by the STUC, which brokered a deal 
allowing two trainloads of coal into Ravenscraig each day to keep the plant in 
working order. Nevertheless, the issue of who delivered the coal remained 
controversial. Initially, the NUR had refused to deliver coal to any BSC plants, but 
given the circumstances they agreed to make an exception for Ravenscraig on the 
condition that steelworkers collected the coal at Motherwell station and delivered it to 
the plant themselves. In spite of contradictory responses from the Associated Society 
of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) and the NUM to this agreement, BSC 
increased the loads of coal reaching Ravenscraig.93 The STUC, under duress from the 
President of the Scottish Area of the NUM, McGahey, countered this development by 
cutting the numbers of trains pennitted to one per day, but BSC found this 
unacceptable and chartered trucks to deliver coal by road. 
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The road hauliers involved were non-union members, and were offered the 
financial incentive of £50 per trip. The ISTC Convenor at Ravenscraig, Tommy 
Brennan, was a friend of McGahey, but McGahey was engrossed in negotiations with 
the NCB, and his deputy in Scotland, George Bolton, began mass picketing at 
Ravenscraig.94 Bolton contends that he was following Scargill's orders but, according 
to Brennan, Bolton informed him that, 'we'll leave you without enough coal to make 
a pan of chips,.95 Yuill and Dodds lorries ran the gauntlet of the pickets, leading to 
some of the most violent clashes of the strike in Scotland. At one stage, the police 
completely sealed off Motherwell to all travelling pickets. 
Brennan describes the strike as, 'the most difficult time of my life,.96 This 
situation was only resolved when Milne agreed a deal in which Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU) drivers were to deliver 18,000 tonnes of coal to Ravenscraig 
every week. The only other point of conflict in Scotland arose at Hunterston ore 
terminal in Ayrshire, where pickets attempted to prevent coal leaving for Ravenscraig. 
TGWU and ISTC members refused to handle the coal, but Bse brought in non-union 
labour to move it. 97 Once again conflict erupted, but the police succeeded in keeping 
the terminal open. 
The turning point of the strike arrived in October 1984, when Thatcher 
intervened to prevent National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and 
Shotfirers (NACODS) members entering the dispute. They were required at every pit 
by law when underground work was in progress, and MacGregor threatened to sack 
all NACODS members who refused to cross NUM picket lines.98 Thatcher recognised 
the inflammatory nature of this threat, and ordered MacGregor to withdraw the 
ultimatum. Yet, in doing so, the NCB accepted a great deal of what Scargill was 
demanding. MacGregor agreed to reconsider his closure programme because of 
changed circumstances, and to keep five of the most contentious pits open pending 
further review. 99 This dispelled any doubt that the Government was overtly involved 
in the dispute, and broke with the 'right to manage' strategy that Thatcher promoted 
throughout the strike. 
At this stage, Thatcher's bargaining position had been weakened, and Scargill 
had the opportunity to reach a settlement, which he could have claimed as a triumph. 
However, he refused to moderate his demand that no pits should close, and over the 
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course of time the strike became a war of attrition that only the Government could 
win. According to Bolton, both he and McGahey wanted to reach a settlement, but 
Scargill refused to compromise. lOO Increasing numbers of miners began to return to 
work in January 1985 and, by 27 February, more than half of NUM workers were 
back at their collieries. 101 
ScargiU abstained from reaching an official agreement to end the dispute, but 
an NUM Delegates' Conference voted for a return to work on 3 March 1985. Peter 
Walker gave an illuminating interpretation of the strike; 'The person who has done 
most damage to the coal industry is the leader of the NUM. He has conducted a 
campaign that has divided mining communities from top to bottom, with an £8,000 
loss of wages for every miner, and destroyed markets for the industry. History will 
show that no one has done more damage to the miners than Mr Scargill' .102 
There was a strong element of truth to Walker's analysis. The NUM's decision 
not to hold a national ballot was a fatal error, as it enabled the Conservatives to 
accuse Scargill of employing undemocratic tactics. His strategy of deploying mass 
flying pickets also played into the Government's hands, as it led to violent clashes 
with the police and discredited the miners' cause. Furthermore, as the scale of the 
violence grew the media focused less on the economic arguments behind the strike, 
destabilising a vital pillar of the NUM's case for industrial action. Scargill' s warnings 
regarding privatisation were eventually vindicated by the sale of the NCB in 1994.103 
By engaging in a long-running dispute, Scargill ensured that the families of 
striking miners endured unnecessary financial hardship. The Government was 
prepared for these tactics, and Scargill' s only hope of long-term victory rested on the 
support of the steelworkers, dockers and railway workers. Many of them, however, 
were also threatened with unemployment, and were unwilling to sacrifice their jobs 
for the miners' cause. Under these circumstances, Scargill should have reached a 
settlement in the autumn of 1984, but was unwilling to compromise any of the 
NUM's demands, and Bolton highlights this as Scargill's greatest flaw. 104 Moreover, 
by seeking financial assistance from Libya in the aftermath of the Brighton bombing, 
Scargill succeeded in alienating many who were sympathetic towards the miners' 
cause. 
Finally, if Scargill had waited until autumn to begin the dispute he could have 
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placed far greater strain on the Government's capacity to provide electricity, rather 
than launching strike action in spring as demand for power dropped off for several 
months. In the event, Scargill's tactics played into Thatcher's hands. He cast himself 
as an undemocratic, violent, revolutionary, and succeeded in splitting the NUM 
through his strategy. At the end of the strike the Union of Democratic Mineworkers 
was established by miners from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, attracting a 30,000 
strong membership. 105 
Although the strike ended for most Scottish miners in March 1985, the return 
to work proved complicated. Polkemmet colliery in West Lothian, and Bogside and 
Frances in Fife, had been badly damaged by the effects of flooding and fire, and were 
unable to reopen. 106 In effect, the miners at these pits remained on strike in protest at 
their closure, but in other parts of Scotland collieries gradually reopened, and the 
miners returned to work. However, the attitude of the NCB's Scottish Area Director, 
Albert Wheeler, was an additional complicating factor, as he chose to dismiss all 
miners who had been charged with any offence at a picket line. 
Elsewhere in Britain the NCB was more lenient, and the Daily Record stated 
that, 'The wounds of the past year will not be healed by sinking the knife still 
deeper' . \07 Industrial tribunals were held and various legal challenges were launched 
against the NCB, and by March 1987 more than 200 of the 700 victimised miners in 
Britain had come from the Scottish Area. \08 The effect of the dispute on the NCB's 
labour-force was unmistakable, as the number of Scottish miners fell from 25,000 in 
1979 to 14,000 in 1985, and by the spring of 1989 there were only two collieries left 
in Scotland.109 Thatcher had unquestionably established management's 'right to 
manage', but in Scotland there were very few pits left where the NCB could assert its 
power. 
While ScargiU was criticised for his role in the dispute, the STUC had opted to 
undertake a less confrontational approach. The STUC highlighted the cost of the 
strike, and contrasted this with the Government's refusal to sanction greater 
investment in the coal industry. I \0 Geological reasons were also cited by the STUC 
for the retention of all Britain's pits, as it contended that more coal would be needed 
as the world's oil and gas supplies depleted. Furthermore, a Scottish Miners' Relief 
Fund was established, which raised almost £2 million in cash, including £34,000 over 
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the 1984/85 Christmas spell alone. III Feelings became particularly heightened at this 
time, as the Government took an extra pound off striking miners' benefits. Fife 
Regional Council provided the children of striking miners with free school meals, and 
gave miners priority in claiming housing benefit to prevent undue hardship.112 The 
STUC formed delegations drawn from a cross-section of Scottish society. as it sought 
to illustrate the depth of the miners' support in Scotland. The Scottish churches, local 
authorities and the Scottish Council (D&I) all campaigned for a quick settlement to 
the dispute. l13 
Labour gave the miners its tacit support, but Neil Kinnock, who came from a 
Welsh mining family,1l4 distanced Labour from Scargill's violent tactics. Dick 
Douglas, MP for Dunfermline West, and Alexander Eadie, MP for Midlothian, both 
represented mining constituencies, and were outspoken critics of the Government, 1 15 
but Scargill felt betrayed by the Labour leadership's attitude. Attacking the cost of the 
strike, Kinnock speculated that it was a calculated part of the Conservatives' wider 
plan to cripple the trade union movement. The party also supported the campaign to 
reinstate miners sacked for trivial offences at the picket line. Kinnock, however, 
pilloried Scargill's role in the dispute, and described the miners as 'Lions led by 
donkeys' .116 Martin Adeney and John Lloyd accurately surmise that, 'Kinnock had no 
choice but to distance himself from it if he and his party were to remain as serious 
contenders for power' . 117 
On the other hand, David Howell argues that Kinnock's response represented, 
'a disabling capitulation before a particular form of electoral politics'. 118 Howell's 
analysis fails to comprehend the changed political climate to which Kinnock was 
adapting. Labour had been humiliated at the 1983 General Election, and a close 
alignment between the party and Scargill would have damaged Labour's electoral 
credentials further. Joe Hill, a former miner from Penicuik, asserts that marriages 
were broken by the strike, and that he was unwilling to dissuade striking miners from 
returning to work, whilst Jimmy Allison claims that Labour had a better relationship 
with the NUM in Scotland, because of McGahey's influence. 119 
The Scottish trade union movement retained a greater degree of unity 
throughout the strike than their counterparts in England, with the STUC aided by the 
solidarity of the Scottish miners, who remained solidly behind the industrial action 
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until the end of the dispute. There were also fewer divisions between the Scottish pits 
in tenns of wages, removing the possibility of 'new realism' prevailing in Scotland's 
mining communities. Another factor was the relationship between Milne and 
McGahey, both long-term comrades from the CPGB,120 which led to a mutual 
understanding in Scotland that did not develop in England. The most valuable skill of 
the STUC was its ability to broaden its analysis of the dispute in Scotland to a wider 
debate on the Government's economic strategy. 
Huw Beynon describes the dispute as, 'a moral and political struggle within 
the working-class movement', 121 but in Scotland this debate strained but never 
fractured the unity of trade unionists to the extent that it did in England. Campbell 
fails to differentiate between the conduct of the dispute in Scotland and England, and 
he does not examine the NUM's relationship with the STUC. 122 This displays a bias 
towards events in England, which may be justified by the importance of Yorkshire 
and Nottinghamshire. In undertaking this approach, however, Campbell overlooks the 
distinctive stance of the Scottish press and the degree of compassion felt for the 
miners' cause in Scotland. In general, the Scottish press was more balanced in its 
coverage of the dispute than the English newspapers, with the pro-Communist 
Morning Star being the only newspaper to give the NUM its unequivocal support. The 
Glasgow Herald summarised the strike as a 'Tragic Fiasco', stating, 'there are no real 
victors in this sorry tale' .123 
Thatcher was jubilant at her victory over the miners, and Hugo Young argues 
that it and the Brighton bombing stoked her sense of personal destiny.124 She had 
withstood the strongest extra~parliamentary challenge to her economic strategy since 
coming to power, and the corporatism of the consensus had been firmly banished 
from industrial relations. Although the strike consumed £2.5 billion of public money 
and acts of brutality committed by both policemen and miners, alike, had shocked 
many, this was a personal triumph for Thatcher. 12S Knox describes the dispute as, 'the 
last dying scream of the old proletarian mentality', 126 marking the onset of a new 
phase of reform intended to eradicate trade unionism as an economic and political 
force. 
The Unions in Retreat: The Final Phase of Reform, 1987-1990 
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Thatcher was re-elected for a third term in office, in 1987, with the support of 27.5% 
of British trade unionists. 127 Labour had fought the General Election on a manifesto 
that pledged to overturn Thatcher's trade union reforms,128 but had failed to make 
serious in-roads into the Conservatives' majority. It was now apparent that there 
would be no return to consensus politics. 
As Scottish-based manufacturing industry continued to decline, the STUC's 
membership remained remarkably high at 910,942,129 but all trade unions were forced 
to work much harder to attract new members. Jobs in manufacturing were not being 
replaced at the rate that they were being lost, and between 1979 and 1985 part-time 
employment in Scotland rose by 76,000. 130 In 1988 over a fifth of the British 
labourforce comprised part-time workers,131 many of whom were disinterested in 
trade union membership. A large proportion of these part-time workers were female, 
and between 1980 and 1985 women represented 46.4% of the Scottish workforce. I 32 
Many of these women were white-collar workers, who were to be found in 
non-manual and professional employment. White-collar workers had become 
increasingly trade unionised in the 1960s and 1970s in response to rising inflation, 
government sponsored collective bargaining and incomes policies. In 1979, there 
were 5,124,700 white-collar trade unionists in Britain, comprising 38.1% of total 
union membership. By 1989 this figure had fallen to 4,325,000, but its proportion of 
total British trade union membership had risen to 51%.133 In 1985 there were eight 
representatives from white-collar unions on the STUC's General Council, and by 
1989 there were ten. 134 The remaining sixteen members of the General Council were 
drawn from the traditional manufacturing and industrial unions, which influenced the 
STUC's economic priorities. 
This fall in union membership was characterised by amalgamations, and 
heightened competition for members. The General and Municipal Workers' Union 
(GMWU) expanded to incorporate the Boilermakers Union, and the Agricultural 
Workers and Dyers and Bleachers merged within the TGWU.135 This was designed to 
consolidate union strength in large general trade unions, which, it was hoped, would 
increase their bargaining power and manoeuvrability in industrial disputes. Moreover, 
these unions were in a position to offer membership packages, which included special 
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commercial offers and discounts, as they attempted to make trade union membership 
appealing in the face of 'new realism'. 
Inward investors exploited this changed industrial climate, and began 
brokering single union recognition deals that enabled them to offer the lowest 
possible terms and conditions. These became known as 'sweetheart' deals, and even 
included no strike clausesy6 Scotland's new towns attracted much of this inward 
investment and, between 1979 and 1986, only 6.6% of employers in Livingston 
recognised a union for bargaining purposes. Furthermore, 78% of plants, in East 
Kilbride, between 1979 and 1986 operated single union recognition deals. 
Both of these new towns benefited from the expansion of the electronics 
industry, which was renowned for its hostility towards trade unionism, and the STUC 
suspected that liS was promoting Scotland as a non-unionised country to foreign 
investors. Therefore, a new generation of Scottish manufacturing workers were 
removed from potential union membership, as Thatcher's economic restructuring 
limited trade union access to industrial growth sectors. These developments placed 
under scrutiny the TUC's 'Bridlington Rules', which dated from 1939 and prevented 
unions poaching each others members. 137 The STUC was also committed to enforcing 
these rules, but the agreement had never been tested until the 1980s. 
In spring 1988 the electricians' union was suspended from the TUe over its 
activities in England,138 and the STUC opted to impose a similar punishment. Christie 
had misgivings over adhering to the agreement, as the electricians' offences had not 
taken place in Scotland, and their Scottish officer, Alfred McLuckie, was about to 
become STUC President. Yet he chose to follow the TUC's example. Allison believes 
that Christie was a less capable General Secretary than Milne and,139 on taking legal 
advice, the STUC was forced to withdraw its suspension of the electricians, causing 
embarrassment. The unprecedented nature of this case in post-war industrial relations 
highlighted the extent to which Thatcher was dismantling and destabilising the post-
war consensus. 
This incident, however, paled into insignificance as an inter-union fiasco arose 
over the proposed establishment of a Ford components' plant in Dundee in autumn 
1987. The deal brokered by the SDA, promised to deliver 400 jobs to Dundee, and 
Gavin Laird of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) who sat on the SDA's 
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board agreed a single union deal on the grounds that the new plant would operate as a 
subsidiary of the Electrical and Electronics Division of Ford USA. 140 Other Ford 
unions, led by the TGWU, were outraged contending that the AEU was being used to 
undercut the national agreement on wages and conditions that already existed at other 
plants in Britain. 141 Indeed, Foster and Woolf son conclude that, <The zeal with which 
the AEU leadership set up the Ford deal at Dundee suggests that this project had at 
least as much to do with maintaining its own political position as with four hundred 
jobS'.142 
The STUC gave the investment package unreserved approval, but the other 
unions pursued the issue through the ruc, resulting in manual workers at Ford plants 
striking in protest, and the STUC being frozen out of the negotiating process by the 
rue. The STUC's only involvement came in March 1988 at the climax of the 
negotiations when the TUC's General Secretary, Norman Willis, invited the sruc's 
General Council to Ford's headquarters in Detroit, as the investment package looked 
in jeopardy. The following day, Ford announced that it was abandoning its plans for 
Dundee. 
Malcolm Rifkind derided <trade uruon Neanderthal attitudes', and the 
Glasgow Herald columnist, Ian Imrie, stated that the <trade union movement 
is ... ponderous, clumsy, inefficient and it and it alone has lost Scotland a great 
opportunity' .143 Furthermore, Ian Lang described the behaviour of the TGWU as 
<appallingly destructive', and the Herald attacked the, <chronic, wretchedly parochial 
short-sightedness of the British union movement' .144 Christie proposed that the sruc 
should, from this point onward, handle all inter-union disputes that took place in 
Scotland, but the ruc declined his offer. 
This set of events illustrated the extent to which Thatcher's legislation had 
undermined trade union solidarity throughout Britain. In effect, she had created a 
marketplace for trade union competition, in which the TUC and STUC were unable to 
implement an effective set of regulations. Relations between the English-based ruc, 
and the sruc deteriorated, as the ruc was anxious to protect its existing powers, 
while the STUC was determined to assert its independence within the British union 
network. The irony of this situation was missed by many political commentators. As 
the STUC fervently campaigned for Scottish devolution (see chapter 6), its own form 
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of self-government within the British trade union movement was highlighting the 
difficulties of successfully operating such a strategy. 
The next phase of reform began when Norman Fowler guided the 1988 
Employment Act through Parliament. Unions were prevented from disciplining 
members who refused to abide by a lawful strike, and the Act continued the 
democratisation process, making non-voting senior union officers subject to the 
balloting provisions of the 1984 Employment Act. 145 Furthermore, union election and 
political fund ballots were required to be conducted as postal ballots, and a Trade 
Union Commissioner was established to supervise the conduct of unions and hear 
complaints. Fowler contended that the legislation, 'puts the interests of the individual 
trade union member first and foremost' ,146 but the legislation was also intended to 
maximise the obstacles surrounding strike action, and to further limit the prospect of 
militant trade unionists being elected to the leadership of unions. 
The Act reinforced the position of superiority that Thatcher had created for 
her government in the field of industrial relations and signalled the point of no return 
for the trade union movement. In less than ten years Thatcher had transformed the 
British trade unions from 'social partners,147 of the Labour Government to a near 
irrelevance in shaping Government policy. By 1988, the number of trade unionists in 
Britain had fallen to 10.5 million, and the number of working days lost to industrial 
stoppages in Scotland had dropped to 205,000, compared to the British average of 
3,702,000.148 A contributory factor was the rise in owner-occupation that was 
precipitated by the right-to-buy legislation (see chapter 5). This meant that many trade 
unionists who became homeowners for the first time were reluctant to engage in 
concerted strike action because of mortgage repayments. 
By 1988 the issue of trade union reform was no longer of primary importance 
to the STUC, as it became a vehicle for cross-party campaigning against Thatcher's 
policies. Nevertheless, Christie described the Bill as 'vindictive and dangerous' ,149 
and the STUC focused its concern on a clause denying trade unions the right to 
discipline members who refused to abide by the decision of strike ballots, contrasting 
this circumvention of union democracy with the Government's assertion that it was 
'making the Unions more accountable to their members'. ISO The approach of the 
STUC to this legislation encapsulated its reorientation in the face of Thatcher's 
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reforms. Wider political issues were now seen as a more productive field for union 
activities than the traditional defence of free collective bargaining. 
The final piece of industrial relations legislation that Fowler piloted through 
Parliament was the 1989 Employment Act. This legislation contained crucial anti-
union measures, which were included alongside clauses that tightened race 
discrimination laws in the workplace and brought greater equality for women. lSI Once 
again the closed shop was a focal point of the Conservatives' reforms, as industrial 
action in support of a closed shop was outlawed. Furthermore, the dismissal of an 
employee who refused to join a union, even where 80% of the workforce voted to 
establish a closed shop, was banned. Finally, the right of union officials to paid time 
off for union duties was restricted. 
This Act directly undermined the ability of trade unions to create a spirit of 
collectivism within the workplace, and was intended to dissuade workers from joining 
unions, as their position became increasingly marginalized. By this stage, the effect of 
Thatcher's legislation on the closed shop was unmistakable, as the number of workers 
employed under these conditions fell from 5.2 million in 1978 to 3.5 million in 
1989. IS2 The 1989 Employment Act took a further step towards liberalising the labour 
market, as Thatcher pressed ahead with compulsory competitive tendering in the NHS 
and local government (see chapters 3 and 4). Trade unions were now focussing on 
discrimination in the workplace, as they attempted to demonstrate their continuing 
relevance in a changed working environment. 
The STUC responded vigorously to this new reform. It believed that the Bill 
embodied an attack on the rights of women and young people in the workplace. This 
was a direct reference to those clauses in the Bill that dispensed with restrictions on 
the hours worked by young people. Michael McMahon, the STUC Youth Committee 
Chairperson, illustrated their anger, 'This legislation shows up the Government's 
hypocrisy. If you are 16 or 17 and cannot find ajob or a place on the YTS you are not 
considered adult enough to claim Social Security benefits ... But if you are at work, you 
will be treated like an adult in terms of the hours you can do'. 153 The STUC also 
criticised the Bill on the grounds that it restricted the amount of paid time-off that 
trade union officials were allowed, and it was unhappy that workers were to be denied 
the right to receive written reasons for dismissal if they had served \Durer two years at 
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their place of work. 
Unlike previous industrial relations legislation, the Scottish press were 
overwhelmingly hostile to the new Employment Act. Despite the tunnoil over Ford's 
decision to abandon Dundee, Ian Imrie criticised Thatcher's 'bulldozing dictates', IS4 
thus reflecting the STUC's growing influence within civil society. Indeed, Gall 
compares the STUC's strategy towards civil society with the CPOS's 'British Road to 
Socialism', which sought, 'to encompass all those interests and groups fighting for 
democratic and progressive causes into ... a more powerful single bloc against the 
monopoly capitalists ... where in being brought together their horizons and aims are 
broadened out' .ISS However, Mark Irvine states that, 'the STUC were happy at times 
to act as what to outsiders often seemed like little more than a 'front organisation' for 
the Labour Party' . IS6 With the STUC at the hub of anti-Conservative resistance, it was 
politically opportune for civil society to sympathise with the plight of the trade 
unions. 
By 1990 Thatcher had entered her final year in office, and the Employment 
Act, which reached the statute book on 1 Novemher,IS7 heralded the end of the 
Thatcher era. Michael Howard, who had become Employment Secretary in January 
1990, oversaw the Bill's eventual passage through Parliament. This Act signified the 
crowning moment of Thatcher's programme of industrial relations reform. It 
outlawed the closed shop, and unions were made legally responsible for the actions of 
lay officials who acted in an illegal manner. Furthermore, the legislation gave 
employers the power to dismiss any instigators of unofficial, or 'wildcat' strike 
action. Balloting provisions were also extended to contract workers, and sympathy 
and secondary action were outlawed. The main effect of this reform was that it 
actively discouraged union membership, and further limited the flexibility that unions 
possessed during industrial disputes. 
There was an air of disbelief and fury in the STUC's reaction to the proposed 
legislation. The Deputy General Secretary of the STUC, Bill Speirs, stated, 'This 
legislation ... will simply make it more difficult for ordinary trade union members to 
get a fair deal out of their boss. It defies belief that...after ten years of unremitting 
attack on trade unionists ... they should still be trying to claim that Britain's economic 
problems are caused by the unions,.IS8 The STUC attacked the Bill on the grounds 
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that it placed the rights of non-union members above those of trade unionists, and 
argued that it encouraged employers to use selective dismissal to sack union activists. 
Furthermore, the sruc contended that the Government's proposals, regarding 
unofficial strike action, were impractical and designed to create friction within the 
trade union movement. The final rebuke that it aimed at the legislation concerned the 
outlawing of all sympathy action, which it interpreted as a further assault on trade 
union rights. 
Thatcher's final industrial relations reform left the trade union movement 
impotent, and the lack of media interest illustrated its declining political importance. 
However, with inflation at 10.9% by November 1990, and unemployment beginning 
to rise again it was evident that Thatcher's assault on the unions had not been a 
panacea to Britain's economic difficulties. When questioned in September 1990, only 
1 % of Britons believed that trade unions and strikes were one of the two most 
important political issues facing the country, compared to 26% who cited 
unemployment, and 25% who highlighted the economy.159 The trade unions had been 
influential in Thatcher's entry to Downing Street, but they played no role in her 
downfall. 
An Irreversible Victory? An Overview of Thatcher's Policies 
Thatcher's attempts to neuter the trade unIOn movement represented a crucial 
dimension of her assault on the post-war consensus. The extent to which she achieved 
her aim would have seemed unthinkable when she came to power in May 1979 after 
the 'winter of discontent'. Indeed, Allison believes that the castration of trade union 
power represented Thatcher's greatest success in her efforts to defeat socialism. 160 
Between 1979 and 1990 the number of working days lost to strike action in Britain 
fell from 29,474,000 to 1,890,000,161 and while the STUC and the ruc remained 
defiant, by 1990, a combination of high unemployment and incisive employment 
legislation had left them depleted and powerless to prevent Thatcher revolutionising 
the entire country. Politically the trade unions remained active, but economically their 
influence had been marginalized. 
The STUC was informed of industrial developments in Scotland during the 
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Thatcher era, but it was never consulted. Thatcher succeeded in creating an economic 
environment in which management could assert its 'right to manage' in both the 
public and private sectors. This process was aided by the influx of inward investment 
in the 1980s, which resulted in sweetheart deals and inter-union competition for 
members. Nowhere was this more evident than in the electronics industry, which had 
an adverse effect on potential trade union recruitment in the one area of Scottish 
manufacturing that was experiencing growth. 
White-collar workers also began to represent an increasing proportion of trade 
union membership, but their representation on the STUC's General Council did not 
reflect this. In stark contrast, female trade unionists saw their representation on the 
General Council rise from two, in 1981, to twelve in 1990. Industrial trade unionism 
was suffocated by Thatcher, and after the defeat of the miners it was decisively 
extinguished. Nevertheless, industrial trade unions continued to monopolise the 
leadership of the STUC, which influenced its economic priorities. Thatcher had 
harnessed the power of the state to exclude the unions from decision-making, and 
after 1985 there was no question that the Government held the upper-hand in 
industrial relations. 
Thatcher partially succeeded in de-politicising the trade union movement, and 
undermined Labour's supportbase amongst trade unionists. At each of her general 
election victories she managed to increase the Conservatives' vote amongst British 
trade unionists, and she was particularly successful amongst non-manual trade 
unionists, many of whom had enjoyed improved pay throughout the 1980s. 162 
However, Thatcher's ability to attract the votes of trade unionists was overshadowed 
by Labour's ability to lose their support. In October 1974, Labour received the votes 
of 52.2% of British trade unionists, but by June 1987 the party's support amongst 
trade union members had fallen to 37.1 %.163 Nevertheless, many of these voters had 
not switched their allegiance to the Conservatives, either abstaining or opting to vote 
for a third party, such as the Alliance or SNP. 
According to Shirley Robin Letwin, Thatcher's legislation, 'tended to 
transform unions by loosening their monolithic structures, autocratically controlled by 
a permanent corps of leaders, and to reshape them as ... voluntary associations of 
independent-minded individuals,.I64 Yet, writing in 1987, John MacInnes concludes 
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that, 'the basic institutions of workplace trade unionism survived the economic and 
legal assault of Thatcherism,.165 Both arguments contain a grain of truth, but Letwin's 
is more accurate, as it envisages the long-term impact of Thatcher's reforms, which 
led to British trade union membership falling under seven million in 1997. 166 
Nevertheless, Thatcher's legislation did not result in trade unions weakening their ties 
with the Labour Party. No trade unions disaffiliated from Labour, and throughout 
Thatcher's premiership the unions continued to provide the vast bulk of Labour's 
funding. 
Thatcher could have outmanoeuvred the unions by introducing legislation that 
compelled individual trade unionists to 'contract in' if they wished to pay the political 
levy, but she was aware that this would have precipitated, 'pressure to change the 
system by which some companies donated to political parties, from which ... the 
Conservative Party heavily benefited'. 167 Moreover, by expanding balloting 
procedures and improving transparency in union decision-making, Thatcher 
unintentionally legitimised the existence of the trade union movement. In 1979 only 
51 % of Britons believed that trade unions were a good thing and 36% believed that 
they were a bad thing, but by 1987 those in favour of trade unions had risen to 71% 
and those opposed had fallen to 17%.168 
Under Thatcher, the trade unions were no longer considered as an 'estate of 
the realm', but trade unionism in Scotland did not die. The STUC managed to 
successfully re-orientate its role after 1987, and union membership remained 
proportionately higher in Scotland than south of the Border. As the STUC's economic 
influence waned, it maintained its public profile by organising mass campaigns of 
resistance to Thatcher's policies. This had the effect of integrating the sruc into 
civil society, and the STUC played an integral role in unifying civil society against 
Thatcher's policies. 
The ruc also attempted to follow suit, but it had never been an accepted part 
of the English Establishment, and was less successful. Moreover, Scotland was 
dependent on public sector employment to a greater extent than England, and it was 
employees in this sector who bore the brunt of Thatcher's efforts to lower public 
sector wage costs.169 Between 1979 and 1986 the pay of manual male workers in the 
public sector rose by only 6% compared to 13% in the private sector, and non-manual 
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public sector workers received a pay increase of 14% compared to 22% in the private 
sector. l7O 
Nevertheless, trade union legislation played a peripheral role in galvanising 
Scottish opposition to Thatcher, as industrial relations had little effect upon the 
autonomy of civil society, and were viewed as a British issue. The trade union 
movement largely operated on a UK-wide basis, and while the sruc was clearly 
independent of the rue it was also unavoidably integrated into the British trade 
union network. Thatcher's legislation did place strains on this British union solidarity, 
but she did not succeed in breaking existing national wage settlements in the public 
sector. 
On the other hand, Thatcher's economic strategy combined with her castration 
of the trade unions to weaken British identity amongst working-class Scots. The trade 
union movement was a vehicle that led working-class Scots to develop contacts with 
union members elsewhere in Britain, and this helped to generate a form of British 
working-class solidarity. These Scots retained their Scottish identity, but they also 
realised that they shared common interests with workers elsewhere in the UK. 
However, as 'new realism' spread and union membership and activity fell, the 
attachment of the Scottish working-class to British solidarity was eroded. 171 
The STUC's pivotal role in opposing the poll tax (see chapter 5) and 
campaigning for devolution enabled it to maintain its influence and public 
prominence in Scotland. However, at a British level, the ruc was ineffectual and, 
after 1987, it focused its hopes on the EEe's social rights proposals. The STUC also 
began to reassess its previously anti-European stance (see chapter 2), as the possibility 
of less stringent European employment laws emerged. l72 Ron Todd of the TGWU 
encapsulated the isolation of the trade unions with the statement, 'The only card game 
in town at the moment is in a town called Brussels' .173 
As Thatcher left Downing Street for the last time in November 1990, she 
could rightfully reflect that the post-war consensus on free collective bargaining had 
been rendered impotent. A free market economy had been cultivated at the expense of 
trade union power, and strikes had become a rarity. The sovereignty of Parliament 
was no longer in question, and it was the trade union movement that was struggling to 
adapt to 'new realism'. Thatcher had slain one dragon, but others lay in wait. 
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Chapter Four 
'SOCIAL THA TCHERISM,?l WELFARE PROVISION IN SCOTLAND, 
1979-1990 
Speaking in Liverpool, in 1976, Margaret Thatcher articulated her view of the welfare 
state, 'the appetite of the education service, and of health and welfare, has proved 
insatiable ... we must try to put responsibility back where it belongs with the family 
and with the people themselves'.2 The boundaries of the welfare state are open to 
interpretation, as is its founding point, but the term gained common currency in the 
1940s.3 Indeed, the spirit of the post-war consensus was enshrined in the welfare state 
and Thatcher's reforms proved immensely controversial. She was accused of 
, Anglicising' Scottish education, privati sing healthcare by stealth, and her overhaul of 
social security was branded as uncaring. 
Structurally, the welfare state poses difficulties for historians, as its subject 
areas are disparate and diverse. For the purposes of this thesis, the welfare state is 
defined as encompassing social security, health and education. These three topics are 
analysed in separate but chronological sub-sections interlinked by an integrated 
introduction and conclusion. The chapter begins with an introductory section that 
charts Scottish welfare developments between 1970 and 1979. The first sub-section 
focuses on social security, the second examines Thatcher's NHS reforms, and the 
third looks at educational restructuring. Nicholas Timmins has adopted a similar 
approach in his recent 'biography' of the welfare state, The Five Giants (2001). 
Scottish historians have tended to neglect this dimension of Thatcher's 
premiership, but comprehensive coverage of her welfare state reforms has been 
undertaken by Timmins, whilst Geoffrey Finlayson has examined her restructuring 
with reference to the voluntary sector. Michael Fry argues that post-war Scottish 
government, 'had been built by and for collectivism, for central planning of a welfare 
state', and Richard Finlay asserts that, 'on the whole, most people thought that it 
worked,.4 Finlay also contends that, as a result of Thatcher's restructuring, 'the 
defence of such British institutions as the social security system and the health 
service, increasingly took on a nationalist air' . 
Furthermore, Christopher Harvie asserts that Thatcher's efforts to create a 
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liberalised labour market, 'seemed aimed at that third of the population which 
struggled to survive on or below the poverty line'. 5 He incorrectly cites the 1985/86 
teachers' strike as taking place between 1986 and 1987, but accurately identifies 
growing alienation amongst Scottish teachers, which he purports to be a direct 
consequence of 'government aggression and parental choice,.6 lain Hutchison argues 
that outwith St Andrews University, 'The Scottish universities, on the whole, resisted 
the intellectual enchantments of the New Right' ,7 whereas James Mitchell's research 
entirely overlooks developments in the welfare state under Thatcher. 
A Crumbling Consensus! The Welfare State, 1970-1979 
By 1970 an identifiable consensus had appeared in the fields of social security and 
health. The main political parties differed only over the best means of delivering these 
services, and the Conservatives were content to shape the welfare state in their vision 
rather than to contemplate a fundamental overhaul. Education proved to be more 
divisive, but the Conservatives made no attempt to abolish the comprehensive system, 
and subsequently embellished it. Furthermore, the ethos of 'democratic 
intellectualism' remained evident within Scottish education and, following the 
Robbins Report, the pursuit of greater access to higher education was embraced by 
both parties. It appeared that a sustainable consensus on welfare provision bad been 
constructed. 
On becoming Conservative Party leader Thatcher challenged the orthodoxy of 
this consensus, asserting that the pursuit of equality was damaging the economy. In 
September 1975, Thatcher stated that, 'People would rather have a little less public 
service and more freedom of choice on how to spend the money they earn'. 8 Indeed, 
Thatcher surmised that the welfare state had eroded the vigorous virtues (see 
Introduction) by discouraging individual responsibility. 
The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 further embellished the post-war 
consensus by providing for a superannuation scheme, known as the State Earnings-
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). It allowed individuals in private schemes, 
adjudged to be adequate by the state, to opt out of SERPS, but created an enhanced 
compulsory state scheme for all other workers.9 The basic pension was to increase 
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annually m line with prices or wages, depending on which was higher. The 
Conservatives supported this measure, but planned on dramatically reducing its 
coverage.1O In 1977, child benefit, a universal payment for all children, replaced 
family allowances. 11 
In 1972, the Scottish Health Service (SHS) underwent restructuring, 
establishing fifteen area health boards, divided into districts for administrative 
purposes.12 The boards operated consensually with responsibility shared by the chief 
medical officer, the chief nursing officer, the board secretary and the finance 
officer. 13 The boards continued to provide private pay-beds which, by 1974, were 
losing £7 million per year. 14 In 1977, Labour established the Health Services Board 
(HSB) to oversee the phasing out of pay-beds in NHS hospitals. IS 
The minimum school leaving age was raised to sixteen in 1972. In 1977 the 
Muon Committee recommended reconstructing the third and fourth year secondary 
school curriculum, whilst the Dunning Report proposed the introduction of a single 
examination certificate, to be awarded to all pupils on completing the final year of 
compulsory schooling.16 In an internal Conservative Party discussion paper on 
education, in March 1978, Nigel Lawson proposed radical reform, favouring the 
introduction of repayable student grants in order to deter 'weakly-motivated and 
marginal would-be students' from entering higher education.17 Moreover, he 
supported the imposition of charges for pupils who attended school between the ages 
of sixteen and eighteen. 
In 1979 only 5% of Scotland's secondary school population was educated in 
the private sector, compared to the British figure of 5.8%, and these proposals would 
have had little impact on fee-paying schools. 18 Nevertheless, they would have affected 
Scottish universities, such as Glasgow, which, by 1964, was attracting 30% of its 
students from working-class backgrounds. 19 Lawson's proposals contradicted 
'democratic intellectualism', and the construct of the 'lad 0' pairts' .20 These 
proposals were omitted from the party's 1979 manifesto, but reveal the extent to 
which some Conservatives wished to break with the post-war consensus. 
Indeed, the Conservatives' Social Services Policy Group favoured increased 
NHS prescription charges and was attracted to a health insurance system. 21 It also 
called for greater cooperation with the voluntary sector, tax relief on employers' 
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medical Insurance, and the taxation of unemployment benefit. Andrew Gamble 
believes that the Conservatives' record on welfare reform was an influential factor in 
establishing the party's twentieth century political hegemony, and during the 1979 
General Election, Thatcher went to great lengths to emphasise her commitment to the 
welfare state, but asserted that improvements had to be tied to economic 
performance.22 The welfare state's central flaw, she believed, lay in its imposition of 
collectivism from above, impeding individual freedom and private enterprise. 
Enhanced individual responsibility, reduced dependency, minimised costs, greater 
choice and more voluntary involvement were her goals. This led to an assault on the 
values of the post-war consensus, which underpinned the welfare state. 
(1) : LOOSENING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SAFETY NET 
Social security was a central battleground in Thatcher's efforts to reduce dependency. 
Beveridge had asserted that his plans for the welfare state would become unworkable 
if unemployment passed 8.5% and. as unemployment increased in the 1970s, the 
social security system became increasingly complex and costly to administer. Labour 
set up an internal review of supplementary benefit in the midst of the IMF crisis (see 
Chapter 1). The review's recommendations published in July 1978, when the social 
security budget accounted for a quarter of total public spending, called for a 
simplification of benefits, less reliance on discretionary benefits and clearer rules of 
entitlement. 23 Being open to interpretation, these findings were acceptable to 
Thatcher, as the review had operated on a no-extra cost basis. 
Thatcher began her restructuring, in 1980, by abolishing the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission (SBC), which she replaced with the powerless Social Security 
Advisory Committee. The Conservatives also broke the link between average earnings 
and pensions by specifYing that pensions were to be uprated in line with the Retail 
Price Index (RPI),24 which led to smaller pensions increases, as wages tended to rise 
faster than prices. Timmins alleges that this change had been agreed to in 
opposition.25 Finally, unemployment, sickness and invalidity benefit and maternity 
allowances were cut, the first deliberate reduction in benefits since 1945.26 These 
reforms resulted in a transfer of resources, with 1.7S million claimants losing out and 
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800,000 gaining.27 Privately Thatcher confided to Patrick Jenkin, Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) Secretary, that, 'we will have to go back to soup kitchens,.28 
Writing in 1983, Ian Gough contended that, 'The goal is to use market forces 
to reduce real wages and augment profits. A cut in the 'social wage' augments this 
pressure to reduce labour's share in the national income' .29 Yet, Gough's perceptive 
analysis overlooks the moral dimension to Thatcher's beliefs, as she was convinced. 
'that no one remained poor for long except by their own fault' .30 These initial reforms 
were designed to castrate consensual bodies and constrain social security costs, which 
were rapidly rising as a result of widespread unemployment (see chapter 2). Thatcher 
had signalled her intention to overturn the post-war consensus on social security, but 
Timmins concludes, 'that these cuts were driven more by a desperate determination to 
reduce spending than by any logically coherent approach' .31 
An overhaul of the existing dual system of housing benefits took place in 
1982. Supplementary benefit claimants until now had their rent and rates covered by 
the DHSS, while those on low incomes could apply to their local authority for these 
rebates. Under this system a considerable number of rebates beneficiaries were better 
off moving onto supplementary benefit. The Social Security and Housing Benefit Act 
1982, therefore, transferred the DHSS's responsibility for rent and rates rebates to 
local authorities. Owner-occupiers on supplementary benefit now had their rates 
covered by their local authority, with the DHSS meeting their mortgage repayments.32 
This legislation increased the functions of local government at the behest of 
central government, and was designed to reduce public spending by transferring 
administrative costs to local authorities, which had their expenditure constrained by 
the Government (see chapter 5). Thatcher, however, was willing to jeopardise her 
efforts to constrain public expenditure by subsidising owner-occupiers in order to 
achieve her objective of a 'property owning democracy' (see chapter 5). Thatcher 
surmised that by subsidising these individuals, in the short-term, she would dissuade 
reliance on council housing, which the right-to-buy legislation was striving to transfer 
into individual ownership. She believed that owner-occupiers would rapidly regain 
their independence when the recession ended. thus providing an immediate reduction 
in public spending. 33 
In Scotland, social security expenditure was running at £523 per head in 
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1981/82, compared to £518 in England. 34 The number of Scots dependent on 
supplementary benefit rose from 450,000 in November 1979 to 770,000 in November 
1982.35 Thatcher made unemployment benefit taxable in July 1982, only restoring its 
value, after the cuts of 1980, in November 1983. Black economy activity denied the 
Government £3.5 billion of tax revenue in 1980 an<L as unemployment escalate<L 
social security spending reached £33 billion in 1982/83.36 
Alarmed at this trend, Norman Fowler, Jenkin's replacement, announced 'the 
most fundamental examination of our social security system since the Second World 
War' in April 1984.37 The review took the form of four panels with a remit to 
examine all areas of social security, with the exception of benefit levels. Its 
recommendations were to reflect a social security system capable of meeting genuine 
need. Its structure was to be consistent with the Government's economic strategy, and 
was to become simpler to understand and easier to administer. 
In June 1985, all four reviews were published in a radical Green Paper. 
Means-tested family credit was to replace Family Income Supplement, and SERPS, 
which covered ten million individuals, was to be abolished. The latter was the 
brainchild of the head of the Downing Street Policy Unit, John Redwood.38 Contrary 
to Thatcher's wishes, however, individuals were not compelled to join a private 
pension scheme, as Lawson was unwilling to burden private sector employers with 
compulsory pension contributions. Furthermore, income support, incorporating a 
system of personal allowances with additions for dependent children was to replace 
supplementary benefit. Fowler contended that this package would increase the 
disposable income of Britain's poorest families. This was questionable, as the 
Government intended simultaneously to cut their entitlement to housing benefit, 
whilst limiting the availability of free school meals. 
At the heart of the Green Paper lay Thatcher's desire to encourage individual 
responsibility. Those under twenty-five were to receive a lower rate of benefit, and 
the housing benefit means-test was to be aligned with that for income support. Single 
payments for essential household items were to be replaced by a social fund that 
dispensed grants and interest-free loans. The universal provision of maternity and 
funeral grants was to cease, and maternity allowances were to be limited to those 
mothers who worked before and after pregnancy. Benefit recipients were to pay at 
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least 20% of their rates, with those individuals on income support receiving an inbuilt 
allowance to cover payments. 
These proposals were intended to reduce social security administration and 
costs, and encourage individual responsibility. Furthermore, by extending the use of 
means-testing, Thatcher believed that benefits would be targeted at those most in 
need, alleviating the worst effects of the poverty and unemployment traps.39 She was 
convinced that this package would reduce state dependency and increase individual 
choice. The STUC, however, contended that many workers would not qualify for 
private pension schemes because of age, ill health or the nature of their work. 40 
Scotland contained some of the most deprived areas of Britain, and had much 
to lose from social security streamlining. In 1985, 15.5% of the Scottish population 
was dependent on benefits, and 45.5% of Scottish households were in receipt of 
housing benefit compared to 34.7% of British households.41 The STUC envisaged the 
review improving 'the position of some of the poorest people ... by taking away 
resources from other poor people'. Indeed, statistics compiled by Gordon Brown 
appear to confirm this, as he calculated that 20,000 low wage families would be 
unable to claim family credit, and that 90,000 would lose housing benefit. The 
Scottish Council for Community and Voluntary Organisations (SCFCVO) added to 
the discontent over the review's findings by revealing that 1.64 million Scots were 
living in poverty or on the margins of poverty. 
Despite only two positive responses being received from the sixty 
representative groups consulted,42 the White Paper issued in December 1985 
contained few alterations. Thatcher's most significant concession was to continue 
SERPS, whilst reducing the benefits of the scheme to those retiring after 1999. 
Furthermore, the Government boosted the financial services sector by enabling 
members of SERPS to transfer their existing contributions to a private pension 
scheme with a guarantee that the state would add 2% to their contributions until 
1993.43 
The Glasgow Herald welcomed some aspects of the proposals, but was 
suspicious of the Government's cost-cutting intentions, whilst the Daily Record 
accused the Government of 'trying to cut the Welfare State, not reform it'.44 Between 
1979 and 1985, the number of British families in receipt of supplementary benefit or 
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housing benefit increased from 2.59 million to 4.11 million, and the number of 
individuals on or below the poverty line rose by 55%.45 With these reforms coming 
into force in April 1988, the Government was pressurised to alter the legislation 
further. One of the most controversial clauses provided for a reduction in housing 
benefit if claimants had more than £3,000 worth of savings, and withdrawal if the 
sum exceeded £6,000. This contradicted Thatcher's doctrine of 'hard work, self-
reliance, thrift',46 by penalising individuals with savings. 
Faced with a backbench rebellion, the Government agreed to raise the capital 
limit to £8,000, benefiting 100,000 people and costing £30 million.47 A transitional 
scheme was also introduced to compensate previous recipients of housing benefit for 
losses of greater than £2.50 per week, aiding 300,000 people at a cost of £70 million. 
In October 1986, Fowler increased the maximum period of disqualification for 
unemployed individuals who were deemed not to be pursuing employment, from six 
to thirteen weeks and, in April 1988, this rose to twenty-six weeks.48 
The potential effect of these reforms on existing benefit recipients was 
contentious with 3.8 million claimants losing out and 2.16 million gaining. The 
legislation disproportionately affected the young with the Conservative-dominated 
House of Commons Social Services Committee estimating that single people under 
twenty-five lost up to £8.84 per week, and the Benefits Research Unit alleging that 
81 % of families with dependent children lost out. 49 This contradicted Thatcher's 
statement that, 'It is on the family that we in government build our own policies for 
welfare,.5o Campbell Christie condemned the reforms as a 'moneylenders' charter,.SI 
Brown calculated that over one million families and households were losing 
more than £3 per week as a result of the 1988 Budget and social security reforms. 
When these initiatives were combined he claimed that the bottom 25% of the British 
population lost £600 million, while the top 5% received £2,500 million. 52 Thatcher 
viewed tax cuts as a stimulus to the economy, unlike benefits which redistributed 
wealth. According to John Campbell she was convinced, 'that the benefit of tax cuts 
and other incentives for the rich would 'trickle down' to benefit the entire 
economy'. 53 
When questioned in 1987, 72% of Scots believed that Thatcher looked after 
the interests of one class, and 54% stated that she was uncaring. 54 These attitudes 
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were influenced by high Scottish unemployment, but Thatcher's social security 
reforms reinforced such beliefs. The introduction of the poll tax in 1989 (see chapter 
4) represented an acceleration in Thatcher's attempts to break the 'dependency 
culture',ss but it also combined with the 1986 Social Security Act to increase the 
financial strain on the poorest sections of society. Thatcher failed to appreciate that 
her economic strategy contradicted the pursuit of individual responsibility as it 
increased unemployment, adding to state dependency. Neither the introduction of the 
community charge nor her restructuring of social security could compensate for a UK 
unemployment rate that peaked at 11.4% in 1986, or the existence of 55% male 
unemployment in Dalmarnock in Glasgow.56 Campbell concludes, 'that in the midst 
of rising wealth, poverty was also increasing, creating a new and permanently 
excluded underclass' .57 
Meanwhile, the abolition of single payments sparked furious debate. In 1985. 
the rate of DHSS single payments in Scotland was over three times higher than in 
England, and SCFCVO estimated that 300,000 Scots received single payments of an 
average value of over £100 each year. 58 The social fund, which replaced single 
payments, was criticised on the grounds that it forced impoverished families into 
debt, and that its 15% standard rate of repayment compelled individuals on income 
support to live below the poverty line. 59 The distribution of grants and loans was also 
made subject to the discretion of local DHSS officers, undermining the principle of 
universality. Thatcher believed that social fund repayments encouraged individual 
responsibility amongst benefit claimants, and exposed them to market forces. 
Moreover, she surmised that individuals who suffered hardship when unemployed 
would be more motivated to find work rather than remain dependent on the state. 
Following the introduction of social fund grants a significant reduction in 
expenditure took place. Rutherglen, then part of Glasgow. received a social fund 
budget of £464,887 for grants and £1,095,068 for loans in 1987/88, compared to the 
sum of £3,115,881 that it had received through single payments in 1986/87.60 
Nevertheless, Scotland continued to fare significantly better than England. St Helens, 
a depressed industrial town on Merseyside, received a social fund grants budget of 
£240,016 and a loans budget of £568,334, compared to its single payments quota of 
£1,556,602 in 1986/87. 
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Thatcher encapsulated the break from the post-war consensus in an interview 
with Women's Own magazine in October 1987, when she stated that, 'there is no such 
thing as society ... no government can do anything except through people, and people 
must look to themselves first...There's no such thing as entitlement, unless someone 
has first met an obligation' .61 However, by 1986, the black economy in Britain was 
consuming around 5% of GDP, as benefit recipients supplemented their incomes 
through illegal tax-free work.62 
State dependency remained more entrenched in Scotland than elsewhere in 
Britain, and it showed little sign of receding. This was partially attributable to 
Scotland's higher than average rate of unemployment, but fails to account for 
Scotland's advantage over equally depressed areas, such as Merseyside. This 
divergence can be found in Scotland's retention of its regional authority structure. 
Regional councils, such as Strathclyde, employed Welfare Rights Officers, 
established Special Joint Initiatives with district authorities, and placed newspaper 
advertisements encouraging benefit uptake, maximising the number of claimants.63 
This was more difficult in England, where local authorities received 20% less in Rate 
Support Grant than Scottish councils, more councils were Conservative-controBed, 
and where the Greater London Council and Metropolitan County Councils' abolition 
in 1986 removed the equivalent tier of English local government (see chapter 4). 
From September 1988 unemployed school-Ieavers aged sixteen and seventeen 
had to take a place on a Youth Training Scheme or forego their benefit. 64 In October 
regulations were implemented forcing the unemployed to prove that they were 
seeking work or have their benefit curtailed. Another controversial tactic was the 
freezing of child benefit between 1987 and 1990, leaving many impoverished families 
reliant on means-tested family credit. Thatcher had favoured its outright abolition, but 
feared the political consequences amongst middle-class voters.6S By 1990, Labour 
estimated that child benefit was worth 12% less than in 1979.66 
'Offering dependency in place of independence'?" Tbatcber's Social Security 
Legacy 
Thatcher succeeded in overturning the post-war consensus on social security by 
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increasing the use of means-testing, reducing benefit levels, and abandoning many 
discretionary benefits. This was designed to differentiate between the 'deserving' and 
the 'undeserving' poor, and Thatcher contended that these measures would alleviate 
the poverty and unemployment traps. Gough argues that, 'this was intended to alter 
the class balance of forces to raise the rate of exploitation', but Thatcher, 'believed 
that inequality was not just inevitable but necessary, indeed positively beneficial, as a 
stimulus to enterprise, a reward for success and a penalty for failure or lack of 
effort' .68 
Nevertheless, this labyrinth of benefit alterations failed to reverse the upward 
trend in social security spending. Between 1979 and 1989 social security expenditure 
rose over 30% ahead of inflation, and the numbers dependent on means-tested 
benefits increased from 4.4 million in 1979 to 8.2 million in 1988.69 Thatcher's 
restructuring also failed to win a majority of support amongst either the British or 
Scottish electorate. When questioned in April 1989,54% of Britons and 60% of Scots 
stated that their ideal was, 'A country which emphasises the social and collective 
provision of welfare'. 70 
During Thatcher's premiership Scotland had suffered higher rates of 
unemployment than many parts of the UK, leading to greater dependence on social 
security. This and the activities of Scotland's regional councils were significant 
factors in the more positive disposition of Scots to social security. Indeed, Scots such 
as Brown were at the forefront in defending the UK social security system from 
Thatcher's reforms, as they objected to Thatcher restructuring a British institution that 
provided for Scotland's social needs. Yet, there was little support for a separate 
Scottish social security system in the Constitutional Convention. 
Consequently, Finlay's assertion that this opposition took on 'a nationalist air' 
should not be over-emphasised In effect, these representations demonstrated 
Scotland's commitment to the post-war consensus on social security. By 1988/89 the 
social security budget stood at £47.58 billion, representing 31% of all public spending 
and, in 1989, 500,000 Scots were in receipt of social security benefits.71 The post-war 
consensus had been ruptured, but the problem of dependency was more acute than 
ever. 
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(2) 'SAFE IN OUR HANDS,?72 THATCHER'S REFORM OF THE 
SCOTTISH HEALTH SERVICE 
The NBS epitomised the spirit of the post-war consensus to a greater extent than any 
other adjunct of the welfare state. Its free-at-the-point-of-need service had become 
enshrined in British and Scottish life, and those principles had never been seriously 
questioned by any Conservative administration. However, the NHS was a state-run 
monolith that was heavily trade unionised, and this offended Thatcher's belief in 
market forces, consumer choice and individual responsibility.73 To overturn this 
consensus she had to either replace the NHS with a health insurance scheme or 
remould the largest employer in western Europe into a market-orientated entity.74 
During the 1979 General Election, Thatcher gave a commitment to maintain 
NHS expenditure,75 limiting the Government's options for reform. The Conservatives 
also inherited a Royal Commission on the structure of the NBS, endorsing its tax-
based funding and calling for the abolition of charges.76 This report highlighted the 
inequitable distribution of resources between and within health boards, and called for 
improved preventive health measures, including the initiation of health education 
programmes. Furthermore, it recommended that the powers of the HSB should be 
increased, but emphasised that the NHS should streamline its structures to experience 
the full benefits of government spending. 
These proposals were complemented by the publication of the Black Report in 
August 1980, which concluded that inequalities in health had widened during the 
1970s.77 Its study of mortality rates between 1970 and 1972 demonstrated that 
unskilled individuals were two and a half times more likely to die before retirement 
age than their professional counterparts, and that unskilled parents' babies were twice 
as likely to die at birth or in the first month of life as professional parents' babies. 
Black called on the Government to bridge this gap by reintroducing free school milk, 
offering universal free school meals, curbing tobacco advertising and improving 
health education. 
However, Jenkin described Black's recommendations as, 'unrealistic in 
present or any foreseeable economic circumstances' and, in her first Commons 
speech as Prime Minister, Thatcher asserted that, 'there is no such thing as a free 
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service in the Health Service,.78 She strongly favoured the use of private medicine, 
believing that it enhanced choice and relieved pressure on the NHS. Indeed, the 
Conservatives immediately contradicted the Royal Commission's proposals in the 
1979 Budget, by increasing prescription charges from twenty pence to forty-five 
pence. By 1983, the cost of prescriptions had escalated to £1.40.79 
Between May 1979 and January 1980 the number of pay beds in Scotland 
dropped from 114 to 95.80 The 1980 Health Services Act, which abolished the HSB 
and empowered the Scottish Secretary to reintroduce pay-beds into SHS 
establishments, sought to stem this decline.81 Health boards were also permitted to 
raise cash from voluntary sources if they wished to supplement their budgets. At the 
beginning of 1980, NHS consultants' contracts were changed, allowing full-time 
consultants to earn up to 10% of their gross salary from private practice. 
Moreover, the Scottish Secretary was no longer required to finance all health 
board expenditure, and health boards were directed to work within their allocated 
budgets.82 George Younger informed health boards that if they could not keep their 
administrative costs below 14%, then they would have to find comparable savings. In 
November 1980, Russell Fairgrieve, Scottish Health Minister, raised the possibility of 
employing private companies to deliver services in SHS establishments.B3 
Nevertheless, the Government endorsed Black's health education proposals and, in 
1980, the Scottish Health Education Group was formed to promote health education 
throughout Scotland. 84 
These initial measures directly challenged the post-war consensus, as Thatcher 
strove to protect and expand private sector provision, whilst enforcing financial 
discipline on Scotland's health boards. This enabled consultants to devote a greater 
proportion of their time to private work, limiting their availability for NHS patients. 
Between 1981 and 1983 surgical waiting lists in the SHS rose from 65,000 to 
88,000.85 Some Scottish health boards were antagonistic towards the Government, 
resenting spending constraints, and the limitations imposed by this on their autonomy. 
Scottish consultants formed an integral component of civil society. and because of the 
limited size of the private sector in Scotland they had less to gain from Thatcher's 
reforms than their counterparts in London. 
In January 1982 Younger informed the STUC that he supported greater private 
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sector involvement in the NHS if it could be proved to benefit the customer.86 By 
1981/82, expenditure on health and personal social services in Scotland was £344 per 
head compared to £273 in England.87 In 1983,44% of male Glaswegians, and 43% of 
female Glaswegians were smokers, and almost one-third of all deaths in the Greater 
Glasgow Health Board area were due to heart disease.88 Furthermore, it was estimated 
that there were 10,000 heroin users in Glasgow, adding to the burden on the SHS, and 
posing a stem test for health educationalists. 
In September 1982, an explosive Central Policy Review Staff report 
examining the replacement of the NHS with an insurance-based scheme was leaked to 
the press. 89 Thatcher claims that she was 'horrified' by the report, but Young states 
that Thatcher was the most enthusiastic proponent of this radical proposal.90 She only 
circumnavigated the storm of public outrage by asserting that, 'The NHS is safe in our 
hands'. When questioned in 1983, 63% of Britons identified additional health 
spending as one of their top two priorities.91 This illustrates the political barriers 
faced by Thatcher, as she considered the best means of restructuring the NHS. She 
was attracted to a system of health insurance, but had to accept that the electorate 
strongly supported the NHS. Young concludes that, 'The NHS was one pillar of post-
war creation which proved unamenable to the grand assumption that almost any of the 
constructs of that era could be dismantled with impunity'. 92 
Thatcher gave a further boost to the private health sector, in 1982, by 
exempting individuals earning less than £8,500 from paying tax on the value of 
private healthcare premiums provided by their employers.93 She also allowed 
employers to offset employees' health insurance premiums against their business's 
liability for corporation tax. Effectively this denied the Exchequer extra finance that 
could have been put towards the NHS. By encouraging the uptake of private 
insurance, however, Thatcher believed that she was reducing state dependency, and 
relieving pressure on the NHS without enduring the political difficulties that 
surrounded a fundamental overhaul. 
The Government gradually unpicked the post-war consensus throughout 1983. 
Fowler announced central control of NHS manpower numbers in January and,94 in 
February, launched an inquiry to be headed by Roy Griffiths, deputy chairman of the 
supermarket chain, Sainsbury's. He was to analyse the effective use and management 
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of manpower and related resources in the NHS, and Griffiths' findings were published 
on 25 October. Recommendations included the creation of a Health Services 
Supervisory Board, with strategic responsibility for the objectives and resources of the 
NHS, and the establishment of a full-time multi-professional NHS Management 
Board, subordinate to the Supervisory Board, to oversee implementation of the 
strategy.9S 
The most controversial proposal surrounded the introduction of general 
managers, who were to carry overall management responsibility for achieving each 
health authorities' objectives, and were to have substantial freedom to design local 
organisational structures. Griffiths also proposed to involve consultants to a greater 
degree in local management through the allocation of workload related management 
budgets, and by extending the review process to Unit level. 
The Griffiths Inquiry represented a new tactical departure for Thatcher. Prior 
to the 1983 General Election, she had pledged to retain the NHS but had given no 
commitment to maintaining expenditure or its existing form. She, therefore, resolved 
to reform the NHS from within by introducing private sector business structures. 
Thatcher believed that general managers would increase accountability within the 
NHS, and streamline decision-making. The delivery of patient care was regarded as a 
transaction between the state and taxpayer, and Timmins describes this as, 'the most 
important single change to the NHS since 1948,.96 Thatcher was convinced that these 
changes would reduce costs and target resources more effectively. but they also 
required increased central government control. Far from reducing the parameters of 
the state, Thatcher's introduction of general managers reinforced them. 
In July 1983, Younger opted to cut £16.4 million from the SHS budget, in 
response to demands that he reduce Scottish Office spending by £33 million, 97 
angering healthcare professionals, operating under growing financial restraints and 
central government control. Yet, the pace of NHS reform in Scotland lagged behind 
that of England. The Griffiths Inquiry had only referred to the SHS in a covering 
letter.98 Half of Scotland's health boards opposed Griffiths' proposals,99 but Younger 
largely adhered to the Government's suggestions for English health authorities. The 
appointment of general managers was to be completed before the end of 1985, and 
the examination of Unit structures, management information and budgeting systems 
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was to have taken place before the end of 1986.100 However, unlike England and 
Wales, health board general managers were to be responsible to the Accounting 
Officer at the Scottish Home and Health Department (SHHD) for board finances, 
creating additional Scottish Office control. 
General managers were in place at all health boards by the end of 1985, but a 
consequence of appointing Unit general managers was to end the line management 
responsibilities of the Chief Area Nursing Officer, the Treasurer and Chief 
Administrative Medical Officer over Unit staff.l0l In the first quarter of 1987 Unit 
general managers took up their posts, but only 10% of them came from outwith the 
NHS. Thatcher's overriding objective had been to break the system of consensual 
management that existed in the NHS, which she believed added to costs and created a 
barrier to market forces and choice. In doing so, she ran the risk of alienating 
healthcare professionals by diminishing their autonomy. The STUC voiced suspicions 
that general managers would act as Government agents, emphasising that the 
Inquiry's lack of Scottish content demonstrated the need for a Scottish Assembly. 102 
Prior to this, in June 1984, John MacKay, Scottish Health Minister, had issued 
a circular to all health boards, 'to stimulate further progress towards seeking tenders 
for services' .103 Competitive tendering was one of Thatcher's flagship policies for her 
second term, and involved health authorities putting out to tender service contracts 
that had previously been provided by NHS employees. 104 This competition was 
intended to improve efficiency, and introduce private sector companies to the NHS. 
Thatcher hoped that this would undermine trade union influence, and make industrial 
action more difficult to organise. When it became apparent that the directive was not 
legally binding five health boards including, Greater Glasgow, announced that they 
would not be implementing MacKay's demands.lOs These boards accounted for 55% 
of expenditure on domestic and catering services, and they entered into discussions 
with staff and unions to find savings and improve efficiency. 
MacKay claimed that competitive tendering would make savings of £9 million 
per year, but he had previously admitted to the STUC, in March 1983, that savings in 
the SHS could not be guaranteed. 106 Nevertheless, in September 1984, Younger 
ordered Fife Health Board to put private pay-beds into its hospitals against the wishes 
of board members and, in November, the Government withdrew a range of 
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proprietary drugs, previously freely available, removing professional and financial 
autonomy from General Practitioners (GP) and doctors. By July 1985, MacKay had 
informed the five rebel health boards that he would set them cost saving targets of 
10% on domestic, catering and laundry services' expenditure. 107 The Glasgow Herald 
attacked MacKay for pursuing this agenda, 'So much for the argument that the 
Government is not. .. imposing real cuts on NBS spending ... the Government's 
obsessive parsimony in these areas of public spending has long passed the point of 
reason' . 108 
The Scottish private health sector remained considerably smaller than its 
English counterpart. In UK terms, 1980 witnessed the largest rise in private health 
insurance, as subscriptions increased by 26%, and this continued into 1981 with a 
further rise of 13%.109 Only British United Provident Association (BUPA) had 
headquarters in Scotland and, in 1982, BUPA's Edinburgh branch was the second 
most successful of its twenty-one outlets. I \0 Yet, in 1982, only 3% of Scots subscribed 
to private insurance schemes compared to 7.7% for England, and 13% in outer 
metropolitan London.111 Ross Hall hospital was opened in Glasgow in 1983 and, in 
1984 BUP A unveiled its Murrayfield hospital in Edinburgh. 
Ross Hall encountered particularly intense opposition, with the Blood 
Transfusion Service (BTS) refusing to handle blood supplies for the hospital until it 
gave an undertaking not to charge patients for blood. The BTS also refused to provide 
Murrayfield with technical assistance on the grounds that this would affect its service 
to NBS patients. Between 1979 and 1984, BUPA estimated that there had been a 
49.6% increase in the numbers subscribing in Scotland Thereafter the Scottish 
growth rate steadied around 5%. 
By 1985, Britain spent only 0.8% of its GOP on private healthcare compared 
to 1.8% in West Germany and 1.7% in France. 1l2 When questioned during the 1987 
General Election, Thatcher created a storm of controversy by stating that, 'I. .. insure to 
enable me to go into hospital on the day I want, at the time I want and with the doctor 
I want'.1l3 Between 1979 and 1988, the number of Britons covered by private health 
insurance doubled to just over 10% of the population.114 However, as a result of 
widespread unemployment and income tax reductions, the Government saw its 
income drop, adding to pressure on NBS funding. In April 1985, therefore, the 
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Government ended the universal provision of free spectacles and, in July 1986, it 
introduced vouchers for the unemployed and those on low incomes, to provide them 
with spectacles. 1 IS Finally, the 1986 Social Security Act banned local authorities from 
providing universal free school milk. 1 16 
Towards Privatisation? The Scottish Health Service, 1987-1990 
Between 1978179 and 1986/87 real expenditure on the NHS increased by 26% and, by 
1987, spending was running at £415 per head in Scotland compared to £336 in 
England. I I? Nevertheless, Labour claimed that SHS expenditure had been cut by 1.8% 
between 1982 and 1986, and a 1986 Social Services Committee enquiry appeared to 
support this claim, concluding that the NHS was underfunded by £1.3 billion.1I8 This 
discrepancy arose, as NHS costs tend to rise at a faster rate than inflation because of 
wage demands, the rising price of drugs, and the development of new treatments. 1 19 
The NHS was declared 'technically bankrupt' in July 1987,120 but Thatcher 
did not envisage fundamental restructuring occurring until her fourth term. She 
claimed that the NHS, 'was being funded with unprecedented generosity', 121 but 
growing waiting lists and understaffing, provoked a barrage of media criticism. In 
January 1988, she announced, 'the review that nobody wanted'. 122 The principal 
objective of the review was to identify how greater value could be achieved from 
existing resources, and it took the form of a ministerial review group that was chaired 
by Thatcher. 123 Malcolm Ritkind was only consulted as the review drew to a 
conclusion. 124 
In the wake of her third election triumph, Thatcher replaced MacKay, with her 
staunchest Scottish ally, Michael Forsyth. By the end of September 1986, only 2% of 
Scottish health boards had awarded contracts for their support services compared to 
43% of English health authorities,12S and Forsyth was entrusted with improving this 
record. In October 1987, he arranged a meeting between health board chainnen and 
managers, and representatives of Grant Thornton Management Consultants, as well as 
the trade associations for contract cleaners and caterers. This was followed by a letter 
to all health boards, demanding that, at least, two blocks of domestic and catering 
contracts per health board were to be put out to tender by April 1988.126 
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NHS trade umons, In Scotland, called industrial action over the 
implementation of competitive tendering, in January 1988. Forsyth refused to alter his 
timescale for the implementation of contracting out and. in February 1988, he 
announced that all health boards had agreed to invite tenders for in-house services. 
The STUC speculated that private companies were planning to use trainees from 
Government training schemes to reduce costs, but Forsyth stated that wages should be 
determined by the market. 127 In March 1988, 58% of Scots thought that the 
privatisation of hospital services would result in a deterioration in the NHS, and only 
14% believed that there was too much reliance on state health provision. 128 The 
Glasgow Herald speculated that, 'savings may be at the expense of lower-paid 
workers ... something which should be regarded as an absolutely unacceptable 
condition' .129 
Meanwhile, Thatcher's NHS review stimulated a frenzy of activity amongst 
New Right think-tanks. The CPS, and the Conservative Political Centre focused on 
the concept of an internal market that had been devised by an American systems 
analyst, Professor Alain Enthoven, which was to involve health authorities buying and 
selling services.130 The internal market was intended to separate the act of purchasing 
healthcare from that of providing it to enable resources to follow the patient in a form 
of transaction. Thatcher, however, remained attracted to the introduction of a health 
insurance scheme.13l 
A similar examination of community care had been entrusted to Roy Griffiths, 
who reported back in March 1988. Community care spending in Scotland rose by 
43% between 1979/80 and 1988/89, but Griffiths criticised the existing system which 
loosely operated through the NHS, local authorities and DHSS.132 He stipulated that 
one minister should have sole responsibility for community care, and that finance 
should be provided through ring-fenced state grants. Moreover, social service 
authorities were to be given a strategic, enabling role, rather than a providing one, and 
he called for, 'the maximum use of voluntary and private sector bodies to widen 
consumer choice, stimulate innovation and encourage efficiency'. Finally, the report 
envisaged transferring responsibility for social care from health authorities to local 
government, subject to the findings of the NHS review. 
Amid this conglomeration of ideas, Forsyth had expanded competitive 
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tendering significantly. He increased the number of new domestic services contracts 
from three in 1987 to sixty in 1989, and new catering service contracts rose from 
three in 1987 to forty-seven in 1989.\33 Forsyth estimated that the first round of 
tendering would save £5.5 million,134 but the robustness of in-house services 
prevented a large-scale influx of private contractors. Of the 164 contracts awarded by 
December 1989,81% were won by in-house bids. 13s Paradoxically, the largest private 
sector presence was located in the Greater Glasgow area, where twenty-one of its 
fifty-two contracts were won by private firms. 
Indeed, controversy was generated by its award of domestic contracts to Initial 
Health Care Services (IHCS) and Hospital Hygiene Services (HHS). HHS had failed 
to deliver one-third of the contracts it had undertaken up to April 1987, and IHCS had 
been identified as inadequate in 45% of its contracts. 136 This added to public 
misgivings over contracting out, and undermines Shirley Robin Letwin's assertion 
that competitive tendering improved the quality of service provision. l37 Furthermore, 
since 1983, IHCS's owners, British Electric Traction (BET), with Norman Tebbit as a 
director, had donated £105,000 to the Conservatives. Two Scottish Conservatives, 
Allan Stewart and Lord James Douglas Hamilton, MP for Edinburgh West, also had 
considerable shareholdings in BET. ) 38 
By March 1991, 68% of domestic contracts and 67% of catering contracts in 
Scotland had been put out to tender,139 which compared favourably with progress in 
England. The only exception was in laundry services, where there was only one health 
board-wide contract. The reduction in health board expenditure was significant and, 
by June 1989, total savings stood at £12,033,995. 140 Greater Glasgow made the largest 
contribution towards this figure, but many critics of competitive tendering highlighted 
the hidden costs involved in the process. Ayrshire and Arran Health Board calculated 
that, in 1988, it had spent £51,000 on tendering costs for only four contracts. 
Furthermore, the STUC claimed that the first and second rounds of 
competitive tendering had resulted in 2,000 redundancies, costing £4.8 million in 
redundancy and early pension payments. The Treasury gave health boards a financial 
incentive to embrace contracting out, allowing them reclaim V AT paid out as a result 
of competitive tendering. This contradicted Thatcher's objective of reducing public 
expenditure, but she was convinced that incentives were necessary if public sector 
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employment was to be reduced and efficiency improved. 
On the other hand, Thatcher accepted that any wholesale change to the 
funding of the NHS was not feasible because of its political consequences;41 and the 
NHS review chose the less radical option of reform from within. In January 1989, a 
White Paper recommended the development of an internal market. to be facilitated by 
the creation of Hospital Trusts, operating independently of health authorities and 
generating income by selling their services to health boards and GPS. 142 GPs were also 
to be given the opportunity to manage their own fundholding practices, which were to 
purchase hospital services. If a GP operated within budget, their practise was to be 
allowed to keep its underspend, and this principle was also applied to drugs budgets. 
Patients were to be provided with sufficient information to enable them to choose 
their GP, and GPs who overspent their budgets by more than 5% were to be 
compelled to repay their overspend the following year. 
The White Paper encouraged fundholding GPs and self-governing hospitals to 
patronise the private sector and Thatcher succeeded, against Lawson's wishes, in 
introducing tax relief on private medical insurance for individuals over sixty. A 
national medical audit, involving fellow doctors assessing the quality of medical care 
provided by their colleagues, was to be created and extended to all hospitals. 
Moreover, Thatcher introduced new GPs contracts, which paid doctors according to 
the number of patients on their surgery register, and compelled them to work, at least, 
twenty-six hours each week.143 GPs were also required to meet targets for the number 
of patients screened or vaccinated, and their prescription and referral rates were to be 
scrutinised by central government. Finally, doctors in inner-city practices were to be 
given bonuses of up to £10,000 to attract GPs to impoverished areas. 
Only one chapter of the White Paper was devoted to Scotland. It proposed the 
appointment of a Chief Executive for the SHS. and Donald Cruickshanks took up this 
position in August 1989:44 This made the Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, the 
senior medical official who advised the SHHD, answerable to the chief executive. 145 
The Government also intended to appoint general managers as health board members, 
and suggested that the size of health boards should be reducecL and include greater 
business input. 
The STUC contended that the White Paper's provisions, 'have been dreamt up 
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by right-wing theologians and Government Ministers who do not even use the 
NHS,.146 This was untrue, as the Health Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, patronised the 
NHS, much to the consternation of Thatcher. 147 Furthermore, the STUC alleged that 
the reduction and change in composition of health board membership would result in 
the removal of trade union representatives and, by 1991, there were no STUC 
nominees on Scotland's health boards, compared to thirty-two in 1979.148 
This restructuring sought to graft free market mechanisms onto a public sector 
entity, with the intention of generating greater competition and reduced costs. 
However, it offered little improvement in consumer choice, as patients who switched 
GP remained at the discretion of their GPs' decision-making. These reforms also 
alienated many healthcare professionals, as government scrutiny increased and GPs 
were compelled to undertake a minimum level of work. The prospect existed of a 
two-tier NHS developing, in which fundholding GPs were given preferential 
treatment, and some hospitals specialised in the most profitable services, whilst others 
were burdened with the expensive treatment of chronic illnesses. 149 Moreover, the 
introduction of drugs' budgets was criticised, as GPs could prescribe the cheapest 
medicine to contain costs and achieve financial bonuses. 
In Scotland, the introduction of a Chief Executive was interpreted as a 
downgrading of the position of the Chief Medical Officer for Scotland. ISO According 
to Bryan Christie the internal market 'was seen in Scotland as a solution to a problem 
affecting the south-east of England. How could competition be promoted in Scotland 
where large parts of the country are served by only one local hospital?'. Furthermore, 
Robin Cook asserted that, 'I view with profound distaste the allocation of health care 
discussed in the patter of a salesman', lSI and Labour emphasised that it would 
devolve responsibility for the SHS to a Scottish Assembly. The Glasgow Herald 
contended that, 'there are serious potential conflicts between the improved quality of 
care which the White Paper envisages and the market orientated assumptions that 
pervade it,.ls2 This reform added to the growing alienation of Scottish civil society, 
and led to the Constitutional Convention placing great emphasis on securing devolved 
control of the SHS.1S3 
The Government's decision to abolish free dental examinations. from January 
1989, and to stop free universal eye-testing, in April 1989, intensified these 
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misgivings. 154 Children aged sixteen and below, the unemployed and those on low 
incomes continued to receive these services at no cost, partially transferring the 
financial burden for these individuals from the state to the chargepayer. Between 
1980 and 1989 the number of courses of dental treatment in Scotland increased from 
2,549,000 to 3,144,000 but, after the introduction of charges, this figure fell to 
2,293,000 in 1990.155 This undermined the NHS's ability to prevent future illness, and 
failed to reduce state dependency. When questioned, in February 1989,65% of Scots 
thought that the Government's proposals would make the SHS worse. 156 However, 
SHS spending had risen by 34% between 1979 and 1989,157 and Thatcher contended 
that this illustrated her commitment to the NHS. 
The British Medical Association launched a campaign against the 
Conservatives' plans, estimating that 80% of GPs were sceptical about the proposals. 
Indeed, David Willetts alleges that Thatcher had to be dissuaded from abandoning the 
implementation of the internal market by Clarke. 1 S8 Thatcher's continuing sensitivity 
towards the NHS contradicts Steve Ilitfe's contention that it represented post-war 
social democracy's, 'greatest ideological and organisational weakness', and her 
statement in the White Paper's foreword that, 'The National Health Service will 
continue to be available to all, regardless of income, and to be financed mainly out of 
general taxation', illustrates Thatcher's inability to fully overturn the post-war 
consensus on health. 159 
The findings of the review acted as a catalyst in Thatcher's attempts to reform 
community care. In November 1989, a White Paper identified local authorities as the 
main community care providers, and guaranteed increased state support for carers. 160 
Thatcher called for greater private and voluntary sector provision, which was 
encouraged by a clause that allowed individuals to retain social security benefits if 
they entered a private residential home, but withdrew payments if they chose to stay 
in public residential care. The Scottish Secretary was also given powers to inspect 
residential homes, give directions, hold enquiries, and intervene in areas of 
community care if and when it was deemed necessary.161 The Government rejected 
Griffiths' concept of ring-fencing community care spending, and no effort was made 
to set national norms or appoint a minister for community care. 
Caring for People gave incentives for community care to be transferred from 
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the public to the private sector, and encouraged those in need of care to harness the 
resources of the state to prolong their independence. Thatcher believed that this 
would lead to greater individual and family responsibility. and less dependence on 
public sector facilities. Indeed, by giving local authorities a central role in community 
care, the Government ensured that it could control expenditure whilst divorcing itself 
from the effects of local decision-making. 
COStA attacked the Government's incentives for the use of private residential 
care, and rejected a greater role for the voluntary sector, whilst Robin Cook asserted 
that the proposals were, 'intended to reduce available choice by obliging local 
authorities to privatise their homes so that they may qualify for subsidy from public 
benefits' . 162 In some rural areas of Scotland there were no private sector facilities, and 
in other parts of Scotland there was insufficient private sector provision, leaving 
individuals in these areas at a disadvantage and discrediting the Government's 
assertions regarding improved choice. Indeed, Finlayson asserts that the voluntary 
sector resented the Government's efforts to increase voluntary involvement in 
services that had previously been dominated by the state. 163 
Thatcher's final SHS initiative related to health education policy, as she 
created a Special Health Board to set national targets and objectives for health 
education. l64 It was to train health board and local authority personnel. whilst 
coordinating health education programmes with each health board. Health boards 
were to construct local health strategies, involving family practitioner services. This 
encapsulated the changed ethos of the SHS under Thatcher. as increasing emphasis 
was placed on individual responsibility for health. Insufficient numbers of Scots. 
however, were heeding this advice, and Scotland's appalling record of ill-health 
persisted. 
Patients or Consumen? Thatcher's Overhaul in Penpective 
As Thatcher left office, in November 1990, her influence on the NHS was 
unmistakable. It had embraced private sector business practices, and consigned its 
consensual management structures to the past. Prescription charges stood at O.OS, 
covering 4.5% of the gross cost of the NHS compared to 2% in 1979:65 The 
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withdrawal of free universal eye-testing and dental check-ups undermined the 
founding principles of the NHS, partially transferred costs from the state to the 
chargepayer and damaged the effectiveness of preventive medicine, adding to NHS 
spending in the long-tenn. Contrary to Peter Riddell's contention that Thatcher's 
health record was 'in many ways .. .impressive', 166 existing inequalities in health 
between Britain's social classes also widened. Between 1981 and 1985 the number of 
individuals on low incomes who died before retirement age was 27«»10 above the 
British average, rising to 31 % between 1986 and 1990.167 In stark contrast, the health 
of middle-ranking and high-earners marginally improved over this period. 
Rather than harness the Black Report's recommendations to address these 
problems, Thatcher offered financial incentives for the use of private medicine. This 
acted as a subsidy to the private medical sector, and deprived the NHS of additional 
resources to increase the number of available beds in the SHS, which had fallen from 
60,356 in 1981 to 54,689 in 1990.168 Nevertheless, Thatcher was convinced that the 
private sector relieved pressure on the NHS, and surmised that its expansion would 
erode opposition to the introduction of a state-run health insurance system. 
By 1990, 11 % of the British population subscribed to private health insurance 
schemes. 169 The NHS remained the largest employer in western Europe, however, and 
the percentage ofGDP consumed by health spending rose from 4.9% in 1979 to 5.2% 
in 1990.170 Indeed, far from reducing the parameters of the state in healthcare, the 
appointment of general managers and chief executives added to central government 
control, and between 1980 and 1990, the number of administrative staff in the SHS 
rose from 13,255 to 15,923. 
The NHS's continued reliance on general taxation highlights Thatcher's 
inability to overturn the post-war consensus on health, and places in doubt Charles 
Webster's assertion that, 'the cumulative effect of the changes introduced after 1979 
were quite as profound as the reforms instituted ... after the Second World War' .171 The 
British public had little enthusiasm for health insurance, creating a conundrum that 
Thatcher was unable to solve. Many Conservative voters, were unwilling to contribute 
towards private insurance when their taxation contributions helped to fund the NHS. 
In 1987, 68% of Britain's highest earners and 72% of middle-ranking earners 
supported the continuation of a universal NHS. I72 Thatcher. therefore, accepted that 
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gradual reform had to take place within the existing system, and Timmins states that, 
'the NHS remained the best cost-control device available'. 173 
Paradoxically, her three election victories both hindered and accelerated this 
incremental process of change. During each campaign Thatcher committed the 
Conservatives to retaining the NHS, but subsequent reforms fuelled suspicions over 
privatisation. Income tax cuts also limited the finance available to the NHS, and 
spending constraints inhibited improvements in the quality of NHS treatment. 
Furthermore, by enabling consultants to undertake a greater private sector workload, 
Thatcher reduced their availability within the NHS, unnecessarily adding to NHS 
waiting times. This process facilitated private sector growth. but it angered taxpayers 
who felt obliged to utilise the private health sector. This added to public misgivings 
over thatcher'S intentions for the NHS and, in June 1989, 73% of Britons believed 
that the establishment of an internal market was the first stage towards 
privatisation. 174 
When questioned in 1987, 28% of Scots named Britain's health and welfare 
systems as their main source of national pride compared to 16% for the rest of the 
UK. 175 This illustrates, once again, the operation of a dual Scottish and British 
identity, which resulted in Scots defending a collectivist British institution that 
provided for their health needs. Thatcher's reforms were perceived as a threat to the 
existence of the NHS, and she alienated many Scottish doctors by imposing spending 
constraints, increased engagement in financial decision-making, and greater central 
government control. 176 Scottish healthcare professionals formed a sizeable component 
of civil society. adding to its disenchantment with Thatcher. Moreover, those Scots 
who were in lower-paid NHS employment were adversely affected by the introduction 
of competitive tendering, and the Government's efforts to contain wage costs. 
Yet, the SHS lagged behind the pace of reform elsewhere in Britain, and fared 
considerably better than the NHS in England. Scotland's share of health expenditure 
was protected by the Barnett formula and, in 1989, 7.5% of Scottish GDP was 
devoted to the SHS. 177 Furthermore, by 1990, the SHS employed one in fifteen of the 
Scottish working population, creating support for the NHS across the social spectrum. 
However, these feelings were not confined to Scotland and, in March 1990, 73% of 
Britons thought that the NHS was not safe in the Conservatives' hands. 178 Therefore, 
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much to Thatcher's frustration, the NHS retained the allegiance of all constituent 
parts of the UK. 
Finlay accurately concludes that, in Scotland, the defence of the NHS, 
increasingly took on a distinctly Scottish character. The NHS was not only a vital 
pillar of the post-war consensus, it also helped to justify Scotland's place within the 
Union. For many Scots, Thatcher's restructuring placed its continued existence in 
doubt, damaging Scottish perceptions of the British state (see chapter 6), and this led 
the Constitutional Convention to place great emphasis on winning devolved control of 
the SHS. Devolution offered Scottish healthcare professionals the opportunity to opt 
out of Thatcher's restructuring, whilst retaining the benefits of the Barnett formula 
and UK-wide pay bargaining, an option that did not exist for their English 
counterparts. In attempting to expand the private sector, and generate greater choice 
and cost-efficiency within the NHS, Thatcher unintentionally alienated civil society 
and fuelled demands for Home Rule. 
(3) 'THE JEWELS IN THE CROWN,?I79 SCOITISH EDUCA nON 
UNDER THATCHER, 1979-1990 
Compared to the NHS, the Scottish education system was an unparalleled symbol of 
Scotland's autonomy within the Unio~ with teachers and academics forming an 
integral component of civil society. Contrary to Riddell's assertion that, 'it had been 
commonly agreed in British politics that something should be done to raise 
standards', the Scottish system was widely perceived to be superior to its counterpart 
in England and Wales. ISO The introduction of a comprehensive system had been less 
controversial in Scotland and, by 1979, it had been accepted by the overwhelming 
majority of Scots. lSI Nevertheless, Thatcher was determined to challenge the post-war 
consensus by increasing parental choice, and streamlining Britain's universities. 
In January 1980, the Government unveiled its plans for an Assisted Places' 
scheme, which was to increase educational opportunities for the poorest families who 
could not afford to send their children to private schools. The scheme enabled them to 
do so at the state's expense, alleviating demand on public sector schooling. 1s2 
Timmins claims that the 'wets' attempted to sabotage the scheme and succeeded in 
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reducing its intended scale. IS3 Thatcher also set up the Scottish Joint Negotiating 
Committee (SJNC) to arbitrate in teachers' pay disputes, contradicting her desire to 
exclude trade unions from Government decision-making by creating a collective 
bargaining body that comprised local authority, trade union and Scottish Education 
Department (SED) representation. 184 Furthennore, all of these refonns added to 
public expenditure and state bureaucracy. 
The Parents' Charter, a ground-breaking initiative, was contained in the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1981, and compelled Scotland's regional authorities to 
relax school catchment zones, and provide school examination results, enabling 
parents to choose their children's school. 185 By giving parents greater choice, 
Thatcher envisaged an education market appearing, in which well-run schools would 
flourish and attract large numbers of pupils, whilst under-perfonning schools would 
be forced to improve to avoid closure. Those parents living in the existing catchment 
area were to be given first priority and excess capacity was then made available 
through the Charter. School councils were to consider applications and parents whose 
requests were unsuccessful could appeal to a committee of their regional council 
which contained non-council members. This refonn was intended to enhance family 
responsibility, whilst loosening the grip of Scotland's regional authorities over 
education. Nevertheless, Conservative supporters gained little from the Charter, as 
Scotland's most academic local authority schools were principally located in 
Conservative-voting areas. 
The EIS described the Assisted Places Scheme as 'socially divisive and almost 
entirely irrelevant', contending that the Parents' Charter favoured the 'well-to-do at 
the expense of the under-privileged'. 186 This accusation was inaccurate, as all social 
classes could utilise the Charter, enabling parents living in a catchment area with 
under-perfonning schools to send their children to a school with a better academic 
record. The Parents' Charter, Labour asserted, would create a selective tier of 
Scotland's best comprehensives, but the Charter did not take a child's academic 
ability into account, discounting this argument. The Glasgow Herald dismissed the 
Charter as an 'Irrelevant exercise', and the Times Educational Supplement Scotland 
(TESS) branded the Assisted Places Scheme as, 'the most divisive educational scheme 
for many years'. 187 
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The Parents' Charter came into effect in February 1982, and Scottish parents 
responded positively to its implementation. Between 1981182 and 1984/85 placing 
requests doubled from 10,456 to 20,795, and 93.8% of secondary school requests 
were granted. Wide regional variations, however, distorted Thatcher's vision of a 
market-orientated education sector, as rural areas with few schools gained little 
benefit from the Charter. Indeed, the popularity of this reform failed to increase 
support for the Scottish Conservatives. 
Higher and further education were Thatcher's next targets. In August 1980, 
Younger announced that Hamilton and Callander Park primary teacher training 
coJ1eges would close.1 88 Britain's universities were also targeted, and between 
1980/81 and 1986/87 Scotland's universities saw their spending cut by 16.69%.189 
Keith Joseph's appointment as Education Secretary, in September 1981, intensified 
this climate of retrenchment, and from 1981, the University Grants Commission 
(UGe) began to grade university departments according to the quality of their 
research whilst inaugurating a series of subject reviews. l90 Some reviews 
recommended the closure of departments and the restriction of others to 
undergraduate teaching. 
One solution to higher education's funding difficulties was to introduce 
student loans to subsidise the existing grants system. Yet, prior to the 1983 General 
Election, this proposal was abandoned. Cecil Parkinson, the Conservative Party 
Chairman, expressed fears that it would deter working-class students from attending 
university.l9l The issue re-emerged in the summer of 1984, when Joseph agreed a 
package with Lawson and Younger to abolish the minimum level of grant for the 
wealthiest students whilst increasing parental maintenance contributions for students 
of parents in the middle or upper-middle income scales. l92 Half of the Government's 
savings from this measure were to be redistributed to the poorest students, but 
Joseph's proposals caused uproar on the Conservative backbenches, as middle-class 
families were to be financially disadvantaged. Concerned about the political 
repercussions of this reform, Thatcher forced Joseph to abandon his plans, 
undermining the Government's efforts to overturn the post-war consensus, and further 
exacerbating the funding crisis in higher education. 
Meanwhile, in July 1984, Younger had appointed the Scottish Tertiary 
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Education Advisory Council (STEAC), contalmng representatives from higher 
education, industry and commerce, 'to consider and report on the future strategy for 
higher education in Scotland' .193 STEAC reported back in December 1985, 
recommending that control of Scottish higher education finance should be devolved 
to the Scottish Office, a separate Scottish sub-committee of the UOC should be 
established, and a Scottish Higher Education Planning Council should be created. 
These demands were rejected, and STEAC was dissolved. Some Scottish vice-
chancellors campaigned for a Scottish sub-committee of the UOC, but the UOC urged 
them to focus on improving Scottish higher education. This highlighted growing 
unrest amongst a sector of civil society that had unanimously opposed devolution in 
1979, and increased anxiety over Scottish educational autonomy. 
The concept of education vouchers intrigued the Government.194 Parents were 
to exchange them in return for the schooling of their choice in either the public or the 
private sector. A plethora of means-tested and non-means-tested schemes were 
proposed, with Joseph and Thatcher being attracted to means-tested vouchers, which 
limited government expenditure. 195 However, they feared the consequences of 
transferring education costs to middle-class voters, and Oliver Letwin, an adviser to 
Joseph, contends that Department of Education and Science (DES) civil servants 
obstructed any possible reform. Therefore, Thatcher and Joseph abandoned the 
voucher scheme. Once again, Thatcher had placed political priorities ahead of her 
attack on the post-war consensus because of concerns over the attitudes of middle-
class Conservative voters. 
In 1981, Allan Stewart announced that he favoured altering the two-thirds rule 
for sacking an 'incompetent' teacher. l96 These views ran contrary to the ethos of 
'democratic intellectualism', which assigned school teachers and academics elevated 
status within Scottish society because of their contribution to the nation's 
education.197 Moreover, Stewart's stance illustrates the extent to which the Scottish 
Conservative Party had abandoned its Unionist roots (see chapter 1). 
Stewart's views provoked a hostile response from Scotland's teachers, and 
speculation regarding the introduction of teacher assessments heightened tension. The 
EIS was by far Scotland's largest teaching' union, with a membership of 45,000 by 
1984, comprising 80% of Scotland's teachers. 198 By contrast, in England and Wales, 
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there was a proliferation of unions, and the largest teaching union, the National Union 
of Teachers (NUT), claimed less than half of teachers as members. Conflict 
subsequently arose over the implementation of the findings of the Munn and Dunning 
Reports, which were to be introduced between 1984 and 1989,199 requiring the 
cooperation of the teaching profession in curricular development. 
A consultative paper on the funding of this refonn was launched in September 
1982, and the SED estimated that it would cost £ 17 million per year gradually to 
phase the new curriculum into place. Spending on Scottish education had risen from 
£13.86 billion in 1980/81 to £17.16 billion in 1983/84,200 and Younger emphasised 
that this precluded any rise in teachers' pay. In June 1983, Stewart was appointed as 
Scottish Education Minister, which was interpreted by the teaching profession as a 
provocative gesture. Tensions further heightened in December 1983, when the EIS 
drew up a pay claim of9.5% for 1984/85 and, in February 1984, the STUC contended 
that the SED's timescale and the resources available were unrealistically limited.201 
The General Secretary of the EIS, John Pollock, called for an independent pay 
review, in April, and his demand was bolstered by the support of the Scottish 
Secondary Teachers' Association (SSTA).202 The deadlock hardened on 29 
September when the EIS national council voted to boycott curriculum development in 
protest at inadequate staffing levels, and on 23 November, the EIS outlined its plans 
for strike action. This was to involve one all-day national strike, and three days of 
rolling strikes on a regional basis. 
On 4 December, the SJNC's working party on teachers' workload ratcbeted up 
tension stating that Scottish teachers were overworked and undervalued Significantly 
this report had been written by a collective bargaining body, established by Thatcher, 
which included the teachers' local government employers, as well as trade unionists. 
Nevertheless, in mid-December Younger announced that there would be no 
independent pay review. Both sides were now deeply entrenched and on 20 December 
the EIS announced that in an 85% poll, more than 75% of teachers bad voted to give 
the EIS leadership powers to escalate industrial action. 
The EIS had adhered to the Government's preferred mechanisms regarding 
public sector industrial action (see chapter 3), and strike action began in January 
1985, with the EIS targeting the constituencies of Scottish Office ministers, and in the 
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third week of January, EIS members voted by a margin of six to one to withdraw from 
all examinations procedures.203 The tactical advantage of the EIS' s curricular boycott 
was that its members did not lose any pay, because they were not in breach of their 
contracts. At the end of March, 5,000 teachers demonstrated at Younger's 
constituency in Ayr, prompting Stewart to describe the EIS's policy of targeted action 
as a 'quite unprecedented tactic of victimisation' .204 Yet, by May, it became clear that 
the EIS' s curricular boycott had been successful, as many schools reverted to O-Grade 
English and Maths, rather than Standard Grade, as had been intended. 
COSLA offered teachers a 15% rise over three years based on a new pay and 
conditions package on 29 August, but 71 % of EIS members rejected this deal. The 
greatest impediment to a settlement was the Government's insistence that additional 
finance had to be tied to job specification, which included the possible introduction of 
teacher assessments. Thatcher, furious at the lack of progress, held a meeting with 
Scottish Office ministers prior to Christmas, at which David Ross alleges she asked 
Younger to explore the possibility of removing educational responsibility from 
regional authorities. 
Malcolm Ritkind replaced Younger in January, and entered St Andrew's 
House with a brief to resolve the increasingly embarrassing dispute.2os Ritkind met 
the teaching unions at the end of January, and was informed that intransigence in 
February would result in an escalation of action in March. On 6 March 1986, Ritkind 
announced the establishment of an Independent Committee of Inquiry, with a remit to 
establish a basis for pay, conditions of service, and management of the teaching 
profession in Scotland.206 
This was not a full-scale capitulation by Ritkin~ as the Committee was only 
to consider options that did not contradict the Government's plans for public 
expenditure. The Glasgow Herald stated that Ritkind's offer, "was not one that the 
teachers could dismiss out of hand without a considerable loss of credibility'. 207 
Nevertheless, Pollock insisted that the strike would continue unless the regional 
authorities offered a two-year pay deal in the interim. On 18 March the SJNC met and 
agreed to offer the teachers 14.95% over two years, including backdating, on the 
proviso that strike action ceased.208 This package was accepted by the teaching 
unions, and the dispute ended a year and three months after it had begun. 
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The significance of this strike was considerable as, for the first time since she 
came to power, Thatcher had been outmanoeuvred by a trade union. The EIS ensured 
that its members continued to receive their full salary, enabling it to maintain the 
initiative throughout the strike. Moreover, the teaching profession formed an integral 
component of civil society, and the dispute accelerated the Conservatives' gradual 
alienation of Scottish middle-class voters. The conduct of the strike heightened 
Thatcher's distrust of local authorities, leading to greater central government control, 
as the SED completed the curricular development that teachers refused to undertake. 
This strengthened Thatcher's resolve to devolve greater power to parents, and 
diminish the educational responsibilities of local government. 
Scotland's teachers fared considerably better than their English counterparts 
who had engaged in less uniform strike action over the same period. In 1987 the 
Government passed the Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act, which abolished collective 
bargaining, replacing it with the Interim Advisory Committee on Teachers' Pay.209 It 
was to operate within spending guidelines laid down by the Treasury, and had the 
power to impose pay settlements on the teaching profession. Thatcher could have 
enacted identical legislation in Scotland, but opted not to do so. This undermined her 
efforts to overturn the post-war consensus, as Scotland's collective bargaining 
machinery remained in place. 
Closing Ranks: Scottish Education, 1987-1990 
Thatcher was returned to power in June 1987 on a manifesto that promised radical 
education reforms in England and Wales, but made no specific commitments in 
Scotland. The 1988 Education Reform Act altered the ethos of English and Welsh 
education by empowering all schools to opt-out of local authority control, and it 
established a national curriculum with various testing phases.2lO Lawson wanted to 
remove education from the responsibility of local authorities,211 whilst Thatcher 
believed that these reforms would impose grammar school standards on the 
comprehensive system facilitating greater parental choice. 
The Act also abolished academic tenure in universities, which had previously 
ensured job security for academics, and it replaced the UOC with the Universities 
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Funding Council (UFC).212 Between 40% and 60% of the UFC's membership was to 
be drawn from higher education, and it was to perfonn a similar task to the UGC 
whilst improving efficiency and lowering costs. These refonns illustrate Thatcher's 
pragmatic acceptance that the state would remain the foremost provider of education 
for the foreseeable future. However, the manner in which she sought to contain public 
spending and control the content of teaching was questionable, as she centralised 
power at the 'self-righteously socialist' DES.213 
In Scotland, Forsyth's appointment as Education Minister, after the 1987 
General Election, illustrated Thatcher's desire to instigate further refonn. His first 
task was to draft legislation for the introduction of school boards, mirroring the 
boards of governors that already existed in England and Wales. School boards were to 
have extensive rights to be informed and consulted about their schools' educational, 
disciplinary and financial policies and achievements, and were to participate in the 
appointment of senior staff.214 Forsyth portrayed this restructuring as a mechanism to 
improve democracy in Scottish schools, facilitating greater communication between 
parents and education authorities.2lS Furthermore, he proposed the creation of a 
national system of testing, which was to enable parents to unifonnly scrutinise the 
perfonnance of schools. 
The introduction of school boards was expected to cost an additional £ 12 
million per year, contradicting Thatcher's desire to contain public spending. 
Nevertheless, Forsyth envisaged school boards in an ideological role. He hoped to 
diminish the power of Scotland's predominantly Labour-controlled regional 
authorities by giving parents a greater input into the running of schools. Furthermore, 
school boards were essential if Scotland was to introduce grant-maintained schools, 
which operated in England and Wales outwith local authority control, receiving their 
funding directly from central govemment.216 
The STUC contended that, 'The general thrust...is towards a much tighter 
central controL.Such an approach is profoundly undemocratic~ alien to the traditions 
of Scottish education; and is, therefore, rejected by the STUC'. However, the STUC 
was mistaken as, since the creation of the SED, Scottish education had experienced 
greater central direction than the English and Welsh system. Furthermore, elected 
school boards that covered groups of schools had existed in Scotland until 1918.217 
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The national curriculum had the potential to undermine 'democratic intellectualism', 
but only if it was based on a narrow set of subjects, as desired by Thatcher and 
Forsyth, who were dismayed by the SED's development of an expansive 
curriculum.2ls Yet there was no tradition of parental involvement in Scotland, 
because 'democratic intellectualism' operated on the premise that teachers were best 
qualified to take decisions affecting education provision. By October 1989 only 15% 
of Stratbclyde's secondary schools had constituted school boards, whilst Shetland and 
the Western Isles had none. 219 
Education was further politicised in the first six months of 1988 by the 
proposed closure of Paisley Grammar School by Strathclyde Region, as it attempted 
to reduce costs. Paisley Grammar was a successful school with a capacity rate of over 
80%, and parents and former pupils, including the Conservative supporting journalist, 
Andrew Neil, set up an action group, calling on the Government to revive its power to 
consider parental appeals against school closures.22o According to Thatcher, it was 
she who took the initiative by sending a personal minute to Rifkind demanding that 
action be taken to save the school but, in a letter to Donald Dewar, Rifkind denied 
any prompting from Thatcher.221 Regulations subsequently empowered the Scottish 
Secretary to intervene in school closures when a school roll was greater than 80% of 
its capacity. 222 
Meanwhile, a substantial expansion had taken place in Scottish private 
education. Between 1979/80 and 1989/90 the number of independent schools 
increased from 96 to 121, and their rolls doubled from 16,400 to 33,100.223 This 
period of growth took place at a time of falling pupil numbers and, by 1990, the 
Assisted Places Scheme was contributing £6.67 million to fee-paying schools in 
return for the education of 2,834 children. Indeed, Scotland's increase outstripped that 
of Britain, which was starting from a higher threshold, as the percentage of British 
pupils in the fee-paying sector rose from 5.8% in 1979 to 6.7% in 1991.224 
Paradoxically, the Parents' Charter may have acted as an impediment to even greater 
private sector growth, as it enabled those parents who had considered sending their 
children to fee-paying schools to utilise excess capacity in Scotland's most popular 
local authority schools. 
Nevertheless, concern grew in Scottish educational circles that Thatcher was 
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intent on assimilating Scotland's education system with that of England and Wales. 
Subsequently, the Forum on Scottish Education (FSE) was established. which aimed 
to safeguard comprehensive education, calling for greater resources.22S It stated that 
Scotland's education system should be 'locally and democratically controlled, within 
an appropriate national framework'. The Rev. Ian MacDonald became chainnan, and 
the Forum was supported by the Church of Scotland Education Committee, the EIS, 
the SST A, and the Catholic Education Commission (Scotland). 226 
This body emphasised that Thatcher's refonns in England and Wales were 
inapplicable to Scotland, because local authority provision was of a higher standard 
than elsewhere in the UK. In 1987/88, 23% of Scottish school leavers held three or 
more Highers, but only 16% of British schoolleavers held two or more A_Levels.227 
Indeed, by 1990,24% of Scots attended university, whereas the British figure lagged 
behind at 15%.228 Yet, by 1993, 82% of pupils in Springburn, 77% in Maryhill, and 
72% in Bailleston failed to achieve five credit or general grades in their Standard 
Grade exams.229 Moreover, in Scotland, the percentage of working-class university 
students fell from 26% in 1980 to 18% in 1990.230 The involvement of Scotland's 
churches gave the Forum added moral authority, and heightened the increasingly 
nationalist defence of Scotland's education system. 
The Self-Governing Schools (Scotland) Act 1989 intensified Scottish 
discontent. It was intended to enable schools to operate independently within the state 
sector in a similar fashion to grant-maintained schools in England, and it was closely 
linked to the establishment of school boards. Self-governing schools were to have 
their own board of management on which parents, teachers, the headteacher, and 
members of the local community would sit. 231 The Government stated that they would 
be free to develop some aspects of the curriculum, and to promote any desired ethos 
within the school. All parents were to be balloted before the decision to become self-
governing was endorsed, and the Scottish Office was to provide these schools with 
grants that were to be deducted from the budget of the appropriate education 
authority. 
Simon Jenkins asserts that the opting-out legislation was intended, 'to achieve 
the goal of ridding education of local democracy', but he misinterprets Thatcher's 
vision, as she intended to rid education of socialism not democracy.232 Forsyth hoped 
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that school boards would rapidly desire greater powers, and self-governing status was 
intended to provide these parental bodies with financial autonomy. This corresponded 
with Thatcher's goal of creating enabling councils (see chapter 5), and was designed 
to reduce poll tax bills. Thatcher also believed that self-governing schools would 
reduce the possibility of strike action, as they were able to offer separate contracts 
with differing pay and conditions to the local authority sector. 
The FSE stated that, 'Inappropriate changes should not be imported from 
England', and the STUC believed that self-governing schools were primarily 
concerned with centralising control of Scottish education.233 Extra tension was added 
to the parliamentary debate by the involvement of Conservative MPs, who 
represented English constituencies. Edward Leigh, MP for Gainsborough and 
Horncastle, justified their presence with the statement, 'We must have a contribution 
to make because we can inform Scottish members about what has been happening in 
England,.234 However, Alex Salmond posed the question, 'Is it not possible that 
Scottish and English parents take a different view of these things?'. According to 
Thatcher's memoirs, Rifkind was opposed to self-governing schools on the grounds 
that there was no demand for this provision, but she insisted that he proceed with the 
reform.235 The EIS derided this measure as 'Anglicisation', and at the time of writing 
(2004) only two Scottish schools have voted to become self-governing, whilst 16% of 
English secondary schools had become grant-maintained by 1997.236 
The Scottish Conservatives' dependency on English support to enact Scottish 
Office legislation only served to strengthen the EIS's accusations regarding 
'Anglicisation'. Yet, these claims were inaccurate, as the introduction of school 
boards, national testing and self-governing schools were intended to facilitate the 
creation of an education marketplace, encouraging competition and enterprise. Both 
school boards and self-governing schools were designed to promote greater parental 
choice and less local authority control. Moreover, national testing sought to enable 
parents to gauge the progress of their child whilst highlighting under-performing 
schools. 
These reforms ran contrary to the ethos of 'democratic intellectualism', but 
were not intended to threaten Scotland's separate education system. On the contrary, 
Thatcher believed that this restructuring was essential if the post-war consensus on 
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education was to be broken throughout Britain. However, because there was little 
Scottish electoral or professional demand for these measures, the EIS and opposition 
parties branded this centralisation of power as 'Anglicisation'. 
Meanwhile, Britain's universities and polytechnics had been forging closer 
links with industry and, by 1989,6% of their funding was received from industry and 
commerce.237 This process was complemented by the Government's decision, in 
November 1988, to introduce student loans. Between 1978179 and 1987/88 the value 
of student grants had fallen by 12%, and Thatcher favoured replacing the grants 
system with loans in order to make students more sensitive to market forces. 238 She 
also believed that Britain's leading universities should be empowered to charge the 
fees that they felt were appropriate to their particular institution. 
Such a wholesale break with the post-war consensus might, however, have 
sparked middle-class resentment over the additional financial burden entailed in the 
abolition of grants. Therefore, from the start of session 1990/91, grants were to be 
frozen, housing benefit for students was to cease, and loans of up to £420 were to be 
made available to all students. The loans were to be interest free, increasing in line 
with inflation, and the proportion of student finance covered by loans was gradually 
to rise.239 Loans would be repayable once a student's earnings had reached 85% of the 
national average wage, and a period of between five and ten years was allowed for 
repayment. 
This reform represented the first stage in the abolition of grants and the 
abandonment of the principle of free universal higher education. Yet, by introducing 
loans, Thatcher contradicted her moral belief that individuals and families should 
remain financially independent and debt free (see chapter 2), as loans created short-
term financial dependency on the Exchequer, and added to the growing number of 
Britons with debt problems. Moreover, the introduction of loans failed to facilitate the 
creation of a higher education marketplace, as there was no differentiation between 
the costs of different universities. This political concession to middle-class 
Conservative voters emasculated Thatcher's vision of inter-university competition, 
and illustrated the extent to which middle-class Britons remained committed to the 
post-war consensus on higher education. 
The number of staff at Scotland's universities fell from 5,132 in 1979/80 to 
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4,470 in 1989/90.240 The Government contended that, as the monopoly purchaser of 
university services, it had the right to decide what was taught, how many staff were 
required and the scale of research that each university should undertake.241 It 
abandoned subject reviews, concentrated on performance indicators, and required all 
universities to establish a system of staff appraisal. 242 Contrary to perceptions of 
'Anglicisation', the UFC created a Scottish Committee that was to consider, in 
conjunction with the SED and the Scottish Secretary, the demand for higher education 
in Scotland, and the implications of this for the balance of provision amongst the 
university, grant-aided and local authority sectors.243 Membership of the Scottish 
Committee was heavily drawn from the business community, as Thatcher attempted 
to mould the UFC into a management board. Nevertheless, this conflicted with 
Scotland's tradition of 'democratic intellectualism', which entrusted academics with 
decision-making. 
Letwin contends that, 'Although the policy was clearly inspired by the 
Thatcherite commitment to making Britain flourish, that aim was implemented in a 
fashion that violated all other Thatcherite commitments'. 244 However, the only viable 
political option that corresponded with Thatcher's economic strategy was to centralise 
control of universities' spending levels, priorities and teaching methods. This failed to 
deliver the results that Thatcher intended, as its implementation was reliant upon the 
SED, which had a vested interest in extending its powerbase through rigorous checks 
and measures that significantly added to bureaucracy.245 Furthermore, many of the 
UFC's members from the business community had little knowledge or experience of 
universities, hindering their efforts to improve efficiency and lower costs, whilst its 
academic members had a vested interest in maintaining expenditure. Writing in her 
memoirs, Thatcher concedes that the Government's education critics 'had a stronger 
case than I would have liked'. 246 
'Anglicisation' or Centralisation? An Overview of Thatcher's Education 
Reforms 
Thatcher's influence on Scottish education was profound, as she oversaw the 
introduction of parental choice and a substantial expansion in private education. Her 
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most successful reform was the Parents' Charter and by 1989/90 the number of 
placing requests under this scheme had risen to 24,901.247 Yet Thatcher's desire to 
overturn the post-war consensus on education was thwarted by the attitudes of 
middle-class voters. She was unable to introduce means-tested education vouchers 
because of the financial costs likely to be imposed on middle-class parents, and 
Thatcher abandoned her plans to replace student grants with loans, as middle-class 
Conservative voters supported state subsidisation of higher education. 
In Scotland, self-governing schools failed to win a similar degree of support to 
grant-maintained schools in England, and school boards did not provoke the upsurge 
in parental participation anticipated by the Government. While this restructuring 
reduced the powers of Scotland's local authorities, resulting in greater central control 
by the SED, comprehensive schools remained predominant. A similar pattern 
emerged in higher education, as Britain's universities saw their financial autonomy 
heavily constrained by central government targets and spending cuts. 
Scotland was more resistant to Thatcher's education policies than elsewhere 
in the UK, because of its distinctive education system. The Government's foremost 
opponent was the EIS, which used its strength amongst Scottish teachers to resist the 
Conservatives' restructuring in a more uniform fashion than the disparate English and 
Welsh teaching unions. It was concerned that Thatcher's consumer-orientated 
initiatives were introducing a greater degree of scrutiny and accountability to the 
teaching profession, contradicting Scotland's tradition of 'democratic 
intellectualism'. Furthermore the Government's public questioning of the quality of 
the teaching-force created a climate of resentment and distrust. 
According to Lindsay Paterson, 'Scottish educational professionals have 
tended not to trust lay people to interfere in their practice' ,248 and this unrest 
manifested itself in the 1985/86 Scottish teachers' strike. The EIS gradually cultivated 
a campaign against the 'Anglicisation' of Scottish education, which gained 
momentum after the 1987 General Election. This can be partly attributed to 
Thatcher's revitalised efforts to reform Scottish education and the appointment of 
Forsyth to oversee this restructuring, but it was also politically opportune to do so, 
with the Conservatives' mandate to govern Scotland under scrutiny. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the EIS was the only trade union that Thatcher 
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failed to castrate during her premiership, as its membership and militancy grew 
without legislative or economic hindrance. The Government aided the EIS' s position 
by establishing the SJNC, contradicting Thatcher's trade union strategy through the 
creation of a collective bargaining body. This was in stark contrast to her imposition 
of centrally-controlled pay settlements on English and Welsh teachers, and discredits 
the EIS' s assertion that Thatcher intended to 'Anglicise' Scottish education. In reality, 
Thatcher believed that Scotland had to pursue similar policies to those of England and 
Wales if the post-war consensus was to be broken, and a spirit of enterprise was to 
flourish amongst the next generation. 
However, Thatcher's attempts to expand democracy through the extension of 
parental choice unintentionally infringed on Scotland's tradition of 'democratic 
intellectualism' . Thatcher failed to appreciate that, in Scotland, the interests of 
democracy were seen to be best served by pursuing a broad curriculum in a 
meritocratic system under the guidance of education professionals, whereas her 
reforms attacked this principle by encouraging parental and business input. 
Furthermore, the Parents' Charter did not significantly benefit Conservative-voting 
areas, and was unable to provoke an upsurge in support for the Scottish 
Conservatives. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that Thatcher intentionally 
imposed her reforms on Scotland for English nationalist reasons. Indeed expenditure 
on Scottish education rose to £18 billion in 1988/89, whilst the percentage of the 
Scottish Office budget consumed by education increased from 24.9010 in 1979/80 to 
25.9% in 1987/88.249 
Scottish teaching professionals formed a crucial component of civil society, 
and Thatcher's restructuring added to civil society's growing alienation. Since the 
1960s, social progression in Scotland had been more heavily interlinked with 
educational achievement than in England,250 which meant that many middle-class 
Scots' experience of education corresponded with the 'lad 0' pairts' construct. 
Moreover, the Scottish middle-class tended to study at Scottish universities, which 
reinforced middle-class pride in Scotland's distinctive education system. This 
conflicted with Thatcher's belief in social progression through the medium of 
entrepreneurial activity, and created the preconditions for civil society to mount a 
nationalist campaign of opposition to Thatcher's restructuring and spending cuts. 
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After 1987 the Government's education reforms combined with the 
introduction of the poll tax to create the perception that Thatcher was 'anti-Scottish' 
and that she was intent on 'Anglicising' Scotland. The Scottish Conservatives 
appeared to confirm these assertions by abandoning any attachment to 'democratic 
intellectualism', which damaged the party's credibility amongst many middle-class 
Scots. Unrest with the Government's education policies was fed into the campaign for 
Home Rule, and the Constitutional Convention placed great emphasis on securing 
devolved control of Scottish education. 251 Thatcher's failed efforts to overturn the 
post-war consensus on education infringed upon Scotland's separate educational 
traditions, alienating civil society and amplifying demands for devolution. 
'SOCIALISING THE NATIONAL INCOME,?132 THATCHER'S IMPACT ON 
THE WELFARE STATE IN SCOTLAND 
Thatcher's attempts to overhaul the welfare state and rupture the post-war consensus 
were fatally hindered by the Conservatives' lack of strategy and vision. Whilst in 
opposition very little detailed thought had been given to the welfare state beyond the 
need to improve efficiency, increase consumer choice and contain costs. This lack of 
preparedness was exacerbated by Thatcher's personal discomfort when discussing 
welfare state issues and, after the 1987 General Election, the Government hurriedly 
undertook reforms intended to graft private marketplace mechanisms onto the welfare 
state. 
Thatcher's sole success in overturning the post-war consensus was in the field 
of social security, but this failed to prevent a dramatic rise in dependency, because of 
the effects of mass unemployment. Deprivation greatly increased as a result of these 
changes and, by 1990, 20% of British households were living in poverty.253 This 
resulted in the emergence of an 'underclass' in the poorest areas of Britain, and 
between 1981 and 1991 the percentage of households in Springburn with child 
dependents that contained no working adults rose from 7% to 32%. 
Nevertheless, the New Right was dismayed by Thatcher's cautious approach, 
and Finlayson believes that the most marked difference between her premiership and 
the consensus era was in terms of rhetoric.254 Yet Thatcher's inertia reflected middle-
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class support for key tenets of the post-war consensus on health and education, such 
as the universal provision of free medical treatment, schooling and higher education. 
These attitudes represented a significant barrier to Thatcher's assault on the 
consensus, as middle-class voters were contributing towards the welfare state via 
income tax, and they demanded the best possible service for the lowest rate of tax. 
These voters were potential Conservative supporters, and Thatcher was 
unwilling to damage her electoral prospects through unpopular initiatives, such as 
health insurance and education vouchers, which directly transferred costs from the 
state to the individual. Thatcher, therefore, compromised her ideological beliefs by 
increasing central government control and scrutiny in order to maximise efficiency 
and enable further income tax reductions. Forsyth concedes that the Conservatives' 
desire to radically overhaul the welfare state was thwarted by political reality.255 
In Scotland, healthcare and education professionals were integral members of 
civil society, and the centralisation process infringed upon the autonomy of these 
groupings. Nevertheless, Thatcher did not intend to' Anglicise' Scottish education or 
the SHS. On the contrary, her Scottish reforms mirrored those in England and Wales, 
because Thatcher was determined to attack the post-war consensus throughout 
Britain. The Scottish Conservative Party was impotent and directionless throughout 
this process. It failed to devise any separate Scottish policies, and abandoned the 
Unionists' strong belief in 'democratic intellectualism'. 
Forsyth was the only Scottish Conservative minister who took the initiative on 
welfare state reform, but his intensified pursuit of the objectives implemented by 
Thatcher elsewhere in Britain, heightening fears over 'Anglicisation'. Scotland bad 
more to lose from the Conservatives' restructuring than other parts of Britain, because 
of its higher rates of welfare dependency, chronic levels of ill-health, and distinctive 
education system. Paterson's assertion, however, that Scots remained more 
committed to the public sector than the English, 256 should not be over-emphasised 
with regards to the NHS or higher education, as both retained the support of a 
growing majority of the British electorate. 
The welfare state had been a mechanism for social mobility in Scotland since 
the 1960s and Finlay estimates that, by the mid-1980s, at least 250,000 working-class 
Scots had progressed into white collar jobs as a result of the welfare state.257 These 
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individuals used the Scottish education system to become teachers, healthcare 
professionals and civil servants, and the Scottish middle-class resented the threat that 
Thatcher's reforms posed to the structure and ethos of the welfare state. This unified 
the interests of the Scottish working-class and middle-class to a greater extent than in 
England, where entrepreneurial activity provided higher levels of social progression. 
The post-war consensus on the welfare state largely remained in place. and 
Scotland continued to enjoy additional health and education expenditure through the 
Barnett formula, but Scottish perceptions of the British state were damaged by 
Thatcher's restructuring. It appeared that Scotland could no longer guarantee that its 
social needs would be adequately met by the British state, and civil society was 
alarmed at the erosion of its welfare state powerbase. This led to civil society 
embracing devolution as a means of preserving the values of the post-war welfare 
state whilst retaining Scotland's spending advantage. 
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Chapter Five 
'THE RUNAWAY TRAIN,?1 SCOTTISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
THATCHER ERA 
Writing in her memoirs in 1993 Margaret Thatcher outlined her interpretation of 
Scotland's ills, 'On top of decline in Scotland's heavy industry came socialism -
intended as a cure, but itself developing quite new strains of social and economic 
disease'.2 According to Thatcher, no area of Scottish society displayed symptoms of 
this 'disease' more than local government, which had played an integral role in 
advancing the post-war corporatist consensus.3 Britain's local authorities consumed 
huge sums of public finance, and were responsible for the administration of the rates, 
a property tax despised by the 'New Right'.4 Thatcher's attempts to overthrow the 
consensus in local government spanned her entire premiership, and provided a 
combination of great success and critical failure. This section examines Thatcher's 
reform of Scottish local government, and will include analysis of the community 
charge or the poll tax, as it was notoriously known. 
Local government has largely been overlooked by Scottish historians when 
analysing the Thatcher years, and effectively has been monopolised by Arthur 
Midwinter. In contrast, the poll tax has received widespread critical analysis, 
inextricably linked to Thatcher's downfall as Prime Minister, and categorised 
alongside the Titanic as a famous 'historical blunder'. 5 Much popular mythology 
surrounds the tax in Scotland, and it is a widely held opinion that Scotland was used 
as a 'guinea pig' to test the charge's suitability. Alice Brown, David McCrone and 
Lindsay Paterson have embellished this interpretation of events by concluding that the 
introduction of the community charge in Scotland was the end product of Thatcher's 
desire to use Scotland as a 'test bed' for rating reform.6 This chapter challenges and 
discounts this theory by analysing the origins of the poll tax in Scotland. 
Analysis of Scottish local government during Thatcher's premiership IS 
extremely limited, and sometimes open to interpretation. Gerald Warner states that 
the poll tax was an 'equitable reform' that was distorted by 'Black propaganda', while 
Christopher Harvie wrongly asserts that the sale of council houses was the brainchild 
of George Younger. 7 In reality, Peter Walker and Michael Heseltine were responsible 
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for designing this scheme whilst in opposition. Richard Finlay provides 
comprehensive coverage of rating reform, and describes Scotland's local authorities 
as, 'the last significant remnants of the corporatist Welfare State'. 8 Yet, in suggesting 
that Thatcher wanted councils to raise their revenue through rates increases, he 
misinterprets the message underlying her reduction in central government grants. On 
the contrary, Thatcher wanted local authorities to find cost savings within their own 
budgets. 
Harvie overemphasises the input of Douglas Mason, and overlooks the 
importance of the rating review team appointed by Thatcher in autumn 1984. On the 
other hand, James Mitchell examines the poll tax thoroughly, but fails to emphasise 
the Scottish Conservative Party's complicity in its introduction to Scotland.9 Finally, 
Michael Fry highlights Younger's 'strict control of local authorities',lO and attributes 
this to the need to conform with Thatcher's wishes, but fails to scrutinise Thatcher's 
reform of local government in sufficient depth, undermining his perceptive analysis. 
Charting the Route: Scottish Local Government, 1969-1979 
In 1966 Labour established a Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland, 
which reported back in 1969, proposing a two-tier system of seven regional 
authorities and thirty-seven district councils. I I All important functions were to be held 
at regional level, excluding housing, which was to be a district council responsibility, 
and both tiers were to hold taxation powers. After much debate the Conservatives 
passed the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, which led to the creation of nine 
regional councils, fifty-three district councils, and three all-purpose island councils in 
1975Y 
One controversial aspect of this restructuring was the creation of Strathclyde 
Region, containing almost half of Scotland's population. Paradoxically, Labour 
opposed the creation of Strathclyde, which encompassed the party's electoral 
heartland in the west of Scotland, but the Conservatives pressed ahead with a measure 
designed to bolster the interventionist power of local government. This reform 
increased public sector employment and expenditure in Scotland, contradicting 
Edward Heath's goal of containing public spending. 
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Heath introduced national rent and rates rebates through the Housing Finance 
Act 1972,13 and the Housing Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act 1972 established a 
standard, market-related pricing system for all rented housing. Rent and rates rebates 
were designed to aid those individuals who could not afford their rent,14 but they also 
created the preconditions for a growth in state dependency. 
As Shadow Environment Secretary, Thatcher's remit had included local 
government. During the October 1974 General Election she proposed the discounted 
sale of council houses, a scheme of which Peter Walker was the architect, with the 
reservation that this might create resentment amongst middle-class homeowners. She 
also pledged to abolish the rates in response to the 1973 English and Welsh 
revaluation, but was concerned that a direct replacement had not been identified. IS An 
innovative suggestion related to overspending councils, with her proposal that central 
government should fix spending limits when distributing block grants to local 
authorities. Prior to 1979, Thatcher's knowledge of local government, its spending 
requirements, and the rating system had increased considerably. 
In 1975 the changing economic climate saw Labour's Environment Secretary, 
Anthony Crosland, inform local authorities that 'the party was over'. 16 Furthermore, 
he appointed a Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance under the 
chairmanship of Sir Frank Layfield, which reported back in May 1976, recommending 
that a local income tax should replace the rates: 7 Labour, however, dismissed 
Layfield's findings and, in accordance with the IMF inspired spending guidelines 
introduced in 1976177, Scottish local authority spending was reduced from £2,644 
million in 1975176 to £2,411 million in 1978179:8 
By 1979, however, UK local government expenditure still accounted for 
28.1 % of public spending and 12.4% of Gross National Product (GNP), with Scottish 
councils receiving 67.8% of their expenditure via central government grants in 
1979/80, compared to 61% in England:9 This was a manifestation of everything 
disapproved of by Thatcher in the consensus. Local government's spending priorities 
were consuming vast sums of taxpayers' money with the approval of Parliament. If 
the frontiers of the state were to be rolled back then Scotland's local authorities were 
in the front-line. 
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Applying the Brake: Local Spending and the Rates, 1979-1984 
On entering office Thatcher passed the Tenants' Rights etc. (Scotland) Act 1980, 
giving council house tenants of three or more years standing the right to buy their 
property at two-thirds of its market value, with a further 1 % discount for each year of 
tenancy.20 For those tenants who were unable to buy outright, a two year option to buy 
at the original price was available on payment of£100.21 The motivations behind the 
right-to-buy legislation were two-fold. Thatcher hoped that the legislation would 
transform Britain into a 'property owning democracy', undermining Labour's 
powerbase in local government, as council tenants generally voted Labour, whereas 
owner-occupiers were more inclined to back the Conservatives.22 The Environment 
Secretary, Michael Heseltine, an architect of this scheme, enacted identical legislation 
for England and Wales.23 
lain Sproat, the Conservative MP for Aberdeen South, claimed that the Act 
would 'change the political landscape of our country', and enable Scots 'to fulfil our 
old tradition of individual independence, and to enjoy the freedom which ownership 
brings,.24 Malcolm Rifkind, who oversaw its passage through the Commons, asserted 
that far from being involved in a process of centralisation, the Government was 
transferring power to the ordinary tenants, who were under no compulsion to utilise 
the legislation. 25 On the other hand, Labour challenged Rifkind on the grounds that 
council housing policy should be left at the discretion of local authorities. In 1981, 
public housing constituted 52% of Scotland's housing stock, compared to 28% in 
England.26 This represented the largest share of public housing outwith the Eastern 
Bloc.27 By September 1982, 28,535 sales had been completed under the Tenants' 
Rights Act,28 but a 'property owning democracy' remained a distant ideal in Scotland. 
Meanwhile, Thatcher attempted to constrain local authority spending. Local 
government was financed through a combination of central government grants, and 
the rates. The Rate Support Grant (RSG) provided the main source of local authority 
support, with the Scottish Secretary having the power to set the ratio consumed by 
each component of the RSG.29 Furthermore, the Housing Support Grant (HSG) came 
into operation in 1978/79, allocating grant in relation to the expenditure and rental 
income of each authority.30 HSG was calculated on the basis of a councils' need to 
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spend on debt charges, management and maintenance, and its potential income. The 
Housing Revenue Account (HRA) covered house building, modernisation and land 
purchase, and the Non-Housing Revenue Account dealt with aid to the private sector 
through improvement grants, and lending for house purchase and improvement. 
Councils had to submit a Housing Plan every four years outlining their intended 
capital expenditure. 
Initially Younger attempted to continue with Labour's policy of laying down 
spending guidelines. In 1979/80, however, a number of local authorities clearly 
overshot their spending targets.31 This can largely be attributed to the Government's 
miscalculation of the projected rate of inflation when allocating RSG, as it estimated 
that inflation would go no higher than 4.3%, whereas the councils budgeted for an 
inflation rate of 10.2%. In practice, inflation increased to 12%, producing unexpected 
distortions in council budgets. 
In 1980 Heseltine introduced financial penalties for overspending English and 
Welsh councils, and established a strict formula for calculating RSG. 32 Therefore, as 
Younger struggled to control high-spending authorities he came under increasing 
pressure to enforce his spending limits more tightly. In 1980/81, Lothian Region had 
planned expenditure amounting to 6.6% over the Government's target, but ended the 
financial year 11.7% in excess of Scottish Office guidelines. In order to facilitate this 
increase in spending, taking place in tandem with rising interest rates, cuts in grant, 
and high inflation, Lothian pushed its rates up by 41 %. 
Younger's solution was to pass the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1981, empowering himself to withdraw RSG from selected 
authorities where he considered their estimated expenditure to be 'excessive and 
unreasonable' . 33 Younger already possessed these powers through the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1966, but the new legislation enabled him to reduce grant 
prospectively. Furthermore, the 1981 Act specified that the Scottish Secretary was to 
take into account the previous year's expenses, general economic conditions and 
'other financial, economic, demographic, geographical and like criteria' when 
assessing expenditure. 
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, Scotland's councils had considerable 
freedom in designating their expenditure requirements, but from 1981 onwards, the 
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financial wisdom of the Scottish Office prevailed over that of Scotland's local 
authorities. Unlike the situation in England and Wales, the Scottish Secretary had a 
great deal of discretion placed at his disposal. This piece of legislation represented a 
clear example of centralisation, laying the foundations for Thatcher's assault on the 
corporatist consensus in local government. 
James Milne interpreted the Act as a Conservative tool, 'to carry its public 
sector wage freeze into practice,.34 The new legislation did not have the desired 
effect, however, as several local authorities defied Younger. In 1981/82 planned 
expenditure was 14% over the Government's target, and Scotland's regional 
authorities ended the financial year overdrawn by £82 million. 35 Lothian was a 
principal offender, with planned spending of 24.7% above the guidelines, but other 
authorities, such as East Lothian District, were equally culpable. Moreover, Stirling 
and Dundee Districts compounded their failure to work within budget by sanctioning 
huge rates increases of 122% and 150%. 
Younger, infuriated by this defiance, announced in July 1981 that selective 
action was to be taken against seven Labour-controlled councils.36 Lothian, Stirling 
and Dundee were not surprised, as they had set out to challenge the Government, but 
according to Midwinter, the rest 'were genuinely astonished to find themselves 
there' .37 Due to their disparate ideological standpoints, the seven authorities failed to 
agree on a common strategy, and Rifkind attempted to exploit divisions by offering 
each council the opportunity to repay a proportion of its overspend to either 
ratepayers or the Scottish Office. The only council to reimburse its ratepayers was 
Renfrew, with the rest agreeing that, as an act of ideological defiance, any repayments 
should be made to the Scottish Office. 
Lothian had the greatest difficulty, as Younger planned to reduce its grant by 
£53 million. In a period of nine months, this was to entail a reduction of four years' 
worth of expenditure.38 Lothian asserted that it had a local mandate to increase 
spending, and launched a campaign in defence of its spending priorities, unlike 
Stirling District, which stated that it could cope with a £1 million reduction in its 
budget. The most potent argument deployed by Lothian contended that the proposed 
grant reduction would force the Region to cut 20,000 jobs. When it lobbied 
Parliament, the Labour leader of the Greater London Council (GLC), Ken 
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Livingstone, offered organisational assistance. 
Younger eventually elected to cut Lothian's budget by £30 million, with the 
other authorities suffering only fractional reductions in their grant, enabling him to 
demonstrate that the new legislation was workable, whilst ensuring that the loss of 
grant was not significant enough to generate large-scale redundancies for which he 
would be held accountable. In December 1981, Scottish local authorities employed 
255,900 workers and, by November 1982, Scotland had 20% more local authority 
employees per head of population than England and Wales.39 
On the other hand, Younger was aware that he had failed to curb rates 
increases, causing great distress amongst Conservative voters. At the 1980 Scottish 
Conservative conference, Arthur Bell had described the rating system as 'absurd and 
evil', and proposed establishing a national lottery, to help finance local expenditure.40 
Thatcher had promised to review the rating system, while in opposition and, in 
December 1981, the Government published a Green Paper, Alternatives to Domestic 
Rates. This resembled the Layfield Committee Report; however, there was one 
difference. Heseltine's review examined the option of a poll tax, which was elevated 
to equal status with a local income tax, a sales tax, and property taxes.41 The Green 
Paper concluded that, in the meantime, the status quo was to remain in place, and 
rejected a poll tax on the grounds that it would require a complex system of 
administration and rebates. However, it did praise the perceptibility of the tax with 
the electorate. The STUC asserted that a poll tax was not a 'practical proposition' 
unless it was used to supplement another tax, and the Scottish Tenants' Organisation 
believed that a poll tax would need to be 'accompanied by a complex rebates 
system,.42 
In the wake of the review's findings, Younger tightened his grip over rate 
levels. The Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982 empowered the 
Scottish Secretary to 'cap' rates by requiring local authorities with 'excessive and 
unreasonable' spending plans to reduce their rates.43 This power could be used instead 
of, or in addition to, the power to reduce RSG. It could, however, only be exercised 
after a debate and vote in Parliament on a report for each penalised authority. 
Furthermore, the Act allowed Younger to omit any category of expenditure he saw fit, 
when proposing a grant or rate reduction. This enabled him to penalise any authority 
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opting for spending priorities unacceptable to him. The Act also restricted the use of 
borrowing to prevent money being advanced from loans funds to cover any deficiency 
arising from the difference between a reduced rate, which an authority had set for it, 
and the rate initially determined by the authority in question. This move centralised 
substantial power in Edinburgh, making Scotland the clear pacesetter in control of the 
rates. 
At the 1982 regional elections the Conservatives retained control of Grampian 
and Tayside, but trailed well behind Labour, which held sway in the populous regions 
of Central, Fife and Strathclyde.44 In Lothian, however, Labour lost its majority and 
refused to form a coalition administration, resulting in the Conservatives uniting with 
the LiberaJJSDP Alliance to run the Region. Indeed, events in Lothian appear to 
contradict the conclusions of Midwinter, Michael Keating and Mitchell, who state 
that, 'some of the most dramatic rates increases owed little to local authority 
decisions' ,4S as Brian Meek pledged to reduce the rates and expenditure. Meek was 
unwilling to meet Younger's demands, because he agreed with the outgoing Labour 
leadership that a £45 million cut would lead to redundancies.46 This jeopardised the 
credibility of the Scottish Office's spending criteria, and undermined the logic of 
central government setting specific figures for each council. Meek brokered a £30.7 
million reduction in grant, and a rates level of lOOp, rather than 116p. Stirling 
District, by this stage isolated, struck a deal to drop its rates by 4p, and accepted a 
grant cut of £832,000. Younger was progressively enforcing his will on Scotland's 
local authorities and, in so doing, he was severely limiting the fiscal autonomy 
previously enjoyed by local government. 
When the House of Commons Environment Committee undertook a further 
rates review, the concept of a poll tax. came under scrutiny once more. The 
Committee's report, in July 1982, concluded that a poll tax. could be used as a 
supplementary tax, but recommended strongly, 'that a Poll Tax, even at a low level, 
should not be introduced'. 47 This was the second dismissal of rating reform within six 
months and, on the Committee's advice, Thatcher switched her attention to the 
introduction of , rate -capping' in England and Wales.48 
Younger also sought to further increase his 'rate-capping' powers. While 
Thatcher pressed ahead with her plans for England and Wales in the Rates Act 1984, 
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Younger was placing an even more radical Bill before Parliament, which was to 
expand on the 1982 Act by empowering Younger to set general rate limits for whole 
classes of authorities.49 The Rating and Valuation (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1984 
was intended to be the final part of Thatcher's legislative drive to curb exorbitant 
rates increases, but its powers were never utilised by a Scottish Secretary. Despite the 
Government's contention that high non-domestic rates deterred potential employers, 
and discouraged enterprise, there was little concrete evidence to substantiate its 
claims. Indeed, Cambridge University's Department of Land Economy published a 
report in 1985, stating that its researchers were 'able to detect little if any influence of 
rates on the location of jobs'. so However, non-domestic rates had risen from 21.2% of 
Scottish local government income in 1979/80 to 26.3% in 1983/84,51 which cannot 
have assisted attempts to attract new employers. 
Another critical part of the 1984 legislation, which was not included in the 
English and Welsh Rates Act, empowered Younger to limit by Order the amount a 
local authority could budget to contribute from its rate fund to the HRA.52 In 1981/82 
a Housing Expenditure Limit had been introduced, linking each local authorities' 
capital allocations to its rate fund contribution. 53 This was a device to prevent Labour-
controlled councils building new houses and using the rates to subsidise council house 
rents. In the first three years of Conservative rule HSG fell by 59%, and by 1984/85, 
74% of council housing finance was derived from rents, compared to 47% in 
1979/80.54 However, by 1985,812,000 Scottish households were in receipt of housing 
benefit, resulting in the Government redistributing these savings towards rent 
rebates. 55 
Between 1979 and 1983 capital expenditure on council housing dropped by 
33%, and when these cuts combined with the effects of the right-to-buy legislation, 
serious imbalances in council house stocks emerged. Between 1981 and 1986, district 
council waiting lists increased from 137,054 to 181,125, and homelessness 
applications rose from 15,955 in 1981/82 to 26,329 in 1985/86.56 Moreover, in 1986 
the Scottish Office identified that out of Scotland's 843,000 council houses, 356,725 
needed to be modernised, 234,074 suffered dampness or condensation, and 153,746 
needed major or structural repair. 57 
David Alexander contends that Thatcher's policies led to the 'residualisation' 
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of Scotland's public housing stock,58 and a growing stigma becoming attached to 
council housing. On the surface, Alexander's analysis is correct, but he fails to 
explore the underlying logic behind the Government's housing policies. Thatcher was 
convinced that all council estates were 'bad' ,59 and believed that by increasing 
council house rents, dependency would be reduced, as those council house tenants 
who did not receive housing benefit would be stimulated into purchasing their own 
home. In Thatcher's eyes, public sector housing was to operate as a safety net for 
those incapable of owning their own home, but was never to be treated on equal terms 
to ownership. 
The extent of Thatcher's commitment to expanding home-ownership was 
underlined by her decision to increase the maximum limit for Mortgage Income Tax 
Relief (MITR) to £30,000 in 1983.60 Thatcher had no ideological objection to 
subsidising home purchasers, as she believed that ownership was intrinsically linked 
to individual liberty. She also surmised that the Conservatives would benefit 
electorally, as at the 1983 General Election, 42% of British council house purchasers 
voted Conservative, compared to 22% of council house tenants.61 
In England, the Metropolitan Councils and the GLC, which had been 
responsible for the majority of overspending there, were abolished as Thatcher 
constrained local government spending and influence. Surprisingly, she chose not to 
extend these plans into Scotland, enabling Scotland's high-spending regional 
authorities to continue in existence for the duration of her premiership. Between 1979 
and 1983 Strathclyde Region's rates increased by 127%, and in 1986/87 Strathclyde 
and Lothian accounted for above 80% of overspending in Scotland.62 
Thatcher was particularly enthusiastic over the abolition of the GLC, which 
had acted as a bulwark against her economic and social policies, asserting that its 
abolition would lead to savings of £1 billion.63 Masterminding high-profile legal and 
media campaigns against the Government's plans, the GLC proved very difficult to 
disband. With the support of the House of Lords, it remained in place until 1 April 
1986,64 when its powers over waste disposal, the police, and the fire service were 
transferred to non-elected Boards appointed by central government. A similar process 
occurred in the areas covered by the Metropolitan Councils, and Andrew Gamble 
plausibly asserts that, 'The logic of government policy pointed to the eventual 
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abolition of local government altogether' .65 
In effect a dual track local government policy was operating, as a genuine 
desire for uniformity in British local government would have resulted in Scotland's 
regional authorities being discarded. Indeed, England's Metropolitan Councils had 
every right to feel discriminated against, because their rates' levels and spending 
increases were no worse than those of the Scottish regions. Furthermore, Scotland's 
most populous regional authorities, such as Strathc1yde and Fife, were largely Labour-
controlled, and were engaged in the promotion of 'socialist' policies.66 By abolishing 
these authorities, Thatcher would have significantly diminished 'socialist' influence, 
and localised opposition to her policies to a far greater extent. Inaction prolonged. the 
life of the post-war consensus in Scotland, when she was attacking it with great 
fervour south of the Border. 
Switching the Engines of Finance: The Replacement of the Rates 
Thatcher had hoped that the 1984 Rates Act would curtail unsustainable rates 
increases in England and Wales, but the Militant-controlled Liverpool City Council 
fought a legal battle against the Government, highlighting significant shortcomings in 
the rate capping system. Thatcher responded. to Liverpool's challenge, and to her 
conflict with Livingstone by sanctioning the establishment of another rates review 
prior to the 1984 Conservative conference. There was very little Cabinet enthusiasm 
for a review, but in the aftermath of the conference she became, 'more convinced 
than ever of the fundamental absurdities of the present system'.67 This was a period of 
attrition, as she battled left-wing councils on one front, and the NUM on another. 
Furthermore, in a Scottish context, the Conservatives only retained. outright control of 
four districts at the 1984 district elections, compared to Labour's haul of twenty-
five.68 Amid these difficulties it was imperative that her vigour for continuing reform 
was demonstrated. 
The review team's remit covered. the funding and structure of local 
government, as well as its electoral arrangements.69 At this point, it held no more 
chance of finding a solution to the Conservatives' rating difficulties than had previous 
attempts. However, by 1985, Scotland was to be at the forefront of the search for an 
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alternative to the rates. According to Scots law a national rating revaluation had to 
take place every five years, unlike in England and Wales, where there was no 
specified legal time limit. Scotland's most recent revaluation had been in 1978, 
whereas England last underwent this process in 1973 . Younger had postponed 
revaluation in 1983 with the consent of the opposition parties and the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), because of the impending General Election but, 
by 1984, had concluded that further postponement would be 'dishonest and unfair and 
damaging to someone,.70 The new rate poundages were to come into effect in the 
spring of 1985. 
In the summer of 1984, Younger was informed that the impact of revaluation 
on domestic ratepayers was going to be more extreme than the Conservatives had 
expected. He attempted to pre-empt this blow by increasing domestic rate relief 
(DRR), and by 1985/86 the total consumed by DRR was £102 million, compared to 
£14.3 million in 1984/85. This clearly redistributed RSG away from poorer areas, 
increasing subsidy to wealthy residential parts of Scotland. The business sector also 
benefited from an additional £50 million from the Treasury's Contingency Fund, 
which was allocated to businesses whose valuation had increased, at least, three-fold 
and required special legislation. A limit of £10,000 per business was placed on the 
subsidy, and Nigel Lawson described this as an act of 'exceptional' generosity. 
Nevertheless, even after adjustments, domestic rates rose by an overall figure 
of 8% across Scotland, and in Conservative-voting areas, such as Bearsden and 
Eastwood, rates bills shot up by as much as 40%.71 This also undermined Thatcher's 
drive to expand owner-occupation in Scotland, as council house sales fell between 
1984 and 1986.72 James Goold branded revaluation, 'a huge vote loser', and he 
asserted that 'Scotland suffers, whilst England does not'. Scotland's business 
community had mixed fortunes, as industrial rates fell by 10.7%, and commercial 
rates dropped by 1.3%, but some high street shops saw significant increases. 
CBI (Scotland) stated that, 'revaluation and local authority rate increases 
impose a charge far beyond anything paid by competitors in England .. .If that is the 
only way we are going to get radical change in the rating system it seems a helluva 
way to run a railroad,.73 Donald Stewart of the SNP echoed these sentiments by 
describing the Scots as 'guinea pigs' for measures that would be unacceptable in the 
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Conservative heartlands of southern England.74 While Thatcher was obliged under 
Scots law to undertake a revaluation, there is a decipherable strain of logic to 
Stewart's argument. Thatcher had pledged to abolish the rates in 1974 after the effect 
of the 1973 revaluation in England and Wales, and the 1981 rates review had also 
analysed the possible impact of revaluation south of the Border. It indicated that 
revaluation would lead to 'Substantially reduced' rates for large-scale, old, labour-
intensive factories in the Midlands and northern England, which the Government 
hoped to phase out of the economy.75 
The rates of southern based firms, 'shops in primary locations', new offices 
and small factories on modem industrial estates, and 'modem oil refineries' were 
expected to rise substantially, and Thatcher was relying on expansion in these sectors 
to replace the jobs lost in manufacturing. Equally significantly, as a result of the 
explosion in southern English house prices since 1973, it was inevitable that the 
domestic rates burden would be increased in the south as well.76 This was politically 
unacceptable to Thatcher, as the bulk of the Conservatives' electoral support was 
located in this area, and she is alleged to have told Heseltine, 'There's no 
problem ... We're not doing it'.77 
Therefore, she knew the effect that revaluation was likely to have in Scotland. 
She could have stalled revaluation or alternatively the Conservatives could have 
passed legislation to overturn the legal requirement that revaluation had to take place 
every five years. Thatcher did neither, but most of the blame for this inaction should 
be laid at the door of Younger, who 'insisted' on revaluation taking place. Even after 
the predicted effect of revaluation was analysed in the summer of 1984, and Goold 
urged the Government to think again, Younger made no attempt to abort 
revaluation.78 Thatcher was largely preoccupied with the miners' strike and 
abolishing the GLC and Metropolitan Councils. Younger should have ensured that 
this politically damaging revaluation was abandoned, but resorted instead to lobbying 
the Treasury for extra finance to cushion the blow. Given the Scottish Conservatives' 
precarious electoral position in 1984, it was incompetent of Younger to sanction a 
revaluation increasing the rates of Conservative voters by up to 40%. Lawson asserts 
that, 'the politics were uncharacteristically badly handled by George Younger'. 79 
At this time, only 1.4 million Scots contributed directly towards the rates,80 
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dispelling the image of a nation in revolt In reality, revaluation alienated the bedrock 
of Scottish Conservative support in the business sector, and amongst homeowners in 
prosperous areas. The 812,000 Scottish households that received housing benefit, and 
had differing proportions of their rates paid by the state, were largely unaffected by 
the turmoil over revaluation. Nevertheless, revaluation was one of the few issues over 
which the Scottish Conservatives asserted themselves during Thatcher's premiership. 
As Thatcher describes in her memoirs, 'Scottish ministers, businessmen and Tory 
supporters began with one voice to call for an immediate end to the rating system,.81 
Amid this furore, the fact that revaluation had carried out its intended task was 
almost entirely missed. Revaluation reflected the changes that had taken place in 
Scotland's industrial capacity, employment levels, and the housing market since 
1978. During Thatcher's time in office, Scotland's manufacturing base had been 
dramatically eroded (see chapter 2), but by 1985, there were signs that the service 
industries and the commercial sector were on the verge of expansion. Hence, it was 
only natural that revaluation would reflect this redistribution of economic strength. 
On the other hand, Thatcher's drive to create a property owning democracy, through 
the right-to-buy legislation, had slowly gained momentum and, by 1987, owner-
occupation had risen to 42% in Scotland.82 This had led to an increase in house prices 
and demand for housing; inevitably this trend was reflected by significant rates 
increases in wealthy residential areas. 
Meanwhile, as panic gripped the Scottish Conservative Party, the review team 
had made significant progress. From the outset, it had operated differently to previous 
reviews, ignoring input from figures such as Sir Frank Layfield.83 This was a clear 
indication of Thatcher's break from the post-war consensus, as she excluded those 
whom she considered as prejudiced by previous involvement in local government. 
This represented a huge risk on her behalf. Kenneth Baker and William Waldegrave 
were the review team's central ministerial figures. 
The review's remit was underpinned by two objectives, guiding it towards a 
radical overhaul of the rating system. Firstly, a system was to be devised that was 
highly perceptible to the electorate, and secondly, the optimum number of electors 
were to be exposed to the financial realities of their council's spending priorities. At 
this time, it was estimated that as few as fourteen million Britons out of an adult 
222 
population of forty million were paying rates, and of every pound spent by Britain's 
local authorities only twenty pence was paid for by domestic ratepayers. An 
ideologically compatible alternative to the rates was essential if Britain was to be 
transformed into an entrepreneurial, self-reliant nation with low taxation. It was this 
political criterion that led the review team towards a poll tax. 
Christopher Foster, a local government finance expert at the London School of 
Economics, was the foremost supporter of a poll tax, and pushed it to the front of the 
review team's agenda. In November 1984 the review team had raised the poll tax 
option with Scottish Office civil servants, but their discussions 'fell on extremely 
stony ground'. 84 Nevertheless, in the period between December 1984 and March 
1985, the poll tax became increasingly attractive. This was partly down to a process 
of elimination, as Thatcher was steadfastly opposed to a local income tax, and her 
interest in a local sales tax had cooled substantially since leaving opposition. In 1981, 
Younger had been the only Cabinet member to support a local income tax, and by 
1985 he was willing to examine any alternative to the rates. 
Initially, a poll tax had been envisaged as a supplement to the rates, but by the 
spring of 1985 it was seriously considered as an outright replacement. By early March 
1985, a fully-fledged tax had emerged, known as the 'personal charge' or the 
'resident's charge'. At this stage it was envisaged that a poll tax would run in tandem 
with the rates for a period of ten years before completely replacing them. This 
proposal was put before almost half the cabinet at a meeting at Chequers on 31 March 
1985, but neither Lawson, nor any representatives of local government attended.85 
Michael Ancram and Younger represented Scottish Office interests at the meeting. 
On hearing the proposals for a poll tax, Younger is alleged to have exclaimed, 'all my 
political life I have been waiting for this',86 and William Whitelaw echoed his 
sentiments. Lawson was staunchly opposed to the proposals, but did not openly 
challenge Thatcher over the tax in Cabinet, choosing instead to register his 
disapproval in a memorandum, whilst attempting to convince Baker that the scheme 
was unworkable. In the face of Lawson's opposition, the pace of reform quickened at 
the Scottish Conservative conference in May, when Younger proclaimed that, 'the 
status quo is not an option', and Thatcher pledged to rectify the 'anomalies and 
unfairness that are inherent in the present system' .87 
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On 6 January 1986, the proposals went before the full Cabinet for the first 
time. The Green Paper stated that a poll tax was to be gradually introduced over the 
course of a decade in England and Wales, and it contended, for no explicit reason, 
that this process could be carried out within three years in Scotland.88 A 'safety net' 
was also to be temporarily established to limit the expected transfer in resources from 
high spending authorities to those with low levels of expenditure. Moreover, a 
national business rate (NBR), which was to be set by central government, was 
proposed, but the Green Paper accepted that this would not be immediately applicable 
in Scotland because of higher non-domestic rates levels. Furthermore, the RSG was to 
be replaced by a Revenue Support Grant which, unlike the RSG, was only to comprise 
a needs element and a standard grant. This was designed to provide a uniform level of 
contribution towards the cost of local services. The projected start of this process was 
1989 or 1990 and, at the insistence of Scottish Conservatives, it was agreed that 
Scotland would pioneer the new tax. 89 
The Green Paper won Cabinet approval in the space of fifteen minutes, and 
not even Lawson bothered to protest. This could, however, be largely attributed to the 
dramatic events that unfolded at this Cabinet meeting, when Heseltine walked out 
over the Westland affair prompting an on-the-spot reshuflle (see chapter 2).90 As a 
result of this controversy, the decision to proceed with the poll tax proposals received 
far less public scrutiny than it might have had under different circumstances. Paying 
for Local Government was launched on 28 January 1986.91 
Scottish Conservative councillors were consulted by Ancram and, according to 
the former Conservative Group leader on COSLA, Struan Stevenson, they informed 
him that the community charge would prove uncollectable if the poorest sections of 
society were not exempt from payment.92 Ancram replied that on his last visit to an 
Edinburgh council estate, all the tenants had a colour television and a video recorder, 
which meant they could afford to pay. 
The STUC dismissed the Green Paper entirely, maintaining its support for a 
local income tax.93 It concluded that the Government would be better advised to 
maintain the present rating system, because it 'retained an element of fairness'. 
Donald Dewar described the Bill as, 'a combination of the ludicrous and the 
menacing', and the SNP leader, Gordon Wilson, asserted that the new tax was 
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'fundamentally unfair,.94 On the other hand, COSLA criticised the Government's 
proposals on the grounds that they were open to widespread evasion, and warned that 
the NBR would lead to 'a massive redistribution of resources from some areas to 
others' .95 The strongest support for the scheme came from CBI (Scotland), which 
described the decision to harmonise business rates as, 'long overdue and very 
welcome', but expressed disappointment that 'it will take so long to implement them 
fully' .96 
Scotland's newspapers were also highly critical of the proposed legislation. 
The Glasgow Herald described the Bill as 'fundamentally flawed', and the 
Government's proposals received negative coverage in the Daily Record under the 
headline, 'Stump up - or else!' .97 Ominously, the traditionally supportive British press 
was also largely hostile. 98 On 29 January 1986, the Times' editorial expounded the, 
'Benefits of Rates' ,99 and the Financial Times was of a similar standpoint. In a 
November 1986 survey, only 26% of Scots and 53% of Scottish Conservative voters 
were found to be in favour of a poll tax compared to 50% of voters in England and 
Wales, and 62% of Conservatives south of the Border.1OO 
Younger's replacement, Malcolm Rifkind, was undaunted by this opposition 
to the community charge, and the Scottish Conservatives pushed for legislation to be 
in place before the next general election. Leading Scottish MPs, such as Michael 
Forsyth, played an important role in convincing Thatcher to allow Scotland to pioneer 
the new tax, and Forsyth was responsible for the publication of The Case for a Poll 
Tax in April 1985, a pamphlet produced in conjunction with Douglas Mason, calling 
for the Government, 'to introduce a poll tax as a replacement for the rates in Scotland 
first' .101 Nevertheless, Timothy Raison, Conservative MP for Aylesbury, wrote in the 
Guardian that, 'As an English MP I cannot help being relieved that Scotland is to be 
the legislative pacemaker or guinea pig', predicting that, 'Those who so much dislike 
the level of their current rates may find that a change could mean worse' .102 At the 
1986 regional elections, the Scottish Conservatives failed to hold outright control of a 
single region. 103 
Scottish Office civil servants were staunchly opposed to the new tax, and 
drafting the Abolition of Domestic Rates etc. (Scotland) Bill became 'something of a 
nightmare' .104 The Scottish Office complained of a lack of interest from its colleagues 
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at the Department of Environment (DoE), and Ancram developed serious reservations 
over aspects of the tax. Furthermore, as the Bill passed through Parliament it received 
a significant alteration. Instead of phasing the community charge in over three years, 
Ancram agreed to introduce the tax universally in 1989, thus dismissing the Green 
Paper's conclusion that, 'the change could not sensibly take place in a single year' . lOS 
The Bill gained the Royal Assent on 15 May 1987. 
Therefore, the Government intended, in one fell swoop, to increase the 
number of Scots who paid local taxes from 1.4 million to 3.9 million. 106 It was 
estimated that 60,000 young Scots would be liable to pay directly for local services 
for the first time. David Willetts argues that this contradicted Thatcher's aim of 
reducing the tax burden on individuals, as the community charge brought millions of 
additional Britons into the taxation system. 107 By January 1987, 80% of Scots were 
opposed to the introduction of the poll tax in Scotland ahead of the rest of Britain. 108 
Ancram lost his seat at the 1987 General Election. Yet, according to Rifkind, 
the poll tax was not a significant factor in the Scottish Conservatives' electoral 
collapse. South of the Border, the campaign was dominated by the defence issue, and 
little was heard of Thatcher's 'flagship' policy.l09 Only in the aftermath of Thatcher's 
victory did the Scottish political community turn its full attention towards the new 
tax. 
Generating Momentum: Scottish Opposition to the Poll Tax 
The community charge was a gift to the Conservatives' Scottish opponents, and with 
the Conservatives' mandate to govern in Scotland under scrutiny (see chapter 6), it 
became a frontline issue. The charge was condemned on the grounds that it increased 
the tax bills of the poor in order to subsidise those of the rich, and Finlay states that it 
was cited as 'hard evidence' of Thatcher's hostility towards the poor. 110 Labour 
launched the 'Stop If campaign in October 1987, urging Scots to disrupt the 
registration system for the poll tax with legal queries, and by returning registration 
forms in a partially completed state. 11l In October 1988, it was estimated that over 
95% of registration forms had been returned in this manner.112 The STUC established 
the Anti-Poll Tax Steering Committee (APTSC) in February 1988,113 and both 
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groupings worked closely together. 
The APTSC was a cross-party organisation, consisting of politicians, pressure 
groups and clergy. The involvement of Scotland's churches was extremely significant, 
allowing the Committee to seize the moral high ground, and giving an air of 
respectability to the tax's opponents. Prior to joining the Committee, in December 
1987, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow, Thomas Winning, the convenor of 
the Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee, Maxwell Craig, and the 
Episcopal Bishop of Glasgow, Derek Rawcliffe, issued a joint statement asserting that 
the poll tax would, 'do nothing to maintain respect for the democratic values of which 
we are justly proud' .114 
This attempt to unite Scottish civil society predated the establishment of the 
Constitutional Convention, and sought to establish a broad-based consensus against 
the community charge. On 14 April 1988, however, the SNP 'suspended their 
involvemenfYs The Nationalists opposed the poll tax on the grounds that it 
contravened the terms of the Treaty of Union, and were determined to follow a policy 
of non_payment. 116 The SNP was intent on embarrassing Labour, claiming that 
100,000 non-payers could stop the tax.1l7 Nevertheless, this was an error on the 
Nationalists' behalf, as the party lost an opportunity to divide the Labour Party from 
within, and exploit Scottish Labour's attachment to the British party agenda. 
Jimmy Allison believes that the debate over non-payment created serious 
divisions in the Labour party.llS However, during the 1988 Scottish Labour 
conference, it was decided by a majority of two to one not to lead a campaign of civil 
disobedience. Dewar and Neil Kinnock feared that Labour's credibility would be 
damaged by undertaking these tactics, but the party's Scottish Executive only 
narrowly voted against a policy of non-payment, with MPs such as, George Galloway, 
Dennis Canavan, and John McAllion, defying the Scottish Executive's decision, and 
joining the 'Committee of one hundred leading Scots', who refused to pay the 
charge. 119 
Scottish Labour Action, which was founded at the 1988 conference,120 also 
campaigned heavily for non-payment. Its spokesman, Ian Smart, argued that non-
payment would force the Government to suspend or abolish the poll tax. Moreover. he 
chose to link the community charge with the campaign for Home Rule. stating that, 
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'Neither can be ignored any longer' .121 The most high profile Labour 'rebel' was Dick 
Douglas, who resigned as chairman of the Scottish Labour MPs after attacking the 
party leadership's stance on the poll tax at the 1988 conference. 122 He was expelled 
from the Labour Party in March 1990, and eventually defected to the SNP in October 
1990. 
Labour's policy of civil disruption was largely ineffective, and the efforts of 
regional authorities to compile poll tax registers of those liable to pay the charge were 
only hindered in a minimal way. Most councils reported registration rates in the high 
nineties,123 and even when a 2.1 % fall in the electoral register was taken into account, 
it was clear that the 'Stop It' campaign would fail. Indeed, in a memorandum to the 
leaders of Glasgow District Council on 20 June 1988, Peter Russell, the personal 
assistant to Pat Lally and Jean McFadden, stated that the campaign name was 
'unrealistic', and that it was 'inevitable' that the poll tax would be introduced in 
Scotland. 124 Furthermore, Russell opposed challenging the Scottish Conservatives' 
mandate to introduce the tax, and proposed a campaign strategy to, 'set the Poll Tax 
into the overall political and moral context: one which displays the Labour Party's 
virtues and the Tory Party's vices'. 
This approach had proved extremely effective at the 1988 Scottish district 
elections, when Labour made its opposition to the community charge the central issue 
of the campaign.125 The Conservatives' only retained control of three district 
councils,126 whilst Labour remained the majority party in twenty-four districts. The 
extent of the crisis facing Thatcher was illustrated by the result in the Conservative 
'fortress' of Eastwood, which was located to the south of Glasgow. 127 Jim Fletcher 
became Labour's first ever representative on the District Council, and his victory was 
reliant upon anti-Conservative voting. It was becoming apparent that the poll tax was 
helping to mould a loose anti-Conservative alliance between the opposition parties in 
Scotland, which ironically bore a close resemblance to the anti-socialist coalitions 
that had operated to the Unionists' advantage between the 1920s and 1950s (see 
chapter 1). 
As the 'Stop It' campaign began to lose momentum, the APTSC took the 
initiative. The community charge was due to come into force on 1 April 1989 in 
Scotland, and the Committee undertook numerous activities highlighting opposition 
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to the tax. However, events like the 'Week of Action' between 10 and 17 September 
received 'only patchy support', and the STUC complained that it was bearing the 
brunt of the anti-poll tax work and costs. 128 One legacy of the 'Stop It' campaign was 
its 300,000 strong anti-poll tax petition, which was delivered to Downing Street on 1 
February 1989. 129 The delegation that accompanied the petition included Campbell 
Christie, Canon Kenyon Wright of the Scottish Churches Council and Norman Shanks 
of the Church of Scotland. At no point during the campaign south of the Border did 
trade unionists and the clergy cooperate so closely. 
One of the largest demonstrations took place in Edinburgh on 1 April 1989, 
attended by 30,000 people. 130 An innovative tactic of the APTSC was to involve the 
youth of Scotland through a music event held at the Usher Hall under the title 'Rock 
Against the Poll Tax'. Meanwhile, militant anti-poll tax campaigners assembled 
under the banner of the Strathclyde Anti-Poll Tax Federation (SAPTF), which was led 
by the Trotskyist, Tommy Sheridan. Sheridan was heavily involved with the Militant 
Tendency within the Glasgow Pollok Constituency Labour Party, and Militant 
members had taken control of the SAPTF in the summer of 1988.131 The Federation 
also contained an unusual mix of Communist Party members, anarchists and members 
of the Socialist Workers' Party, who believed that the Government could be defeated 
by extra-parliamentary opposition.132 
It strongly advocated civil disobedience, and non-payment. 133 However, 
Militant members excluded the other groupings from committee positions, and the 
Federation lobbied Scotland's regional authorities in an attempt to prevent them 
collecting the poll tax. This brought Sheridan into direct conflict with the STUC, and 
the Labour Party establishment. Christie, a fellow non-payer of the charge, responded 
to Sheridan in unequivocal terms, 'this policy position, far from defeating the Poll 
Tax will merely lead to the surcharging and disqualification of the Councillors and 
Council Officials we are depending on giving ... assistance to those who find 
themselves in genuine hardship due to the Poll Tax ... your call for unity is very 
shallow and hypocritical' . 134 
Nevertheless, the Federation attracted the support of several individual trade 
union branches.135 Furthermore, according to Sheridan, 15,000 Scots and nearly 5,000 
supporters from England and Wales attended a rally on 4 March 1989.136 From April, 
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the Federation focused on preventing and disrupting warrant sales for those who had 
refused to pay. Sheridan was expelled from the Labour Party in December 1989, and 
went on to become leader ofthe Scottish and British Anti-Poll Tax Federations. 137 He 
was eventually jailed after breaching an interim interdict banning him from attending 
or impeding warrant sales. 
Yet, this much-hyped opposition to the new tax would have been rendered 
impotent if the community charge had succeeded in providing the savings that 
Thatcher believed to be guaranteed. In fact, Rifkind was convinced that the poll tax 
would present greater difficulties for Labour, which had to contend with the Militants 
within the party, and the Nationalist challenge outwith. When Ian Lang announced the 
first grant settlement for the community charge on 4 November 1988, which he 
estimated would range from £193 per adult in Tayside to £221 in Strathclyde and 
£247 in Lothian, he confidently predicted that the figures, 'give lie to the many absurd 
and misleading predictions about community charge levels'. 
The Scottish Local Government Information Unit (SLGIU) disputed these 
figures,139 and in April 1989 the poll tax level in Tayside was £241, in Stratbclyde it 
was £219, and in Lothian it reached £305. These figures were distorted by the impact 
of the safety net. Strathclyde received £31.7 million of additional grant at the expense 
of Scotland's other regional councils, helping it to reduce its charge by £ 18 per 
adult. l40 At district level, £23.4 million was redistributed, reducing the charge in 
Glasgow by £55 per adult. The mechanics of the safety net contradicted Thatcher's 
belief in rewarding prudent councils, as it prevented Conservative-run councils 
reaping the rewards of their cost efficient budgeting. It also undermined her attempts 
to introduce a greater degree of market discipline to Scotland's local authorities, by 
cushioning the effect of the charge on high-spending councils. 
A similar misjudgement was made over the relaxation of penalties for 
overspending councils. Contrary to Finlay's claim that Thatcher intentionally reduced 
central government grants to Labour-run councils in order to 'raise poll taxes', 141 
local authority expenditure actually rose by 13% in cash terms prior to the 
introduction of the charge. This contradicted the review team's belief that all councils 
would be forced to work within budget, as they would be held accountable for any tax 
increases. The system was, in fact, open to abuse as overspending by councils in the 
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inaugural year would ensure increased budgets in forthcoming years, and many were 
protected by the safety net. Moreover, the councils believed that the Government 
would be blamed for the increase in spending, because it had introduced the new tax. 
Thatcher resolved this problem by retaining powers to cap the community charge of 
any local authority that set its tax rate at an 'excessive and unreasonable' level, but in 
doing so she undermined the entire concept of accountability that had underpinned 
the poll tax. 142 
Another point of conflict arose over the Government's decision to defer the 
introduction of the NBR in Scotland until non-domestic rates levels had converged 
with those of England and Wales. A further complicating factor was the disparity 
between central government grant in Scotland and England. Between 1979/80 and 
1988/89, RSG fell from 67.8% of relevant expenditure to 51.5% in Scotland, whereas 
by 1990/91 the English Revenue Support Grant only accounted for 29% of 
spending. 143 In order to circumnavigate this anomaly, the 1989 Local Government and 
Housing Act gave the Scottish Secretary the power to set a common business rate for 
each council in Scotland Rifkind indicated that he would use this power to ensure 
that Scotland's business rate increased in line with the RPI until business rates could 
be harmonised with those of England and Wales. This was an important deviation 
from the English and Welsh legislation, and maintained the uneven trend of 
development that had been prevalent in British local government during Thatcher's 
premiership. Furthermore, it continued the process of centralisation that embellished 
the powers of the Scottish Office at the expense of Scotland's local authorities. 
Midwinter and Clare Monaghan contend that the nationwide application of the 
NBR in April 1990, 'would have led to an inequitable and intolerable burden being 
imposed on Scottish businesses' .144 However, the reaction of the Scottish business 
community appears to contradict their analysis. CBI (Scotland) had been staunchly in 
favour of the early implementation of the NBR from the outset of rating reform.145 An 
All Scotland Rates Action Appeal, which had lain Lawson as a joint organiser, was 
established, claiming that Scottish businesses were paying 300% more in rates than 
their English counterparts.l46 The Scottish Council (D&I) also joined this chorus of 
discontent, highlighting the fact that service industries, which the Government was 
promoting as the future of Scotland's economy, were paying two to two and a half 
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times more in business rates than they would do in England. I47 
The creation of the NBR was designed to castrate left-wing councils, as 
Scotland's local authorities could no longer set their own business rates. Thatcher 
hoped that this reform would create fertile conditions for a growth in entrepreneurial 
activity. Moreover, she viewed local government as a stronghold of socialism, and 
was angered that local taxation powers could be used to further the aims of 
socialism.I48 By removing a principal source of income from Labour-controlled 
councils, through the centralisation of non-domestic rates, she surmised that she could 
disarm one of the principal agents of socialism. Thatcher was convinced that high 
spending local authorities would be forced into accepting the discipline of the market. 
Alternatively large community charge increases by Labour-controlled authorities 
would lead to their replacement by low spending, Conservative administrations. 149 
Nevertheless, despite opposition to the poll tax throughout Scottish society, 
non-payment of the community charge did not initially break out on a huge scale and, 
by September 1989, non-payment was averaging 16.8% across the Scottish regions. ISO 
The cost of collection also increased dramatically. In 1988/89 the Government had 
spent £14.093 million collecting the rates in Scotland, but by 1990/91 the cost of 
collecting the poll tax and non-domestic rates amounted to £43.558 million. 151 
However, not everyone in Scotland was liable to pay the full poll tax, and as a result 
of a rebate scheme launched in April 1988, around 30% of the adult population in 
Scotland, most of whom were on low incomes, were only expected to pay a 
proportion of the community charge.152 A strict '57 day' rule was operated by the 
Government that prevented councils backdating a rebate beyond fifty-seven days. 
On the other hand, the SNP, which had rejoined the APTSC in May 1989, was 
criticised over its 'debilitating strategy' by the STUC. I53 In Grampian, the 
Nationalists proposed the direct deduction of the poll tax from claimants' benefits, 
and the SNP Chair of Finance on the Council stated, 'we can make a bad law work 
efficiently or inefficiently. We intend to make it work efficiently,.154 This presented 
difficulties to the Nationalist leadership, and highlighted the extent to which the 
party's standpoint on the charge differed on a regional basis. 
Bitting the Buffen : The Impact of the Community Charge in Scotland 
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and Britain 
As Scotland came to terms with the effect of the poll tax, Thatcher was encountering 
growing dissent from within her own party over the implementation of the community 
charge in England and Wales. Sir George Young, Heseltine and Raison, were outright 
opponents of the tax. In a famous statement, Heseltine warned that, 'Responsibility 
for the poll tax will be targeted precisely and unavoidably at the Government who 
introduced that tax. That tax will be known as the Tory tax' ,ISS 
Many of the debates centred on issues, such as the charge's capacity to tax 
those at the bottom of the income scale. Thatcher opted to treat this dissent in a 
similar fashion to that over her economic strategy in 1980/81 (see chapter 1), in the 
belief that the end-result would vindicate her stance, but this needlessly created a 
strong personal connection between Thatcher and the success of the tax. The one 
significant alteration to the English and Welsh legislation was the abandonment of 
dual-running. The recently deposed former MP for Aberdeen South, Gerry Malone, 
was at the forefront of this campaign, and made an impassioned speech at the 1987 
Party conference urging Thatcher to throw caution to the wind. 156 Nicholas Ridley 
was responsible for piloting the Bill through the Commons, and after an unexpectedly 
awkward passage the Local Government Finance Bill received the Royal Assent in 
July 1988.157 
Conservative backbenchers, however, were outraged by the expected effect 
that the safety net was set to have on the redistribution of resources, and Conservative 
Central Office produced poll tax figures, showing that voters in marginal 
constituencies would suffer huge tax increases. Having already secured £33 billion, 
Ridley, unwilling to further breach Thatcher's public spending constraints, refused to 
ask for the additional £1 billion needed to keep bills affordable. This ensured future 
difficulties for Thatcher, as voters in the marginal constituencies of 'middle England' 
had provided the electoral foundations from which she had attacked the post-war 
consensus. By mid-February 1990 it was rumoured that the average charge could be 
as high as £350. 
With panic engulfing much of England, the Glasgow Herald wrote a 
swingeing editorial, 'The whingeing English', commenting with 'ironic amusement' 
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on 'the squeals now emanating from the fat heartlands of the Tory vote' .158 The 
Herald's comments are extremely illuminating, highlighting one of the most basic 
errors made by Thatcher in her handling of the community charge. At no point did the 
Government seriously analyse the impact of the poll tax in Scotland when preparing 
for its implementation in England. The Scottish Office had encountered similar 
difficulties, and its advice could have aided officials at the DoE. If Scotland was 
Thatcher's 'guinea pig', then she neglected to examine the results of her experiment. 
At the budget in March 1990, the new Chancellor, John Major, provoked 
further controversy by extending the savings limit for community charge rebates from 
£8,000 to £16,000. 159 The Treasury, however, in rushing to implement this package 
overlooked Scottish poll tax payers, and Rifkind informed Thatcher that his position 
would be untenable if £4 million of Scottish Office funding was not sanctioned to 
finance this scheme in Scotland. l60 This oversight added to the Scottish 
Conservatives' difficulties, as it appeared that the Government was treating Scottish 
poll tax payers as an afterthought. Given the widespread perception that Thatcher did 
not understand or care about Scotland's interests.161 this event represented a public 
relations disaster for the Government. 
English and Welsh opposition to the community charge came to a head at an 
anti-poll tax rally in London on 31 March 1990. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people 
attended the protest,162 which resulted in a full-scale riot in Trafalgar Square. In a 
simultaneous rally in Glasgow the police praised the behaviour of protestors. 163 
Nevertheless, the inflammatory comments of Sheridan prior to the events were widely 
criticised, as he clamoured 'The force of people power will force Mrs Thatcher to 
stand down and then the whole house of cards will fall' .164 Thatcher's interpretation 
of the protest was scathing, 'an 'underclass' ... had been dragged back into the ranks of 
responsible society and asked to become not just dependents but citizens. The violent 
riots ... was their and the Left's response' .165 
In England and Wales, the reality of the community charge in operation 
compounded Thatcher's difficulties, as many councils set exorbitant poll tax rates. 
Community charge bills were averaging £363 per adult and, almost immediately, the 
Government announced its intention to cap twenty authorities, sixteen of which were 
Labour-controlled. A superficial review of the poll tax was also undertaken, but 
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Thatcher had no intention of jettisoning her 'flagship' policy. Indeed, she examined 
the possibility of introducing universal capping, only to be thwarted by the legal 
complexities involved in this procedure. 
A critical driving force behind Thatcher's desire for universal capping was the 
impact that the poll tax was having on inflation (see chapter 1). The community 
charge was calculated as part of the RPI, which had a very significant bearing on 
inflation. Higher than expected charge levels combined with unforeseen increases in 
local authority expenditure to create an upsurge in inflation and, by October 1990, 
inflation had reached 10.9%.166 Yet, Thatcher was oblivious to the fact that universal 
capping would have destroyed the entire concept of local accountability, which was 
essential if the community charge was to operate effectively. 
The level of non-payment in England and Wales was considerably lower than 
in the first year of the poll tax in Scotland. By 31 March 1991 English and Welsh 
local authorities had collected 91 % of the collectable charge, whereas the previous 
year Scotland had a non-payment level of 12.3%.167 Indeed, by the second year of the 
charge, and its inaugural year in England and Wales, non-payment in Scotland had 
risen to 25.7%.168 Therefore, rather than attacking dependency, the poll tax was 
actually contributing towards a deterioration in levels of individual responsibility. 
Between 1990/91 and 1991192, the number of Scots registered to pay the 
charge fell from 3,818,617 to 3,745,436, and at the 1992 General Election it is 
estimated that 700,000 Britons omitted themselves from the electoral register in order 
to avoid payment of the poll tax. 169 A huge amount of time and money was also spent 
on recovering relatively small sums of money from non-payers, presenting another 
area of conflict, in Scotland, over the use of warrant sales to recoup the outstanding 
charges. 
By February 1990, Scottish voters ranked the community charge as the 
foremost political issue in Scotland. 170 Yet, the real danger to Thatcher came from 
within her own party, as her longstanding opponent, Heseltine, launched a challenge 
to her leadership in November 1990 (see chapter 1).171 The poll tax was by no means 
the only issue involved, but Heseltine's pledge to review the charge if he became 
Conservative leader, was an integral pillar of his campaign. Thatcher, on the other 
hand, remained defiantly behind her 'flagship' policy. Both Thatcher and Heseltine 
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were ultimately rejected, as John Major won through with a pledge to scrap the poll 
tax at the earliest possible opportunity.I72 
On 1 April 1993, the community charge was replaced by the council tax. The 
charge had cost the Treasury £1.5 billion to set up and then destroy, and the rebate 
system is estimated to have consumed £20 billion. 173 The roots of the poll tax can be 
traced to the legal complexities of rate capping, the effects of revaluation in Scotland, 
and the attempted castration of socialism within local government. Much of the 
opposition to the charge focused on its disproportionate effect on the incomes of the 
unemployed and low-paid, but it would be foolhardy to suggest that the perceived 
unfairness of the regressive charge was its most serious flaw. In reality, Thatcher's 
'flagship' was sunk because it failed to deliver the reduced local taxation bills that 
she had promised when discarding the rates. Contrary to Sheridan's assertion that left-
wing agitation resulted in the collapse of the poll tax,174 this inability to reduce the 
local taxation bills of Conservative voters led to the downfall of the community 
charge. 
Inflation was also ignited by this unexpected rise in the Government's outlay, 
helping to destabilise the economy. Moreover, Thatcher's dismissal of Lawson's 
opposition to the charge alienated the Chancellor, contributing towards his eventual 
departure. The tax achieved the opposite of its intended impact, as non-payment 
progressively rose, increasing dependency and undennining levels of personal 
responsibility. Shirley Robin Letwin argues that the 'poll tax was an experiment in 
autonomy: an attempt to undermine municipal socialism without centralization' ,175 
but Thatcher's retention of capping powers and the centralisation of business rates 
discredits Letwin's analysis. The entire episode was a personal disaster for Thatcher, 
as the tax was so closely associated with her. In that sense, Heseltine was wrong to 
contend that the charge would become the ultimate 'Tory tax', as any successor to 
Thatcher was in a position to replace the charge. 
On the other hand, the community charge had a long lasting effect in Scotland, 
and Ritkind admits that it was a serious error.176 Viewed in a British context, the poll 
tax represented a hammer blow to the corporatism of the post-war consensus, but in 
Scotland this assault was interwoven and entangled with the autonomy of civil 
society. A powerful myth developed that Scotland had been used as a 'guinea pig' by 
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the Conservatives, and most Scots were either ignorant of or dismissed the Scottish 
Conservatives' role in supporting the early imposition of the charge. Furthermore, 
these sentiments were fanned by politicians, and the Scottish media. This was a 
powerful grievance, and a valuable campaign tool for devolutionists. 177 By 
implementing the community charge in Scotland first, Thatcher unwittingly 
undermined the Union, creating the preconditions for constitutional reform. 
Changing Track: Local Government Reform, 1987-1990 
Another equally controversial local government issue was the imposition of 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) (see chapter 4). Thatcher's attraction to 
competitive tendering can be 'traced to the 'winter of discontent' (see chapter 3), 
when local authority workers were at the forefront of militant strike action. Rubbish 
lay uncollected throughout the streets of Britain, and this became the abiding memory 
of the various disputes. 
Thatcher hoped that the competition generated by contracting-out would break: 
the monopoly that many councils held in public service provision, whilst providing 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency for ratepayers. Moreover, Thatcher surmised that the 
fragmentation caused by competitive tendering would create a proliferation of 
different wages and conditions, constraining the trade unions' ability to call uniform 
strike action. Writing in June 1980, Forsyth asserted that, 'When a centrally provided 
service is replaced by one contracted with a private firm, the result seems to be better 
service, fewer complaints and lower costs'. 178 
Competitive tendering was already widely used by English local authorities, 
and Thatcher hoped that the Local Government Act of 1988, which introduced CCT, 
would help to facilitate a smooth transition to the poll tax. In Scotland, however, the 
debate over CCT was dominated by arguments over her mandate to force competitive 
tendering on the nation's predominantly Labour-controlled local authorities. Thatcher 
attributed these attitudes to the prevalence of socialism in Scotland, but some Scottish 
Conservatives were also unsure of its merits. 179 Indeed, her actions contradicted 
Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionists' belief in 'natural monopoly' (see chapter 1). 
The ultimate objective of CCT, and the community charge was set out by 
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Ridley in 1988. He spoke of his vision of an 'enabling council', operating as one of a 
number of agencies providing services within the local community. ISO Its central task 
was to contract out the services within its remit to private sector companies, and 
voluntary organisations. However, in Scotland, CCl was tainted in a similar fashion 
to the poll tax by its lack of democratic legitimacy. 
Under the new legislation the Scottish Secretary had the power to remove 
work from a Direct Labour Organisation (DLO) if it did not comply with its 
tendering, accounting or financial requirements. 181 Local authority trade unions were 
outraged that councils were banned from taking 'non-commercial' decisions, such as 
trade union recognition, into account when awarding a contract. DLOs trained 
between 15% and 20% of building craft apprentices in Scotland,182 but under this Act 
private contractors were not obliged to continue this practice. The legislation 
specified that refuse collection, street cleaning, cleaning of buildings, ground 
maintenance, vehicle maintenance, and catering were all to be put out to tender. 
The initial impact of CCl was limited, and after the first two rounds of 
tendering in October 1990, 85% of contracts had been awarded in-house. DLOs won 
all the catering and street cleaning contracts, whereas private contractors fared best in 
vehicle maintenance, refuse collection, building cleaning, and ground maintenance. 
One of the Conservatives' greatest concerns was that 40% of contracts attracted no 
external bids. This led to the Scotsman commenting on the resilience of corporatism 
within Scottish local government: 'Close co-operation between the trade unions and 
local authorities to work out the best deal has been another benefit of the new 
legislation which has not so far fulfilled the prophecies of doom'. IS3 
On the other hand, the SLGIU highlighted the fact that 53% of the contracts 
awarded in the first two rounds of competitive tendering resulted in job losses, 12% 
produced cuts in pay, and 17% led to a drop in hours. 184 Of the contracts won by in-
house teams, 26% retained jobs, as well as pay and conditions. Furthermore, the case 
for CCl was hindered by the quality of service provided by many private sector firms. 
During the first round of tendering Strathclyde Region awarded a London-based 
company, Southdown Cleaning and Maintenance, two cleaning contracts, but it soon 
became apparent that Southdown had been insolvent for four years, and was paying 
its staff £31 per week. ISS 
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In Tayside Region there was controversy when the council opted to hand 
Initial Contract Services the tender to clean schools and school buildings. 186 The 
minority Labour administration opposed this, and called for the matter to be deferred 
for negotiation with all bidders, but the SNP sided with the Conservatives to push the 
decision through. As a result of this, 900 jobs were lost in Dundee. Initial's poor 
performance prompted complaints from parents, staff and pUpilS,187 and the English 
company was eventually stripped of the contract and replaced by an in-house team. 
As CCT came under scrutiny, another ambitious Government reform had 
largely passed unnoticed. Scottish Homes came into existence on 1 December 1988, 
and began its work on the same day as the poll tax was introduced on 1 April 1989.188 
Operating as a national housing agency, the new organisation replaced the Scottish 
Special Housing Association, and the Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS). 
Scottish Homes' central task was to further increase the levels of owner-occupation in 
Scotland,189 a flagship policy in receipt of huge Government support through the 
right-to-buy scheme, and MITR. 
In 1987/88 MITR amounted to £4,750 million, and by 1989 public housing 
represented less than 50% of the Scottish housing stock for the first time since 
1945.190 Paradoxically the Government's enthusiasm for increased Scottish owner-
occupation did not provide any electoral spin off for the Scottish Conservatives. At 
the 1987 General Election, 54% of British homeowners had voted Conservative, but 
by July 1989 the party could only rely on the support of 34% of Scottish owner-
occupiers. 191 In stark contrast, Labour's popularity amongst council house tenants 
remained as high as 59%, and it commanded the support of 31 % of Scottish 
homeowners. 
Scottish Homes was to act as a bridge between the public and private sector 
housing market. It was to have powers to lend to private landlords in order to finance 
new building projects or the rehabilitation of older, deteriorating housing stock, but it 
was not permitted to set rents for any of the properties it invested in. In its first year, 
Rifkind hoped that the new agency would achieve a sales target of 7,500 houses, and 
a performance-related-pay package was drawn up for Scottish Homes employees as 
an incentive. 192 The legislation also insisted that all public sector tenants should be 
given the opportunity to choose a new landlord. 
239 
In April 1989 Scottish Homes' housing stock stood at 74,572, but 57% of its 
tenants were in receipt of housing benefit, limiting their options under the right-to-buy 
legislation. The next best alternative, in the Conservatives' eyes, therefore, was to 
empower these tenants to choose a private landlord. Rifkind hoped that, within three 
years, 60% of Scottish Homes' tenants could be moved into the private sector, 
specifying that Scottish Homes' stock was to be maintained at its current standard, but 
not improved. In stark contrast, private landlords were to be given grants up to 50% of 
their costs if they provided rented housing in areas where there was a shortage of this 
type of accommodation. Scottish Homes' budget for 1989/90 was £270.34 million. 193 
Labour and the STUC speculated that Scottish Homes' direct labour structure 
would be abolished and replaced by private contractors. 194 Furthermore, COSLA 
interpreted the creation of Scottish Homes as an act of centralisation, and Labour 
expressed concern that the new agency had no strategy for dealing with homelessness, 
which had risen by 36% in Glasgow between 1983 and 1986.195 Contrary to 
accusations surrounding the 'Anglicisation,l96 of Scotland by Thatcher (see chapter 
4). this initiative created a separate Scottish housing body. The HCiS had been part of 
a UK-wide network, but this aspect of the reform received very little media attention. 
Scottish Homes encapsulated the difficulties that Thatcher faced in Scotland 
as, in order to achieve the continued expansion of home-ownership, she was obliged 
to establish an interventionist housing agency, creating more bureaucracy and adding 
to Scotland's public sector expenditure requirements. The agency embraced many of 
Thatcher's beliefs, as it sought further to increase owner-occupation, minimise public 
sector provision, and revitalise the private rented sector, but a body of this sort was 
not required to stimulate the housing market in England and Wales. 
A Decade of Change: Thatcher's Reforms in Penpective 
After ten years of rolling reform, the changes in the landscape of local government 
were unmistakable, as Thatcher presided over a significant injection of market forces. 
However, this process encountered much opposition, as the Government implemented 
these reforms through a combination of centralisation, and forceful coercion. In 
Scotland, the Government operated to a separate timetable, but the objectives 
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remained the same as those elsewhere in Britain. 
The right-to-buy legislation was hugely successful, and by 1991, 21% of 
Scotland's council housing stock had been sold, whilst 53% of Scots were owner-
occupiers.197 Midwinter et al. argue that Thatcher's housing policies were, 'marginal 
in terms of the government's objective of a radical change in Scotland's tradition of 
public ownership',t98 but short of giving council houses away for free, the impact of 
the right-to-buy could not have been more striking. Indeed, Stevenson and Forsyth 
believe that the sale of council houses was Thatcher's greatest single achievement in 
Scotland.199 This helped to fulfil Noel Skelton's vision of a 'property owning 
democracy' (see chapter 1), but there was no electoral spin-off for the Scottish 
Conservatives. By 1990, for the first time in history, Labour held the advantage over 
the Conservatives in terms of owner-occupiers.200 Furthermore, the proportion of sales 
were unevenly spread throughout Scotland and, by June 2000, the Lanarkshire 
constituencies of Airdrie and Shotts, and Motherwell and Wi shaw, still had 62.5% of 
households under council control.201 
Local authority finance had also undergone a revolutionary overhaul. After the 
poll tax came into operation, Scotland's councils only had the authority to raise at 
most 30% of their income, and by the time the poll tax was replaced by the council 
tax in April 1993 this figure had fallen to 20%.202 This did nothing to improve local 
accountability, and made the Government a convenient scapegoat for all of local 
government's shortcomings. 
Furthermore, Thatcher's policies failed to lower state dependency, as the 
effects of high unemployment (see chapter 2) resulted in the cost of housing benefit 
payments in Scotland rising from £95 million in 1979 to over £500 million in 1990.203 
Expenditure on MITR escalated from £1,450 million in 1979/80 to £7,700 million in 
1990/91, as Thatcher subsidised the expansion of home-ownership?04 Other 
initiatives, such as CCT undermined the extent of trade union influence within local 
government, and forced councils to consider private sector involvement in service 
provision. In the long-term this was to have an unmistakable impact on Scottish local 
government. 
The overriding outcome of Thatcher's reforms was the maximisation of 
central government control over Britain's local authorities. Letwin correctly asserts 
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that, despite the drastic error of the community charge, Thatcher successfully 
managed to castrate high spending local authorities by depriving them of their 
traditional sources of finance.2os However, in financial terms, Scotland lagged behind 
England, and in 1990/91 Scottish local authorities spent £1,276 per adult, compared 
to £920 in England, and £967 in Wales.206 Furthermore, English councils only 
received 29% of their standard spending through the RSG, whereas Scottish 
authorities were allocated 49% of their expenditure in the RSG. Manpower numbers 
also remained stubbornly high in Scotland and, between December 1980 and 
December 1990, the number of council employees only dropped by 4,500 to 
254,587.207 
Despite Scotland's advantage in the allocation of resources, Thatcher's 
overhaul of local government had damaged the Scottish Conservatives as much, if not 
more so than the post-war consensus. This was largely due to the rolling process of 
centralisation undertaken by Thatcher, which saw the unelected Scottish Office grow 
substantially in power. In Thatcher's eyes, she was sapping the strength of Labour-
controlled authorities, but in doing so she was ignoring the democratically expressed 
wishes of the Scottish electorate and eroding the power of civil society.20s The 
implementation of the poll tax only served to intensify the Scottish Conservatives' 
difficulties and, by 1990, the Conservatives failed to control a single Scottish regional 
authority, and only held power on three district councils. Thatcher had succeeded in 
bringing the 'runaway train' under control, but in doing so she had irreparably 
damaged the Scottish Conservatives' electoral credentials, and as will be seen in the 
next chapter, she pushed the Union to breaking point. 
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Chapter Six 
RULE BRITANNIA? THATCHER AND THE 'SCOTTISH QUESTION,l 
Speaking, in November 1975, Margaret Thatcher outlined her opposition to Scottish 
Home Rule, 'Devolution should march hand in hand with a conscious attempt to scale 
down the size of government. The object is not more government of the people but 
more decisions by the people over their own lives'? Scotland's constitutional 
relationship with the British state has been the subject of much historical debate, and 
it has been a recurrent political issue since 1886. During Thatcher's premiership her 
assault on the post-war consensus became intertwined with the Scottish question, 
creating a fascinating constitutional by-product of her restructuring. This chapter 
illuminates the impact of Thatcher and the Scottish Conservative Party on the 
campaign for Home Rule, and includes analysis of the fortunes of the SNP. 3 
Scottish historians have paid great attention to developments in the Scottish 
question during Thatcher's time in office. Christopher Harvie correctly highlights the 
continuation of 'a collectivist Britishness' during the first half of Thatcher's office, 
but concludes that, 'by 1990 the nationalist genie was out of the lamp,.4 Furthermore, 
James Mitchell provides comprehensive coverage of constitutional developments, but 
omits the fact that every mainstream Scottish party, with the exception of the SNP, 
supported the Union. This detracts from his analysis of Unionist attitudes within the 
Conservative Party, and fails to convey the extent of support that the Union continued 
to enjoy in Scotland. 5 
Gerald Warner dismisses 'the so-called 'Doomsday Scenario' as 'the 
'Doomsday Fantasia', whilst Richard Finlay asserts that Thatcher, 'undermined what 
was for many Scots the true essence of a British identity and political loyalty', 
attributing this to her attack on 'the corporate state,.6 Finlay also argues that, in order 
to defend the Union, the Conservatives pursued conflicting objectives, as the party 
encouraged independence in England, whilst discouraging it in Scotland. Y ct, his 
analysis is misplaced, as Thatcher supported independence for individuals and their 
families throughout the UK. Constitutional independence for Scotland was strongly 
opposed by Thatcher, but she also opposed this within England. 
Finlay correctly highlights Scotland's public expenditure advantage over 
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England as a key political factor in justifying Scotland's place within the Union, but 
fails to mention that the SNP favoured higher levels of British state spending in 
Scotland throughout Thatcher's premiership. This leads Michael Fry to conclude that, 
'It was hard to take seriously a party which preached independence yet practised 
dependence', and writing in 1987, he states that 'devolution was no longer a burning 
issue,.7 Finally, lain Hutchison correctly identifies the importance of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention in ensuring that support for devolution, 'would be both 
broader and deeper than in the 1970s'. 8 
The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism: The 'Scottish Question', 1967-1979 
On 2 November 1967, the SNP registered a spectacular electoral success, as Winifred 
Ewing overturned a Labour majority of 16,576 to win a by-election in the Lanarkshire 
seat of Hamilton.9 The SNP performed well in by-elections during the 1960s, and 
Gordon Wilson attributes this to the Nationalists' tactic of high profile mass 
canvassing. Wilson believes that the rise in support for the SNP was a reaction to the 
death of imperialism and a popular response to the run-down of Scotland's heavy 
industries. 1O This upsurge illustrated discontent with the consensus on administrative 
devolution. Yet, the post-war consensus remained unchallenged in Scottish politics, 
as the SNP voiced its support for consensus policies. The Nationalists only differed 
on the best constitutional basis to pursue them. I I 
In the summer of 1967 the Scottish Conservatives established a committee to 
examine the structure of Scottish government and, in November, the Thistle Group 
was launched by young Scottish Conservatives, such as Malcolm Ritkind and Michael 
Ancram. 12 It proposed the creation of a Scottish Assembly with fiscal autonomy, and 
the Thistle Group agreed with the party committee that too much power rested in the 
hands of Scottish Office civil servants. At the 1968 Scottish Conservative conference, 
Edward Heath announced the party's intention to create a Scottish Assembly, but Fry 
states that most Scottish Conservatives felt that 'Heath had gone too far too fast'. 13 
William Ross vehemently opposed devolution, but in April 1969, Labour 
appointed a Royal Commission on the Constitution to quell the upsurge in support for 
Home Rule.14 In November, a Scottish Select Committee with powers to undertake 
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investigations into Scottish affairs was created. I5 The Conservatives' final devolution 
proposals in March 1970 were limited, supporting the establishment of a directly 
elected Scottish Convention to take on the work of the Scottish committees of the 
House of Commons. 16 It was apparent that neither Labour nor the Conservatives were 
convinced of the need for devolution. 
The Royal Commission on the Constitution reported back in favour of the 
principle of devolution in October 1973.17 One month later the SNP's Margo 
MacDonald swept to an unexpected by-election victory in the safe Labour seat of 
Glasgow Govan. I8 Neither Labour nor the Conservatives fought the February 1974 
General Election on a pro-devolution platform, and the SNP won seven seats on the 
back of its imaginative 'It's Scotland's Oil' campaign.19 A special conference in 
August 1974 committed Labour to the creation of a Scottish Assembly, and at the 
October General Election the party issued its first ever Scottish manifesto.2o The SNP 
gained four seats at the Conservatives' expense.21 
Labour's 1975 devolution White Paper provided for a limited form of Home 
Rule, and the Conservatives' Shadow Scottish Secretary, Alick Buchanan Smith, and 
the Scottish Conservative Party Chairman, George Younger, signalled the party's 
support for Labour's plans.22 The MP for South Ayrshire, Jim Sillars, was angered by 
this package, however, and left the Labour Party, in December 1975, to create his own 
Scottish Labour Party (SLP).23 Sillars propounded a message of Scottish 
independence within the EEC, but continued to vote in favour of devolution.24 The 
media publicised Sillars' activities and his innovative European policy was to have 
long-term resonance in Scottish politics, but only John Robertson, MP for Paisley, left 
the Parliamentary Party, and few Labour Party members joined the SLP.25 
Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian and a prominent Scottish Labour 
opponents of devolution, argued that it would create the unacceptable constitutional 
anomaly of Scottish MPs voting on English legislation, whilst devolved matters were 
legislated for in Edinburgh.26 This came to be known as the 'West Lothian 
Question,.27 Scotland had 11.2% of British seats, but only 9.4% of Britain's 
population,28 and some Scottish Labour MPs were concerned that devolution might 
bring a reduction in Scotland's Westminster representation. 
Rifkind chaired a committee to finalise the Conservatives' devolution 
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proposals, and was appointed as the party's Devolution Spokesman.29 His committee 
recommended a Scottish Assembly with no executive powers and no direct control 
over Scotland's block grant.3D By the end of 1975, only five Scottish Conservative 
MPs, including Younger, Rifkind, and Buchanan Smith, were firmly in favour of 
devolution. After consulting with William Whitelaw, Thatcher opted to pursue a 
compromise policy of opposing Labour's proposals, whilst emphasising the 
Conservatives' belief in the principle of devolution.3l Buchanan Smith and Rifkind 
resigned from their frontbench positions in December 1976 in protest at Thatcher's 
decision to enforce a three-line whip to vote against the Scotland and Wales Bill,32 
and the staunchly Unionist, Teddy Taylor, became Shadow Scottish Secretary. 
The Scotland and Wales Bill ran out of parliamentary time in February 1977, 
and a separate Scotland Bill was introduced to Parliament in November 1977. 
However, opponents of the Bill secured amendments requiring a referendum, and 
stipulating that 40% of Scots had to vote in favour of an Assembly before it could be 
established.33 Labour won three successive by-elections in 1978, and many party 
activists, who had supported devolution on pragmatic grounds, surmised that the 
SNP's fortunes were on the wane.34 Internal divisions festered within the Labour 
Party and SNP. 35 
The Conservatives were the. only Scottish party officially to campaign against 
devolution, but some Scottish Conservatives, such as Buchanan Smith, Rifkind, Brian 
Meek and Struan Stevenson, urged Conservative voters to vote 'Yes,.36 Their efforts 
were undermined by the intervention of Lord Home, who contended in an interview 
on 13 February 1979 that, 'a No vote does not and need not imply any disloyalty to 
the principle of devolution,.37 Thatcher took a low profile during the campaign, but 
on the eve of the Referendum she proclaimed that, 'A "No" vote does not mean the 
devolution question will be buried'. 38 
At the Referendum on 1 March 1979,32.9010 of Scots supported the creation 
of a Scottish Assembly, whereas 30.8% voted against devolution.39 The result failed 
to satisfy the 40% rule, and the constitutional status quo remained in place. It was 
apparent that significant groupings within civil society remained to be convinced of 
the merits of Home Rule, and many other Scots could not see the need for a Scottish 
Assembly when the British unitary state adequately provided for their economic and 
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social needs. 
The Calm Before the Storm: 'The Scottish Question', 1979-1987 
Thatcher entered Downing Street without the uncertainty of constitutional change at 
the heart of Scottish political debate. At the 1979 General Election, the Scottish 
Conservatives regained seven seats from the Nationalists, as the SNP's representation 
dropped to two MPs. This combined with the Referendum result to convince Thatcher 
that the Scots had expressed their satisfaction with the status quo. 40 
The Conservatives' 1979 manifesto committed Thatcher to the creation of, 'an 
all-party conference or committee to see if we can reach agreement on improvements 
in our system of government'.41 This, however, proved to be no more than a token 
gesture. From February 1982, the Scottish Grand Committee was permitted to meet in 
Edinburgh, but was granted no legislative powers. There were sixteen meetings of the 
Grand Committee in Edinburgh between 1982 and June 1987,42 provoking little 
public interest. 
On I March 1980, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) was 
established in Edinburgh.43 Its stated objective was ·the creation of a directly elected 
legislative Assembly for Scotland'. Another priority of the CSA was 'to call a 
National Convention representative of Scottish life and society to consider detailed 
proposals for the constitution and powers of a Scottish Assembly'. The CSA was 
determined to generate greater unity in the Home Rule movement, and its non party-
political outlook sought to create an atmosphere conducive to constructive and 
consensual debate.44 The early 1980s was characterised by economic turmoil in 
Scotland, and devolution was no longer a significant political issue (see chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, a Scottish Conservative Party memorandum to Central Office in March 
1981 emphasised that, 'Scots think very much in Scottish rather than British terms', 
stating that, 'If Scotland is seen to be doing badly in economic terms', interest in 
devolution could be revived 4S 
The SNP entered a period of internal turmoil in the wake of its poor showing 
in May 1979. Some Nationalists were determined to alter the party's ideological 
stance, and this manifested itself in schisms. The most prominent splinter group, the 
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'79 Group, formed in May 1979,46 was avowedly republican and wished the SNP to 
espouse socialism. A central plank of the '79 Group's beliefs was to gear the party's 
message towards working-class Labour voters in the central-belt. The Group's most 
high profile recruit was Sillars, who had disbanded the SLP after losing his seat at the 
1979 General Election. Sillars joined the SNP in 1980, and was elected as Vice-
Chairman for policy in 1981, winning approval for a policy of civil disobedience. The 
campaign was a serious misjudgement on Sillars' behalf as, during the early 1980s. 
devolution was heavily overshadowed by unemployment. If Scots would not engage 
in civil disobedience over mass unemployment it was unrealistic to expect them to do 
so over Scotland's constitutional status. 
Wilson believes that some members of the '79 Group made useful individual 
contributions to the SNP, but its divisiveness acted like a cancer in the party.47 Events 
climaxed at the 1982 SNP conference, as Wilson expelled six members of the '79 
Group. The party was still discussing these expulsions in April 1983, only five weeks 
before the 1983 General Election. In a period when Thatcher's economic strategy was 
heavily dependent on receipts from North Sea oil, the Nationalists had indulged in 
internal wrangling that undermined the party's credibility, enabling Labour to heal 
some of its divisions over devolution. 
Speaking to the Conservative Political Centre, in July 1979, Thatcher 
proclaimed that, 'The mission of this Government is much more than the promotion 
of economic progress. It is to renew the spirit and solidarity of the nation .. .It will not 
be given to this generation of our countrymen to create a great Empire. But it is given 
to us to demand an end to decline,.48 She equated her attack on the post-war 
consensus with a national mission to restore British greatness through the defeat of 
socialism. This new mission was intended to fill the void left by decolonisation, and 
Thatcher was unwilling to accommodate devolution, which she viewed as a potential 
ideological and constitutional threat to these objectives. 
Following Britain's triumph in the Falklands War, Thatcher tapped into the 
mood of resurgent British nationalism, and Eric Hobsbawm concludes that, 'there is 
no doubt that this was a reaction to the decline of the British Empire,.49 However, 
David McCrone accurately states that, 'Such nationalism ... depended upon a powerful 
enough sense of 'Britain' to encapsulate the minor nationalities of these islands'. so 
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The Falklands conflict was as a vivid symbol of Thatcher's resolve to restore British 
greatness, but the Scottish euphoria was muted in comparison with England. 
Younger made little effort to channel Scottish national sentiment into the 
Falklands triumph, instead focusing on practical opposition to devolution. Speaking in 
October 1982, he contended that it would be impossible to conceive of any new 
system that would not, 'either create an area of perpetual friction between Edinburgh 
and London, or an unacceptable and additional burden on the taxpayers of 
Scotland' .51 Nevertheless, when questioned by the CSA in February 1983, Ritkind 
claimed that he remained 'sympathetic to the idea of a Scottish assembly' within a 
federal UK.52 The Scottish Conservatives' 1983 manifesto stated that, 'We remain 
willing to consider further changes to improve the government of Scotland within the 
United Kingdom' ,53 but, in reality, the party had no intention of undertaking 
constitutional reform. At the 1983 General Election, the SNP put up another poor 
showing, retaining its two seats in Dundee East and the Western Isles, but losing fifty-
three of its seventy-two deposits. 54 
The CSA was undaunted by Thatcher's victory, and held a 'Referendum 
Week' in March 1985 to mark the sixth anniversary of the Devolution Referendum. 55 
This event was designed to publicise the CSA's proposals for a constitutional 
convention, but neither Labour nor the STUC responded to this initiative. The eSA 
also targeted those sections of civil society that had opposed devolution in 1979. A 
significant grouping was located in local government, and the CSA contended that a 
Scottish Assembly could shelter Scotland's councils from Thatcher's spending 
constraints. 56 
When the CSA called a conference in late 1984 with the intention of 
reassuring representatives of Scottish local government that an Assembly would not 
usurp their existing powers, 57 fewer than one-third of Scottish councils opted to send 
delegates. This did not deter the eSA, and in October 1986 its persistence paid off, as 
COSLA pledged its support for devolution. Experience of Thatcher's reforms had 
convinced Scotland's local authorities that the prospect of potential conflict with a 
Scottish Assembly was more desirable than the certainty of conflict with Thatcher. 
Scottish affairs and devolution received very little attention from the New 
Right, but in 1984 the Adam Smith Institute (ASn published the Omega Report on 
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Scottish Policy, proposing a considerable reduction in the powers of the Scottish 
Office.58 The ASI surmised that this contraction in Scottish government would 
facilitate the devolution of power to individual Scots through the pursuit of free 
market policies at Westminster. Allan Massie concluded: 'It is an alternative that will 
meet resistance from the vested interests ... which were not threatened at all by the 
schemes of political devolution, but battle has been joined; and it's a battle worth 
joining' .59 
This document illustrates the extent to which the ASI misunderstood the 
Conservative and Unionist relationship with administrative devolution, as the Scottish 
Conservatives could not adopt its proposals, because they were incompatible with the 
party's stance on administrative devolution since 1937. Furthermore, unlike the 
nineteenth-century when the Scots were described as one of the 'least governed 
people in Europe' ,w administrative and business opportunities for Scots had become 
far more limited in the aftermath of Empire. The Scottish Conservatives, therefore, 
continued to argue that devolution was unworkable in practice, and that it would 
inevitably lead to the destruction of the UK. This was the only coherent position left 
open to Younger, as he sought to minimise discussions on constitutional reform. 
Younger's replacement by Ritkind raised the hopes of the CSA because of his 
support for devolution in the 1970s. Ritkind agreed to meet representatives from the 
CSA in March 1986,61 but continued to contend that devolution was unfeasible until a 
federal system was introduced in Britain. Rifkind realised that Thatcher would not 
permit the Scottish Conservatives to jeopardise her attack on the post-war consensus 
by changing its devolution policy. Yet this stance had considerably different 
connotations to that of its former Unionist proponents, as the governance of the 
British Empire was no longer a factor (see chapter 1), and Rifkind's arguments 
implied that Scottish devolution was reliant upon the English electorate supporting 
federalism. 
The Scottish Conservatives' stance was logical, however, as a Scottish 
Assembly was likely to be dominated by Labour, whereas the existing British 
constitution enabled the party to exercise control in Scotland by virtue of the 
Conservatives' support in England. Nevertheless, this constitutional position was only 
sustainable if it continued to command the support of significant sections of civil 
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society. Conservative hopes rested on the inability of Scottish devolutionists to 
coordinate their efforts and agree upon a specific scheme. It was apparent that an 
upsurge in support for constitutional reform would sternly test the ideological and 
tactical strength of the Scottish Conservatives' stance. 
Although divisions remained within the Labour Party, devolution continued to 
be a manifesto commitment. During Thatcher's first and second terms, Labour 
published devolution proposals,62 and Donald Dewar's appointment as Shadow 
Scottish Secretary boosted the influence of devolutionists. George Foulkes, MP for 
Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley, was amongst the most enthusiastic Labour Home 
Rulers. He, in cooperation with Scottish Labour MPs, such as Falkirk West MP, 
Dennis Canavan, questioned the Conservatives' mandate to govern in Scotland after 
the 1983 General Election. Foulkes proposed organising a campaign of parliamentary 
and civil disruption in cooperation with Scotland's local authorities to gain publicity 
for devolution.63 The constitutional logic that underpinned this argument was, 
however, extremely limited. Britain was a unitary state with a single constitution that 
was based on the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament. 64 In effect, the writ of Her 
Majesty's Government covered the entire UK. and Scotland had no more right to opt 
out from this framework than the English regions. 
Some opponents of devolution now reconsidered their stance as the 
momentum of Thatcher's progressive assault on the post-war consensus gathered 
pace. Robin Cook told Radical Scotland in September 1983 that because of the 
divergence between voting behaviour in England and Scotland it was now necessary 
to create a Scottish Assembly within a federal Britain. 6S Nevertheless, Cook 
emphasised that Labour should not attempt to mobilise a populist campaign for self-
government, because the Scottish electorate expected it to focus on the economy and 
the welfare state. Therefore, until 1987, devolution was a secondary Labour priority to 
reducing unemployment and defending the welfare state. 
After 1983 the in-fighting within the SNP subsided, which allowed the 
Nationalists to focus on policy reform. In August 1983, Wilson, with the strong 
support of Sillars, successfully reversed party policy on membership of the EEC.66 
This represented a significant reform for a previously anti-European party, and was to 
prove a pivotal moment in the SNP's policy development. This process of reform 
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continued at the 1984 SNP conference, as Sillars narrowly succeeded in winning the 
party's support to campaign for an elected constitutional convention.67 An integral 
part of this strategy involved cooperating with the eSA in its campaign for a 
constitutional convention. Mitchell contends that, 'It was a good campaigning 
position, but little attention was paid to how a convention would be established and 
what should be done in the event of one being set up which was not along the lines 
the SNP proposed,.68 By 1987, the Nationalists' policy reforms and internal 
difficulties had the dual effect of shifting the party towards a clear social democratic 
stance,69 whilst conveying a more credible independence message. 
Writing in 1986, Sillars identified that middle-class opposition to se1f-
government was weakening, but he concluded that, 'the Scottish middle class will not 
provide the springboard for change,.7o This statement, however, displays Sillars' 
detachment from civil society and the middle-class, as by 1986 around 60% of 
middle-class Scots expressed support for constitutional change, compared to 35% in 
1979.71 Thatcher's efforts to restore British greatness through the medium of market 
forces were having a negative effect on the interests of the Scottish middle-class and 
the autonomy of civil society, as she reduced public spending and reformed local 
government (see chapters 3 and 4).72 These groupings possessed the power and 
influence to re-ignite interest in devolution. 
As the 1987 General Election neared, Scottish political commentators began 
to speculate on the prospect of Thatcher facing the 'doomsday scenario' of holding no 
Scottish seats, but retaining power with an English majority.73 Labour's 1987 Scottish 
manifesto stated that devolution was, 'at the heart of Labour's plans for Scotland', 
whilst the STUe strongly emphasised its support for 'an entirely new institutional 
framework' in Scotland.74 The only mainstream Scottish political party to oppose 
constitutional change was the Conservative Party, and it was the only Scottish party 
which had failed to seriously re-assess its devolution stance since March 1979. When 
questioned in June 1987, Thatcher asserted that the Scottish media was paying an 
unjustified amount of attention to devolution, and a &otsman poll in the run-up to the 
General Election bears out her claim, as only 2% of Scots described devolution as a 
major political priority.7S Nevertheless, the Scotsman stated that, 'The aim of all Scots 
who wish to improve the condition of their nation must be to support the reform of 
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their system of government, and the experience of Tory political and economic rule 
since 1979 ought to encourage them in this ambition,.76 
Beyond 'Doomsday' : 'The Scottish Question', June 1987-March 1989 
On 11 June 1987, Thatcher won a third term in office with a comfortable majority 
built upon the Conservatives' support in southern England and the West Midlands.77 
However, in Scotland, the party only narrowly avoided electoral disaster, as it was 
reduced to ten MPs. Andrew Gamble states that, 'The divide between North and 
South in the UK ... seemed to have reached a new stage in the elections of 1983 and 
1987' ,78 but if Scotland is excluded from the voting figures for northern Britain, only 
Yorkshire and Humberside and north-east England decisively rejected Thatcher's 
policies. 
Both Labour and the SNP challenged Thatcher's mandate to govern in 
Scotland, highlighting her inability to satisfactorily staff the Scottish Office. Thatcher 
and the Scottish Conservatives' response was to prevent the Scottish Select 
Committee from convening. Allan Stewart described the Committee as a 'complete 
irrelevance',19 but, in reality, Thatcher did not have enough backbench Scottish MPs 
to serve on it. Thatcher believed that she was denying Labour a Scottish platform on 
which to voice its opposition to her policies but, in doing so, she inhibited the 
democratic accountability of the Scottish Office, which was implementing policies 
that had been rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Scottish electorate. 
English Conservative MPs also began attending Scottish Question Time to swell the 
Government's ranks, and at the first Scottish Questions of the new Parliament, 
Canavan exclaimed, 'I spy strangers' .80 
Nevertheless, Ritkind contended that there was no constitutional crisis, as the 
Conservatives possessed 'nearly 400' British MPS.81 Rifkind received support from 
CBI (Scotland), which feared that a Scottish Assembly would raise taxation. 82 
Furthermore, the Scottish division of the Institute of Directors consulted its members, 
and of the 180 replies that it received, 140 opposed devolution The main hope of the 
Scottish Conservatives rested on Rifkind's belief that the party's Scottish opponents 
would be unable or unwilling to put their differences aside and unite against the 
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Government in a concerted campaign for devolution. 
However, the views of Thatcher and the Conservatives' Scottish MPs did not 
necessarily concur with all of those at the grassroots of the Scottish Conservative 
Party. A discussion document produced by SCUA, analysing the 1987 General 
Election result, was damning in its conclusions. The report contended that Thatcher 
was a liability to the Scottish Conservatives because of her 'Englishness' and 
perceived 'uncaring attitudes' .83 It harked back to the Scottish Unionist era (see 
chapter 6), and appealed to Thatcher to 'keep an open mind' on devolution. This 
illustrates grassroots awareness of one of the Scottish Conservatives' most glaring 
weaknesses dwing Thatcher's premiership. The party was unable to play the 'Scottish 
card', because of Thatcher's entrenched opposition to devolution, the lack of Scottish 
policy initiatives and the growing prominence of its southern English MPs. After 1987 
these factors combined to create the perception that the Conservatives were 'anti-
Scottish' . 
Scottish Conservatives, such as Meek and Stevenson, were alive to this 
development, establishing a Conservative Constitutional Reform Forum (CCRF) in 
the wake of the 1987 General Election. This body had a membership of 100 but only 
twenty were active members.84 Stevenson stated in August 1987 that the Scottish 
Conservatives would, 'be reduced to a decimated rump acting solely as a conduit for 
Westminster legislation', if the party failed to deliver an Assembly, and Meek argued 
that devolution was inevitable. 85 
Under these circumstances, Labour was in a difficult position, as the 
Conservatives huge British majority rendered the party powerless to defeat any of 
Thatcher's reforms. The Nationalists exploited this by branding Labour's Scottish 
MPs the 'feeble fifty'. 86 Indeed, Scottish Labour's impotence was highlighted in 
January 1988, as a Labour Party sponsored Devolution Bill failed to make its second 
reading because of English Conservative opposition.87 It was apparent that Scottish 
Labour was in a position where it held responsibility but no parliamentary power. 
The most obvious beneficiary of the Conservatives' mandate difficulties and 
Labour's impotence at Westminster was the SNP. Although the Party only won three 
seats at the 1987 General Election, it proved a watershed for the SNP. Wilson, who 
lost Dundee East, and Donald Stewart, who retired from the Western Isles', were 
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replaced at Westminster by Alex Salmond, Margaret Ewing, MP for Moray, and 
Andrew Welsh, MP for Angus. Furthermore, the arguments of the '79 Group began to 
rise to prominence, as the party adopted a policy of parliamentary disruption, and 
advocated non-payment of the poll tax (see chapter 5). In May 1988, the Nationalists 
launched a campaign promoting Scottish independence within the EEC, emphasising 
the growing influence of Sillars. 
Meanwhile, the STUC organised a Festival of Scottish Democracy in 
September 1987 at Glasgow Green.88 This event was intended to focus on the lack of 
Scottish democratic accountability, with the STUC branding Rifkind as the 
'Governor-General' of Scotland.89 The Festival, however, was marred by poor 
weather and attracted a turnout of only 5,000 drawn from the ranks of the Labour 
Party, the trade unions and CSA. This event highlighted the continuing divisions 
between the Scottish parties over devolution, and the need for the Home Rule 
movement to broaden its base beyond party politics, in order to win the support of the 
Scottish public. 
As devolutionists struggled to organise a broad-based campaign, Rifkind 
launched a defence of the constitutional status quo. Speaking in April 1988 he posed 
the question, 'is it in Scotland's interests to become one devolved country in what 
would remain, otherwise, a unitary state?' , contending that devolution, 'would lead to 
the provincialisation of Scotland,.90 Furthermore, Rifkind spoke of 'the genius of 
Britain', which had enabled it to meet the needs of each constituent nation within a 
unitary state. He also outlined his interpretation of Unionism, as a belief 'that the 
peoples of these small islands share a common destiny', asserting that, 'the Union 
must remain a partnership ... and Scotland must enjoy all the benefits as well as the 
responsibilities of full partnership'. 
This speech represented a return to Unionist-nationalist rhetoric, with no 
mention of federalism. Stevenson states that Rifkind was privately sympathetic 
towards the CCRF,91 but had little room to manoeuvre as, in Thatcher's eyes, Scottish 
political distinctiveness was incompatible with her mission to eradicate socialism 
throughout the UK. This was in stark contrast to the ideological outlook of the 
Scottish Unionists, which had enabled figures, such as Walter Elliot, to equate 
Scottish nationalism and British diversity as the antithesis of state-controlled 
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socialism. Ritkind hoped that, by taking this stance, the party could withstand the 
initial calls for devolution until the Scottish public and opposition parties lost interest. 
The Conservatives' hostile attitude towards devolution was confirmed at the 
party's 1988 Scottish conference, which saw the first conference debate on devolution 
during Thatcher's premiership.92 Michael Forsyth and Bill Walker intentionally 
disrupted a fringe meeting that was held by the CCRF to promote its devolutionist 
motion.93 Both Forsyth and Walker, aided by a group of Young Conservatives and 
members of the free market pressure group, the Committee for a Free Britain (CFB), 
stood under a 'Devolution Sucks' banner, declaring 'Devolution NO Thatcherism 
YES' .94 Stevenson describes these tactics as, 'delving into the nether regions of Party 
in-fighting,.9s 
The CFB distributed a pamphlet entitled, 'Labour's Devolution Con-trick', 
which stated that, 'The Scottish people have been neglected by the Conservative 
Party. It has not directed its attention to saving Scotland, as distinct from Britain, 
from Socialism'. This strain of logic surmised that Thatcher should pursue her attack 
on the post-war consensus more vigorously in Scotland, whilst explaining her 
objectives in a Scottish context. In the event, the Scottish party conference delegates 
voted 500 to 12 against devolution.96 
Indeed, Thatcher's response to the Conservatives' poor showing in June 1987 
corresponded with CFB's arguments and ran contrary to SCUA's recommendations, 
as she embarked on high profile trips to Scotland, conveying her policies in person At 
the 1988 Scottish conference, Thatcher stated that, 'The values of hard work, self-
reliance, thrift, enterprise ... That is what the Tory Party stands for. That is what 
Scotland stands for'.97 Furthermore, she asserted that, 'Tory values are in tune with 
everything that is finest in the Scottish character and with the proudest moments in 
Scottish history', and exhorted the Scots to follow the examples of the Scottish 
enlightenment philosophers, Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Ferguson. 
These enterprising qualities were closely interlinked with the Scottish 
experience of Empire, and Thatcher believed that, 'the spread of British civilisation, 
by trade, by conquest, by settlement, by education and by example has provided Scots 
with opportunities that would otherwise have been untbinkable,.98 Shirley Robin 
Letwin asserts that Thatcher's attempts to overturn the post-war consensus and restore 
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British 'greatness' were interlinked with her belief in the English 'vigorous virtues' 
(see Introduction), but Thatcher had an equally strong attachment to this separate set 
of enterprising Scottish virtues.99 If Thatcher was 'to renew the spirit and solidarity of 
the nation', and restore British greatness then she had to cultivate these Scottish 
virtues as rigorously as the English ones. 
Thatcher intensified her efforts to promote these virtues in a keynote address 
to the Church of Scotland's General Assembly on 21 May 1988. The tone of her 
speech was intended to be of a personal nature, but five ministers objected to 
Thatcher speaking on any basis. 1°O Her address rejected any association between 
social responsibility and Christianity, 'we must not profess the Christian faith and go 
to Church simply because we want social reforms and benefits or a better standard of 
behaviour'. She stated that, 'We are told we must work and use our talents to create 
wealth ... How could we respond to the many calls for help ... unless we had first worked 
hard and used our talents to create the necessary wealth?'. 101 Furthermore, Thatcher 
placed great emphasis on the link between individual responsibility and religion, 'any 
set of social and economic arrangements which is not founded on the acceptance of 
individual responsibility will do nothing but harm ... intervention by the State must 
never become so great that it effectively removes personal responsibility' . 
The Kirk's immediate response was to hand Thatcher two reports dealing with 
housing and the Christian approach to the distribution of income and benefits. Nine 
months later, in response to this address, the Rt. Rev. Professor James Whyte, the 
Moderator of the Church of Scotland, observed that he had heard, 'much about the 
importance of the individual, a little about the family, but nothing at all about these 
other communities which give us our sense of where we belong' .102 Nicholas 
Fairbairn polarised attitudes further when he branded Whyte a 'socialist animal, 
totally uninterested in Christian duty'. Stevenson describes Thatcher's address as, 
'utterly patronising', but does agree with Fairbairn that the Kirk's leadership was 
dominated by 'socialists,.lo3 Indeed, the Kirk's wholesale rejection of Thatcher's 
post-colonial British mission was symbolic, as in the nineteenth and early twentieth-
century the Church of Scotland had been a vociferous supporter of imperialism, and 
an influential mouthpiece of Unionist-nationalism. 104 
Thatcher had offended the sensibilities of Presbyterian -dominated civil society 
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by mixing her politics with religion, and Mitchell states that she, 'could not complain 
when the Church decided to respond' .105 Yet, Thatcher had delivered an identical 
sermon at the church of St Lawrence Jewry in the City of London on Ash Wednesday 
1981, in an attempt to convey the moral vision that underpinned her political beliefs 
to the Church of England 106 Furthermore, a report by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
in December 1985, recommending social reform, was described by one Conservative 
MP as 'Marxist', and another MP contended that the Church of England was 
dominated by 'Communist clerics' .107 In Thatcher's eyes, her address displayed no 
greater insensitivity towards the Kirk and Scottish civil society than she exhibited 
towards the Church of England and the English Establishment. 
However, Thatcher failed to appreciate that the Church of Scotland had a 
tradition of autonomy from British state interference. The Kirk had issued the 'Claim 
of Right' in 1842, asserting its spiritual independence from the state, and in 1921 
Parliament had conceded that the Church of Scotland had the, 'right and power, 
subject to no civil authority, to legislate and adjudicate ftnally in all matters of 
doctrine, worship, government and discipline' .108 Presbyterianism had been at the 
heart of Scottish Unionism (see chapter 1), and Walter Elliot described the Church of 
Scotland's General Assembly as, 'the pure expression of the political heritage of 
Scotland' ,109 but Thatcher was oblivious to this connection. Her address was 
interpreted as an unwarranted infringement on the independence of the Kirk, and the 
Glasgow Herald described her speech as 'Thatcher's sermon on the Mound,.l1O Given 
Thatcher's Methodist upbringing and the Scottish Conservatives' Unionist roots she 
should have been more sensitive towards the Kirk's independent status. By 1990 the 
Scottish Conservatives could only rely on the support of 34% of Kirk members. 111 
Frustrated by its lack of headway the CSA decided to grasp the political 
initiative. In December 1987, the CSA announced its intention to create a 
Constitutional Steering Committee (CSC) to report on the possibility of reforming 
Scotland's place within the Union. The motive behind this manoeuvre was to force 
devolution onto the Scottish political agenda and pressurise all Scottish parties into 
joining a constitutional convention. In order to enhance its credibility, the CSA 
invited prominent members of civil society to sit on the CSC, and the tacit support of 
the editors of the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman was assured. 112 
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The CSC's report, A Claim of Right for Scotland was launched in Edinburgh 
in July 1988. As it stated, only twice before, in 1689 and 1842, had Scotland's ruling 
elite issued claims of right in protest at misgovernment, 113 which emphasises the 
constitutional magnitude of this document. It went on, 'Scotland faces a crisis of 
identity and survival. It is now being governed without consent', and called for the 
concentration of power that masquerades as 'the Crown-in-Parliament' to be broken 
up. Furthermore, the CSC concluded that, 'if any remnant of distinctive Scottish 
government is to be saved' then a Scottish Assembly had to be established. The 'West 
Lothian Question' remained unanswered, as the report contended that, 'The United 
Kingdom is a political artefact put together at English insistence .. .It is for the English 
to decide how to govern themselves .. .If they dislike the Parliamentary anomaly 
created by a Scottish Assembly, the remedy is in their own hands - a federal system'. 
This constitutional development represented a watershed in the Thatcher era 
in Scotland. The CSC had rejected the sovereignty of Westminster, which was an 
integral component of the British constitution, and had asserted the sovereignty of the 
Scottish people. The radical nature of this stance, however, should not be 
exaggerated, as the Claim of Right was simply calling on the British Government to 
accept the democratic wishes of the Scottish electorate. The document's political 
significance is in its articulation of the anger and resentment of civil society at 
Thatcher's attempts to break the post-war consensus and marginalise their input. Civil 
society was expressing its disquiet in a Scottish, not a British, context, which was in 
stark contrast to the rhetoric of Unionists, such as F. S. Oliver, who had called for 
imperial federation. It was apparent that Thatcher's assault on the post-war consensus 
was unintentionally unifying civil society against her policies, and in favour of 
constitutional reform. 
The reaction of the Scottish media was positive. The Glasgow Herald stated 
that, 'We would support the development of quasi-federal institutions in Britain, with 
entrenched civic rights and a Scottish Assembly elected by proportional 
representation', whilst the Scotsman was more fulsome in its praise, contending that 
the Committee's fIDdings were, 'as clear and cogent an articulation of the 
constitutional position Scotland finds herself in as has been published' .114 
Labour's response was cautiously optimistic. I1S It was, however, concerned by 
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the CSC's proposal that any future scheme for Home Rule should assert the 
sovereignty of the Scottish people. There was also widespread consternation within 
the party over the Liberals' condition that voting reform would have to be on the 
agenda of a constitutional convention. At the 1987 General Election, the LiberallSDP 
Alliance had increased its quota of MPs to nine, which represented the largest 
Scottish Liberal grouping since 1931.116 This bolstered the devolutionist lobby, but 
also pressurised Labour into considering voting reform. 
Moreover, the Nationalists were wary of joining a convention if it was not on 
the party's terms, causing the SNP to take a reticent approach towards the CSA's 
proposal. The greatest concern of the SNP was that the convention would be 
dominated by Labour, which would use its huge supportbase in Scotland to engineer 
an inbuilt majorityY7 This was compounded by the SNP's fear that a convention 
instigated by the CSA would choose to deal solely with devolution, marginalizing 
debate on independence. lIs 
The only main political party immediately to disregard the report was the 
Conservative Party. John MacKay commented that, 'It will be interesting to see if the 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly has any answer to the financial concerns and to 
constitutional concerns', asserting that, 'Given the membership of the steering group 
the report is totally predictable' .119 By taking this stance the Conservatives were 
making the task of creating a constitutional convention significantly easier for the 
CSA. The Conservatives were already perceived by many Scottish voters as 'anti-
Scottish' . By choosing to opt out of this constitutional forum, the party further 
ostracized itself and provided the opposition parties with an incentive to reach 
agreement on establishing a convention. If the Scottish Conservatives had entered the 
convention it would have enabled its representatives to convey the party's Unionist 
views, and disrupt the decision-making process. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely 
that Thatcher would have permitted the Scottish Conservatives to enter any 
consensual organisation geared towards constitutional reform. David Seawright 
accurately states that devolution policy, 'became one more shibboleth of the 'wet and 
dry' party discourse' .120 
On 21 October 1988 Dewar announced that Labour would join the proposed 
constitutional convention. He stated: 'Any talks should be a genuine attempt to find 
271 
that common ground and to evolve an agreed package - that means that the process 
must be seen as a way of finding the right reform within the United Kingdom and not 
breaking away from it' .121 Dewar concluded: 'The people must decide if they are 
prepared to live a little dangerously in order to achieve what they want'. Labour was 
sensitive to opinion within civil society, and Dewar surmised that it would be in the 
party's interests to join the convention, putting Labour in a position to veto any 
extreme proposals whilst taking the plaudits for conceding its huge electoral majority 
to cooperate with the other parties. 
Furthermore, Labour was wary of neglecting devolution and sparking an 
upsurge in Nationalism. The Govan by-election in November 1988 dispelled any 
uncertainty over the Party's participation, as Sillars dramatically overturned a Labour 
majority of 19,509. This result heightened the animosity that existed between Labour 
and the Nationalists,122 and signalled a change in Scottish politics. After Govan, the 
Scottish Conservatives were no longer treated as Labour's main opponents, as Labour 
engaged in bitter conflict with the SNP. The constitutional debate also began to 
overlook the status quo as a viable option, focusing on the desirability of devolution 
as opposed to independence in Europe. 
Ian Lang concludes that devolution was, 'an easy vehicle by which', Labour 
could, 'engender a sense of grievance in their fellow Scots and a facile response to 
their fears of nationalism,.123 This displays a lack of political judgement on Lang's 
behalf, as Labour realised that by entering the predominantly unionist convention it 
was presenting the Nationalists with a strategic dilemma. The SNP was divided over 
involvement in the convention. The fundamentalist wing of the party distrusted any 
involvement with a convention that did not examine independence as its primary 
option.l24 They believed that, by joining the convention, the SNP would be forced into 
diluting its commitment to independence. Wilson, therefore, concerned by the 
prospect of, 'campaigning for the Labour Party's policy of devolution',l2S set 
preconditions for the SNP's participation. 
Wilson demanded that the convention should be elected, and should accept the 
principle of Scottish popular sovereignty.126 The SNP's final precondition related to 
the staging of a multi-option referendum that would include the options of 
independence, devolution, or the status quo. The Nationalists were certain that Dewar 
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would find these proposals unacceptable, enabling the SNP to blame Labour for the 
convention's failure. As discussions over the convention opened in January 1989, the 
SNP believed itself to be in a strong bargaining position. 
These negotiations proved constructive, but Labour refused to concede a 
referendum or elections, and the fundamentalists began to exert pressure on Wilson to 
withdraw. Wilson bowed to this campaign. He conducted a straw poll amongst party 
office-bearers to gauge opinion, leading him to believe that the best option was 
withdrawal. The only leading party member whom he failed to contact was Salmond. 
Mitchell asserts that, 'The one problem would have been Salmond', 127 but the SNP 
deputy leader was also sceptical about SNP involvement. Salmond was concerned 
that the CSA was becoming excessively involved in the politics surrounding the 
convention and, in particular, over the attitude of Jim Ross, the secretary of the CSC, 
towards the SNP. 128 Furthermore, Salmond was equally convinced that Labour would 
not participate in the convention without an in-built majority. On 29 January 1989, 
Sillars announced that the SNP would not be taking part in the convention. 
This decision has to be seen in the light of Sillars' spectacular victory at 
Govan, and opinion poll ratings placing support for the SNP at 32% compared with 
Labour's 36%.129 The Nationalists believed that they were winning the argument, and 
that participation in a convention devoted to devolution was an unnecessary diversion 
from independence. They were, however, out of touch with the growing unity of civil 
society, and the party's decision to opt out of the convention was a huge tactical error. 
By taking this course of action the SNP, 'allowed the initiative to speak for the vast 
majority of Scots to pass into the hands of others'. 130 Nevertheless, Wilson maintains 
that the Convention was 'a cul-de-sac', and Campbell Christie believes that, with 
hindsight, the withdrawal of the SNP may have aided the Convention's efforts to 
reach agreement on a specific plan for devolution. 131 
As the Convention began to take shape, CBI (Scotland) contended that a 
Scottish Assembly would raise taxation, and discourage inward investment in 
Scotland.132 Furthermore, in a speech in February 1989, Thatcher attacked the concept 
of Scottish independence in the EEC, and asserted that a Scottish Assembly would be 
'another layer of bureaucracy' .133 Emphasising her belief that, 'when you strengthen 
the sense of responsibility of the citizen you strengthen the whole nation', she 
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contended that 'devolution to the individual citizen' was the best means of achieving 
that goal.134 Thatcher reiterated that, 'This Government remains committed to the 
Union, as committed as ever' . 13S 
This attack on Scottish independence within the EEe was a response to the 
success of Nationalist campaigning, and by March 1989, 52% of Scots supported this 
constitutional option. 136 The economic arguments against independence were 
weakened by the growing strength of the Irish economy, and Wilson contended that 
Scottish independence in the EEe could provide, 'maximum political change with 
minimum economic disruption' .137 Nevertheless, Atsuko Ichijo concludes that, for 
Scots, Europe has a dual function as, 'a politically correct alternative to the Empire 
which could provide a new stage for Scottish talent~ a new frontier and a bigger role 
to play in the world', and, 'as a reference point from which contemporary Scots can 
distinguish themselves from their southern neighbours, the English' .138 Both of these 
interpretations were problematic for Thatcher, as they illustrated the extent to which 
her attempts to launch a post-colonial British mission against socialism were 
weakening Scottish attachment to the Union and intensifying Scotland's desire to 
emphasise its distinctiveness from England. By February 1989,42% of Scots were in 
favour of devolution, whilst 35% backed independence in one form or another. 139 
Thatcher was hopelessly detached from Scottish civil society, and her absolute 
opposition to constitutional reform made her appear undemocratic. Hugo Young 
describes Thatcher as 'the first unashamed English nationalist to occupy Downing 
Street',14O but her decision not to establish a Scottish Assembly refutes this allegation. 
By establishing a Scottish Assembly with fiscal autonomy, elected by proportional 
representation CPR), and by reducing Scotland's number ofMPs at Westminster, she 
would have achieved several political goals. By reducing Scotland's quota of MPs she 
would have lessened the likelihood of a future Labour majority at Westminster, whilst 
by granting a Scottish Assembly fiscal autonomy, she would have succeeded in 
abolishing the Barnett formula. Furthermore, by electing the Assembly through PR 
she would have prevented it from becoming a Labour-dominated body, and would 
have ensured greater representation for the Scottish Conservative Party, which had a 
disproportionately low number of seats at Westminster in relation to its vote. 141 
Finally, the introduction of an Assembly would have required the reorganisation of 
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Scottish local government, enabling Thatcher to abolish Scotland's high spending 
regional authorities (see chapter 5). 
When questioned in August 1989, 69% of Scots strongly disagreed that 
Thatcher had Scotland's best interests at heart, and 61 % strongly agreed that she 
treated Scots as second-class citizens. 142 T. M. Devine concludes that 'Thatcher 
disregarded the tradition of the union as a partnership in which Scottish interests had 
to be taken into account', 143 but his analysis is misplaced Thatcher saw England as 
the senior partner in the Union, 'by reason of its greater population' ,144 which 
explains why she did not accept that her stance on devolution was undemocratic. She 
believed that every constituent part of Britain should be in favour of constitutional 
change before any reform took place. Nevertheless, on specific issues, such as rating 
reform (see chapter 5), Thatcher thought that she was placing Scotland's interests 
ahead of those of England. Significantly, Thatcher's interpretation of the Union 
displays her inability to comprehend Scottish Unionism or Unionist~nationalism, both 
of which viewed Scotland as an equal imperial partner of England 
Thatcher's decision to maintain the status quo reflected her belief that the 
campaign for Home Rule represented an attempt by Scotland's 'left-wing 
establishment' to construct a constitutional and ideological bulwark against her 
assault on the post-war consensus. She was convinced that a Scottish Assembly would 
raise business rates and increase intervention in the Scottish economy, in direct 
contradiction of her economic strategy. The continuation of the British unitary state 
was, therefore, a prerequisite of Thatcher's attempts to defeat socialism in every 
constituent part of the UK. 
An Emerging Consensus? 'The Scottish Question', March 1989-December 1990 
The Constitutional Convention's first meeting on 30 March 1989 at the Church of 
Scotland Assembly Halls attracted an array of figures from civil society, and to that 
extent it paralleled the launch of the Scottish Covenant in 1949 (see chapter 1). In 
stark contrast to 1949, however, fifty-eight of Scotland's seventy~two MPs, and five 
of Scotland's eight MEPs attended. 145 They were joined by representatives from fifty~ 
nine of Scotland's sixty~five local authorities, as well as seven political parties. 
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Outwith the political spectrum, the Scottish churches, the STUC, Gaelic 
organisations, women's groups, and ethnic minorities were represented. They all 
signed the Claim of Right. 146 
Lang describes the Convention as, 'some of Scotland's opposition MPs, plus a 
few hangers-on', asserting that, 'it was permeated by socialism' .147 Lang's analysis 
illustrates the extent to which the Scottish Conservatives had become detached from 
civil society. The launch of the Convention symbolised the growing unity of civil 
society, which was already coordinating its efforts against Thatcher's assault on the 
post-war consensus in the Standing Commission on the Scottish Economy (see 
chapter 2) and in the campaign against the poll tax (see chapter 5). Only CBI 
(Scotland), the Scottish division of the Institute of Directors, and the National 
Farmers' Union (Scotland) refused to become involved, but every other grouping 
within civil society participated in the Convention. 
In an attempt to provide the Convention with added moral authority, an 
Episcopalian clergyman, Canon Kenyon Wright, was appointed as Chairman.148 In his 
address at the Convention's inaugural session, Wright captured the mood of his 
audience with a rhetorical question mocking Thatcher's single-minded Prime 
Ministerial style, 'What if that other single voice we all know so well responds by 
saying, "We say no, and we are the state"? Well we say yes - and we are the 
people' .149 In effect, civil society, under the auspices of the Convention, was issuing a 
challenge to the authority of the British unitary state. 
The Herald concluded that the Convention was, 'unlikely to prosper as long as 
Mrs Thatcher is in Downing Street, nor does it enjoy much popular support ... Home 
Rule, must await its hour, and it is not yet at hand'. The Daily Record's political 
correspondent, Tom Brown, took an equally sceptical stance, 'the dream of Scottish 
self-rule is off and running - yet again. It's an old dream. But it just refuses to lie 
down and die' .IS0 In a similar vein to its coverage of A Claim of Right for Scotland, 
the Scotsman was more enthusiastic than the Herald. Ruth Wishart specifically 
emphasised that, 'it was generally agreed, Margaret Thatcher had been the unwitting 
midwife', of the Convention, and the Scotsman's editorial gave the Convention its 
resounding endorsement: 'The Convention has set out on a great enterprise which, 
successfully completed, will restore to Scots their political identity and return their 
276 
distinctive values to the political stage' .151 
The Scottish Conservative Party chose to treat the Convention's launch with 
contempt. Gerald O'Brien, the Scottish Conservatives' press officer, commented that, 
'This body .. .is not just Labour dominated it is Labour saturated' ,I 52 posing the 
question: 'How can they [Labour] claim to be a party of the Union?'. In stark contrast, 
MacKay chose to play down the importance of the Convention: 'It is just a new guise 
for the home rule lobby which has been around for many years'. This onslaught on the 
Convention was continued by Ritkind at the 1989 Scottish Conservative conference. 
Contending that Home Rule had failed to become a reality because the Scottish 
people were not united in support for constitutional reform, he argued that: 
'Unilateral devolution would destroy the reality of partnership and shunt Scotland off 
to the sidelines of a United Kingdom Parliament that would not be permitted to 
address itself to the domestic affairs of one major part of the Kingdom,.1s3 Moreover, 
he dismissed the Convention as, 'an assembly of politicians and others with closed 
minds', highlighting the gradual reform of Scottish government since 1885 as 
evidence, 'that the Union can evolve and need not be seen as some fossilised 
structure' . 
Ritkind was attempting to reinvigorate Unionist-nationalism, whilst 
maintaining the line that the party had followed since 1979 on constitutional affairs. 
He failed to appreciate, however, that the debate over devolution had advanced from 
its 1979 position. The use of Unionist rhetoric carried less weight after three general 
elections in which the vast majority of Scots voted against Thatcher, but saw her 
impose her policies because of the Conservatives' overwhelming support amongst the 
English electorate. This highlighted the differences that existed between Scotland and 
England, and undermined Rifkind's emphasis on the cohesion of the UK. 
Administrative devolution was also discredited amongst civil society and the Scottish 
electorate, because the Scottish Office had complied with Thatcher's directives to 
implement unpopular reforms, such as compulsory competitive tendering and the poll 
tax (see chapters 4 and 5). Indeed, by attempting to polarise the constitutional debate 
between independence and the status quo, Rifkind was endorsing the SNP's argument 
that Home Rule was unachievable within the Union. 
The STUC was intensely committed to the Convention, but some of Christie's 
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arguments were suspect: 'just as our brothers and sisters in Africa, in Asia and 
elsewhere had to do when under colonial rule, if constitutional change will not come 
through Government initiatives, it must be fought for by other means' .154 Christie's 
analysis was entirely inaccurate, but the unpopularity of Thatcher's policies, which 
had become synonymous with British patriotism, 155 had led to a redefinition of 
Scottish identity, which attempted to erase Scotland's imperial past. 
According to Ichijo, 'The message of this vision is the assertion of the moral 
superiority of the Scots over, in particular, the English by showing the Scots to be a 
people with high moral standards who care for community more than money,.I56 
These sentiments were incompatible with Scotland's prominent role in the British 
Empire, representing the antithesis of Unionist-nationalism. It was becoming apparent 
that Thatcher's attack on the post-war consensus was discrediting the Scots' 
interpretation of British identity. By May 1990, 45% of Scots supported devolution, 
whilst 37% favoured independence in one form or another. ls7 
Meanwhile, the Convention's activities were beginning to attract the interest 
of English-based broadsheets. The Guardian appeared to be attracted by the challenge 
that Scottish devolution presented to Thatcher, and Bernard Crick favourably 
paralleled the work of the Convention with that of the Charter 88 movement, which 
was campaigning for greater decentralization of power throughout Britain. 1SS The 
Convention received an additional boost in June 1990 when The Joseph Rowntree 
Reform Trust, which provides grants to socially progressive organisations, decided to 
accept the Convention's application for funding. 159 However, writing in 1991, Arthur 
Midwinter, Michael Keating and James Mitchell correctly stated that, 'For the UK as 
a whole Scotland's political alienation remains a marginal issue' .160 
In July 1990 the STUC organised a music festival in Falleninch field on the 
edge of Stirling.161 The 'Day for Scotland' attracted around 38,000 people to 
campaign for Home Rule, and listen to the music ofRunrig, Hue and Cry and Deacon 
Blue.162 Scotland's arts community strongly favoured devolution, and the STUC gave 
financial support to theatre groups, such as Wildcat, which expressed opposition to 
Thatcher in their work.163 Forsyth made great efforts to prevent the 'Day for Scotland' 
from proceeding at the expense of poll tax payers in Stirling, and succeeded in 
removing the event from Stirling Castle for safety reasons. l64 He was clearly aware of 
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the publicity to be gained from holding the festival at the site of William Wallace's 
victory over Edward 1 of England but, in his attempts to obstruct the event, Forsyth 
also ran the risk of appearing anti-Scottish. This helped to create the perception, 
which was alien to the Scottish Conservatives' Unionist heritage, that expressions of 
Scottish nationalism were an illustration of anti-Conservative sentiment. When 
questioned in August 1990, 79% of Scots saw the Conservative Party as, 'mainly an 
English party with little relevance to Scotland' .165 
Alex Salmond who replaced Wilson as leader of the SNP in May 1990, was 
only thirty-five years old, and declared that, 'The Scottish Constitutional Convention 
is performing a great service to the nation' .166 Furthermore, Salmond described the 
SNP as, 'A clearly defined left-of-centre party in the mainstream of Scottish political 
tradition', contending that, 'The only sanction you can have against a government 
which says No to all Scottish opinion would be ... confronting Westminster's 
parliamentary sovereignty with Scottish popular sovereignty' . 
This leads Finlay to assert that, 'Consensus Scotland was increasingly 
squeezed by a polarised political system that was divided between an 
uncompromising take-it-or-Ieave-it Unionism and an independence-is-the-only-
escape-from-Thatcherism nationalism'.167 Nevertheless, the Labour Party's policy 
overhaul had worked against the Nationalists' interests. Prior to 1987, Labour had 
remained committed to the establishment of a Scottish Assembly as a component of a 
British planning network that was intended to work in partnership with central 
government,l68 but after 1987 Kinnock's decision to discard the party's left-wing 
agenda, in an attempt to make Labour electable in southern England, allowed the 
Scottish party greater leeway. 
Indeed, Dewar asserted that official Scottish Labour policy was, 
'Independence in the UK' /69 as the party attempted to channel Scottish national 
sentiments into the campaign for devolution. Labour's position was aided by the 
prominence of Scottish MPs, such as John Smith, Robin Cook and Gordon Brown, 
who articulated opposition to Thatcher in a Scottish accent. The party's nationalist 
posturing deprived the SNP of its traditional campaigning territory, but this tactic was 
greatly aided by Labour's contacts and support amongst civil society. 
Thatcher fell from power on 22 November 1990, and the pUblication of the 
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Constitutional Convention's plans for devolution took place on 30 November 1990. 
The tone of Towards Scotland's Parliament was more conciliatory than A Claim of 
Right for Scotland, and portrayed devolution as a device to strengthen Scotland's 
place within the Union. 170 However, the report demanded that a Scottish Parliament 
should have entrenched powers that could not be repealed by Westminster without the 
Scottish legislature's consent. 
The report pressed the case for a Scottish Parliament to send representatives to 
the EEC, and particular emphasis was placed on the economic and industrial powers 
of a Scottish Parliament. It also stated that a Scottish Parliament was to be responsible 
for all areas of Scottish government, with the exception of defence, foreign affairs, 
central economic and fiscal matters, and social security policy. Moreover, Scotland's 
block grant was to remain in place, and was to continue being calculated according to 
the Barnett formula. First-past-the-post was to be replaced by PR, but no specific 
system was proposed. The most striking development was the Convention's decision 
to alter the title of this proposed legislative body from an Assembly to a Parliament, 
emphasising the degree of autonomy that it would bring to Scotland. The term 
Scottish Assembly was associated with the abortive 1979 Referendum, and this 
change in terminology was another useful campaigning tool against the SNP. 
However, the report overlooked the 'West Lothian Question'. 
The Scottish press was divided by the Convention's proposals. The Glasgow 
Herald criticised the arrangements for fmancing devolution as, 'unnecessarily 
complicated', and attacked the report's failure to tackle the 'West Lothian Question', 
concluding that, 'The Convention's scheme is high-minded, if woolly. Unfortunately 
it does not advance the prospects of that indispensable consensus' .171 In contrast, the 
Daily Record's Dave King described Towards Scotland's Parliament as, 'the most 
important document to be signed in Scotland since the Treaty of Union', and stated, 
'All parties are agreed that the archaic procedures of Westminster be swept aside in 
the Scottish Parliament' .172 The Scotsman praised the Convention, but warned that, 
'the key phase of the debate is only beginning' . 173 Support for devolution rose to 49% 
in December 1990, and the proportion of Scots in favour of independence in one form 
or another stood at 32%.174 Although only 19% of Scots favoured the status quo the 
Conservatives remained implacably opposed to constitutional change. 
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A New Scottish Consensus? Thatcher's Impact on the Union 
On the surface, when Thatcher left Downing Street in November 1990, Scotland's 
constitutional position paralleled that of May 1979. There continued to be a desire for 
devolution amongst the electorate~ but no means of achieving that goal existed 
without Westminster's consent. 
Younger had succeeded in marginalising political debate on devolution during 
his tenure at the Scottish Office, but the activities of the CSA and continuing interest 
of the Scottish press ensured that support for a Scottish Assembly remained 
consistently above 40%. Furthermore, the role of the British state in Scotland took on 
increasingly negative connotations during Thatcher's premiership. She presided over 
a huge increase in unemployment, privati sed British state-owned industries (see 
chapter 2), and severely reduced the influence and membership of British trade unions 
(see chapter 3). 
Thatcher's attack on the post-war consensus and socialism was intended to 
restore British greatness. Yet it weakened the institutional ties that bound Scotland 
into the Union, and alienated large numbers of working-class Scots, who perceived 
Thatcher's Government and the reformed British state to be uncaring and 
unsympathetic to Scottish interests (see chapters 2 and 4). Moreover, Thatcher's 
efforts to overturn the consensus, which she viewed as a post-colonial mission to 
defeat socialism, offered the Scottish middle-class and civil society scant reward in 
comparison to their experience of Empire. This restructuring infringed upon the 
autonomy of civil society and increased job insecurity amongst the Scottish middle-
class, leading many previous opponents of devolution to reverse their stance. 175 
The 1987 General Election represented a turning point in constitutional 
developments, as the Scots decisively rejected Thatcher's policies for the third 
consecutive time, only to see a Conservative government returned because of the 
party's support in England. Thereafter, Labour's nationalist posturing and the work of 
the Constitutional Convention, which were designed to discredit the British unitary 
state and prevent an upsurge in Nationalism, contributed towards a steep decline in 
Scotland's confidence in the British constitution. 
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Indeed, comparison of the Claim of Right with the Scottish Covenant of 1949 
illustrates this point. The Covenant stated that, 'we solemnly enter into this Covenant 
whereby we pledge ourselves in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of 
the United Kingdom' ,176 whereas the Claim of Right committed its signatories to 
'acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of 
Government best suited to their needs'.177 By April 1989. only 9% of Scots agreed 
that Westminster worked for Scottish interests, whilst 68% stated that Westminster 
worked either against or strongly against Scottish interests. 178 
Civil society. which had been seriously divided over devolution in 1979, was 
now clearly in support of Home Rule. Its diverse groupings achieved this unity by 
working together in organisations, such as the Standing Commission on the Scottish 
Economy, and in the campaign against the poll tax. These activities harnessed the 
opposition of all sections of Scottish society to Thatcher's policies. The only group to 
remain opposed to devolution was the business community. but its influence had been 
eroded by Scotland's growing reliance on inward investment, and it was becoming 
increasingly intrigued by the opportunities that the impending European single market 
could offer (see chapter 2). 
Finlay correctly states that, 'the key element in motivating support for the 
creation of a devolved Scottish parliament was ... to deflect the policies emanating 
from south of the border without sundering the Union,.179 Scotland's public spending 
advantage within the UK combined with Labour's influence within civil society, and 
the party's decision to adopt a more nationalistic stance, to create a broad-based 
campaign in favour of devolution. The Constitutional Convention was the ideal 
vehicle to enable Labour to construct a unionist consensus around devolution, whilst 
ostracising the Conservatives and SNP. 
Wright asserts that Thatcher's overhaul of the consensus, 'seemed to 
mark ... the imposition of something like an alien ideology,.lso Many of Thatcher's 
reforms were hugely unpopular in Scotland, and her difficulties in staffing the 
Scottish Office after June 1987 embellished perceptions that the Conservatives were 
an 'alien' government. However, her beliefs and values were not 'alien' to Scotland, 
as they were not imported from England, and corresponded with the prevailing 
nineteenth-and early twentieth-century view of the Scots as 'a race of empire 
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builders'. 
St Andrews University was at the heart of New Right activity in Britain (see 
Introduction), and Thatcher had a minimum of two Scots in the Cabinet throughout 
her premiership.I81 She relied heavily on the advice of Whitelaw during her first and 
second terms (see chapter 1), and Andrew Thomson, her election agent between 1981 
and 1987, was a SCOt. I82 There were five Scots in the Cabinet between October 1987 
and January 1988, including James Mackay, who was appointed as Lord Chancellor, 
after the 1987 General Election, with responsibility for English law. Moreover, 
Forsyth was a founding member of the 'No Turning Back Group' (see chapter 1), and 
Younger was in nominal charge of both of Thatcher's leadership election campaigns 
(see chapter 1). Finally, policies, such as the right-to-buy (see chapter 5) and the 
Parents' Charter (see chapter 4), may not have increased the Scottish Conservatives' 
electoral support, but they were popular in Scotland. 
Rifkind believes that one of Thatcher's greatest difficulties was her inability to 
understand the existence of a dual identity in Scotland, which allowed Scots to be 
both British and Scottish.183 Furthermore, Stevenson describes Thatcher as, 'a 
matronly middle-class Englishwoman', whose 'gut instincts' about Scotland were 
'consistently wrong'.l84 Both Rifkind and Forsyth agree that Thatcher was committed 
to Scotland and the Union, but Forsyth admits that, 'she could be a bit of an English 
nationalist' .185 Indeed, Thatcher created resentment in Scotland by flaunting her 
English identity on occasions, such as the 1986 Conservative conference, when she 
proclaimed that, 'The rose I am wearing is the rose of England', and in a newspaper 
interview with the Daily Express in February 1990, when she stated that the Scots 
were 'privileged' to be subsidised by the 'marvellously tolerant English' .186 
Nevertheless, James Kellas is misguided when he criticises her 'ethnic 
nationalism' ,187 as Thatcher's English identity was a secondary complement to her 
British nationality. Her inability to clearly distinguish between these separate but 
interlinked identities meant that her British nationalist rhetoric was easily 
misinterpreted by her Scottish opponents as English nationalism. lSS This is reflected 
in Thatcher's interpretation of the Union, in which she saw England as the senior 
partner, because of its greater population. Furthermore, this also explains why 
Thatcher rejected the Constitutional Convention's accusations that she was anti-
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democratic, as she believed that she possessed a UK majority, entitling her to pursue 
her policies throughout Britain. In stark contrast to the Unionism of the Scottish 
Unionist Party, which stressed Scotland's contribution as an equal partner in the 
Union and the British Empire, this had little appeal in Scotland. Yet, it did reflect the 
constitutional reality of the British unitary state, seriously undermining the legitimacy 
of the status quo in Scotland. 
The impact of Thatcher's attempts to break the post-war consensus, which 
were justified through the use of 'Anglo-British rhetoric', precipitated a redefinition 
of Scottish identity and a decline in British identity amongst ScotS.189 Rifkind adopted 
a strong Unionist stance in response to the upsurge in enthusiasm for constitutional 
change after June 1987, but the sincerity of his arguments was undermined by his 
support for devolution in the 19708. Moreover, Rifkind's contention that Scotland's 
interests were best served by the status quo was out of place in a political 
environment in which every opposition party proposed a form of constitutional 
change. Kellas concludes that, 'Thatcher was seen as an 'English politician', and the 
Conservative Party as an 'English party' .190 
However, Thatcher sacrificed party political gain in England, and the potential 
abolition of the Barnett formula by opposing constitutional change. This was largely 
out of Thatcher's concern to eradicate socialism in Scotland, which, she believed, 
required the continuation of the British writary state. Thatcher's inflexible stance 
towards devolution stood in sharp contrast to the Unionism of F. S. Oliver, and her 
insensitivity towards Scottish institutions, such as the Kirk, was the antithesis of 
Walter Elliot's Unionism. This leads Gamble to assert that, 'This was not 
Unionism' .191 Yet he fails to appreciate that Unionism is open to interpretation, and 
Thatcher's belief in the Union was interlinked with her efforts to overturn the post-
war consensus and restore British 'greatness'. 
Thatcher's brand of Unionism failed, because Unionism is only successful in 
Scotland when it defends existing Scottish institutions and commands the support of 
civil society. The Scottish Conservatives' use of strong Unionist-nationalist rhetoric 
after June 1987 failed to capture the imagination of Scottish voters, because of the 
huge divergence in electoral behaviour between Scotland and England. Moreover, 
Thatcher's tendency to impose policies against the will of civil society, and without 
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the support of the Scottish electorate made her appear undemocratic. The 
Government compounded these difficulties by refusing to accept that its wholesale 
rejection in Scotland represented a constitutional crisis. Therefore, the Scottish 
consensus on administrative devolution, which had begun to fracture in the 1970s, 
collapsed after 1987, as Thatcher's assault on the post-war consensus discredited the 
legitimacy of the British unitary state in Scotland. This precipitated the emergence of 
a new Scottish consensus embracing the need for constitutional change. 
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CONCLUSION 
In an interview with the Times, in October 1975, Harold Macmillan, stated, 
'The Tory Party is not regarded as a national party now. We tried ... to make it 
a sort of jolly for everyone. It was a party for the nation. Now I'm afraid 
they've lost that'. 1 An integral factor that made the Conservatives a 'national 
party' was the post·war consensus, and Macmillan's statement is an early 
indication of the direction in which Margaret Thatcher was leading the party. 
Thatcher was the longest serving British Prime Minister in the twentieth-
century,2 and her premiership proved to be a watershed in British and Scottish 
history. This ftnal chapter summarises the main points of the thesis dividing 
its analysis between the trends that Thatcher inherited and those altered or 
initiated by her. 
Prior to Thatcher's election as Conservative Party leader the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party had been in decline since 1959, as 
decolonisation and secularisation robbed the Unionist label of its populist 
connotations (see chapter 1). Council house building, Labour's low rents policy 
(see chapter 5), and the decline of Scottish capitalism also eroded the party's 
traditional supportbase. Furthermore, from the mid-to-late 19605, Scotland 
received around 20% more public expenditure per head of population than 
England, and the Scottish economy became increasingly reliant on public sector 
employment and regional aid (see chapter 2). When Thatcher became 
Conservative leader, the post-war consensus was, therefore, firmly entrenched in 
Scottish society, and the Scottish Conservative Party held its lowest number of 
seats since 1928. 
James Mitchell asserts that, 'Thatcherism involved the lowering of 
expectations in order ultimately to regain lost glory'.3 but Thatcher's objective 
was to alter the expectations that individual Britons placed on the state with 
the intention of destroying socialism, whilst encouraging individualism and 
entrepreneurship. Her attack on the consensus proved to be overwhelmingly 
successful, as she broke the industrial power of the trade unions through a 
combination of unemployment and legislative reform (see chapter 3). Thatcher 
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lowered Income tax, and the privatisation programme resulted in a massive 
decline in public sector employment, whilst greatly increasing share-ownership 
(see chapter 2). 
Scotland's economy witnessed a revolution as traditional manufacturing 
industry was replaced by service employment, electronics, tourism, financial 
services and oil (see chapter 2). Central government grants to local authorities 
fell dramatically, and the sale of council housing was immensely popular in 
Scotland and elsewhere in the UK (see chapter 5). The provision of universal 
social security benefits was minimised, whilst the number of means-tested 
benefits escalated, and the Parents' Charter, which was utilised by tens of 
thousands of Scots, introduced parental choice to education (see chapter 4). 
Thatcher's pursuit of these goals created mass unemployment, however, 
and her income tax reductions were cancelled out by rising indirect taxation. 
When she left office, inflation was above the rate inherited by her, and 
individual debt had substantially increased (see chapter 2). The poll tax was 
massively unpopular (see chapter 5), and dependency on social security benefits 
spiralled as a result of unemployment (see chapter 4). Furthermore, Thatcher 
failed to castrate the EIS (see chapter 4), and was unable to curtail the 
sruc's influence as comprehensively as that of the ruc (see chapter 3). 
Finally, Thatcher abandoned her plans to replace the NHS with a health 
insurance system, and declined to introduce university tuition fees, as she 
feared alienating the middle-class electorate (see chapter 4). 
The most striking aspect of Thatcher's attack on the consensus was a 
dramatic rise in unemployment. Scotland was particularly badly affec~ and 
unemployment only started to recede after the 1987 General Election (see 
chapter 2). This severely affected the Scottish working-class, which suffered 
the worst effects of Thatcher's economic strategy, and while northern England 
experienced equally high levels of unemployment most Scots remained pre-
occupied with the difficulties of the Scottish economy (see chapter 2). To 
compound matters, Thatcher reduced housing grants, resulting in increased 
council house rents, and the introduction of the poll tax added to the financial 
burden on the low paid, who had previously received rates' rebates (see 
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chapter 5). Thatcher also offered minimal social security benefits increases, and 
the use of indirect taxation disproportionately affected the poor (see chapter 4). 
Peter Riddell, contends that Thatcher provided a, 'much needed shock 
to British industry and society',4 but the number of families living in poverty 
rose sharply and homelessness became a feature of inner-city Britain (see 
chapters 4 and 5). Thatcher achieved the unprecedented post-war feat of 
winning the 1983 and 1987 general elections in the midst of mass 
unemployment, and contested that her reforms were intended to encourage 
enterprise, home-ownership, and individual responsibility. Shirley Robin Letwin 
positively reflected that, 'it had become thinkable that people sleeping in 
cardboard boxes might be at least in part responsible for their plight, that they 
had perhaps failed or even refused to look for other possibilities' .5 
Nevertheless, many Scots were appalled by Thatcher's lack of compassion for 
the unemployed, and the widespread perception developed that Thatcher was 
'uncaring' and 'anti-Scottish' (see chapters 2 and 6). 
In southern England the skilled manual working-class provided the 
foundations for Thatcher's attack on the post-war consensus. Some were self-
employed business people who gained as a result of her income tax 
reductions, and the property boom of the mid-to-Iate 19805. Those who 
remained in work during Thatcher's premiership often witnessed an increase in 
their standard of living (see chapters 2 and 3) and, at the 1987 General 
Election, 36% of British manual workers voted Conservative.6 Yet far fewer 
Scots were self-employed, and the Scottish property market was starting from a 
lower base due to Scotland's high levels of public sector housing. Richard 
Finlay explains that Scotland was, 'missing out on many of the skilled factory 
workers in areas such as aircraft, cars, defence contracts and light engineering, 
all of which prospered during the Thatcher years'.' whilst the working-class 
Unionist vote, which to a large extent had been dependent on Orangeism, had 
virtually disappeared (see chapter I). Therefore, only a marginal community of 
working-class Scottish Conservative support existed. 
Nevertheless, the middle-class also had a crucial say 1D the ultimate 
success or failure of Thatcher's policies. The Scottish middle-class were more 
, 
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dependent on public sector employment than their English counterparts, and 
resented Thatcher's efforts to reduce public expenditure and employment. This 
meant that the impact of Thatcher's income tax cuts and the privatisation 
programme was nullified amongst the Scottish middle-class, as they were often 
bearing the brunt of the public sector savings needed to deliver these income 
tax reductions. 
Thatcher's economic strategy also contributed towards heightened job 
insecurity in both the private and public sectors, and Scotland did not 
experience an economic recovery similar to that of southern England, further 
alienating middle-class Scots. Furthermore, high interest rates, lower consumer 
spending power caused by unemployment, and falling regional aid grants 
resulted in the collapse of many Scottish companies (see chapter 2). Scottish 
ownership of industry also declined, as a result of multinational takeovers (see 
chapter 2), and Scotland possessed fewer middle-class commuter-based suburbs 
than the Conservatives' heartlands in southern England In effect, Thatcher's 
restructuring conflicted with the interests of a significant proportion of the 
Scottish middle-class. 
Indeed, middle-class interests were closely interwoven with those of 
Scottish civil society, and David McCrone contends that, 'it is hard to 
envisage a political message more at odds with what has gone before, and one 
which runs more directly against the grain of Scottish civil society,.8 Civil 
society had traditionally enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and, since 1945, 
it had successfully adapted to the post-war consensus (see chapter 1). Yet 
Thatcher attacked the post-war consensus on a UK-wide basis, and greatly 
added to central government control of civil society's domains in local 
government, health and education (see chapters 4 and 5). 
This impinged upon the independence of civil society and, after 1982, 
the Scottish lobby was progressively marginalised in economic decision-making 
(see chapter 2). Moreover, Thatcher's reforms often resulted in Scottish 
institutions mirroring English structures and practices, leading to the fear that 
they would lose their distinctiveness. These factors provided the backdrop to 





asserts that, 'Labour was in a better position to take on the role of protector 
in this defensive battle'. 
Scotland returned clear Labour majorities at the 1979 and 1983 general 
elections, whilst Thatcher comfortably won at a British level, but the Scottish 
Conservatives' support remained solid at twenty-one MPs. After 1987, Labour 
held fifty Scottish seats to the Conservatives' ten, despite Thatcher's emphatic 
British victory, highlighting in its most extreme form, the constitutional limits 
of the British unitary state. Thatcher owed her British success to the manual 
working-class, Labour's internal difficulties, and a fragmented three party 
system, which saw the SDPlLiberal Alliance split the anti-Conservative vote.9 
In Scotland, the 1987 result represented an outcry by a cross-section of 
Scottish society against Thatcher's overhaul of the consensus rather than a 
wholesale endorsement of the Labour Party. However, Labour's third 
consecutive British defeat made devolution more attractive to the Scottish party 
(see chapter 6). 
Following the 1987 General Election, civil society and the Labour Party 
began seriously to re-examine the prospect of devolution. Any uncertainty over 
Labour's commitment to Home Rule was extinguished by the SNP's innovative 
independence in Europe campaign, and Jim Sillar's victory in the 1988 Govan 
by-election (see chapter 6). The STUC acted as the hub for anti-Conservative 
campaigning, and formed a vital bridge between civil society and the labour 
movement (see chapters 3 and 6). This newly found interest in constitutional 
change manifested itself in A Claim of Right for Scotland, and was embodied 
in the Scottish Constitutional Convention (see chapter 6). 
The Convention was the ideal cross-party, civic vehicle for the Home 
Rule movement, enabling civil society to work alongside the Labour Party and 
STUC without becoming politicised. Devolution offered civil society the 
prospect of reasserting its autonomy and authority in Scotland, whereas Labour 
was intent on defending its local government powerbase from further 
Conservative reforms whilst preventing a Nationalist upsurge. Underpinning 
these thought-processes was a desire to attain greater Scottish independence 
within the Union whilst retaining the Barnett formula . 
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Throughout this process, the Scottish Conservative Party was largely 
impotent, blaming its electoral difficulties on the growing hostility of the 
Scottish press, which encouraged the use of anti-Conservative tactical voting 
(see chapter 1). Scottish broadsheets, such as the Glasgow Herald, were in 
reality articulating the Scottish middle-class and civil society's discontent with 
Thatcher's restructuring, whilst tabloids, like the Daily Record, were reflecting 
their working-class readership's experience of unemployment. In contrast, the 
English-based press offered crucial support to the dissemination of Thatcher's 
political philosophy (see chapter 1). 
Ironically, the Scottish Conservatives' one major initiative led to the 
poll tax, which was pivotal in Thatcher's downfall. The early introduction of 
the tax was interpreted as a symbol of the Conservatives' disdain for Scotland 
(see chapter 5). George Younger successfully maintained a consensual stance, 
as Scottish unemployment escalated, but allowed the party's electoral 
organisation to wither, and was influential in the decision to adopt the poll 
tax, His successor, Malcolm Rifkind, had to contend with this organisational 
decline as well as the 1987 General Election result, and mass opposition to 
the poll tax, To compound matters, the party engaged in bitter in-fighting after 
Michael Forsyth's appointment as Scottish party Chairman (see chapter 1). 
According to Andrew Gamble, Thatcher's appeal was, 'directed much 
more towards England, and towards certain regions of England, the old 
metropolitan heart of the Empire' ,10 His analysis, however, overlooks 
Thatcher's bewilderment at the Conservatives' rejection in Scotland, as she 
failed to fully understand the Scottish Conservatives' Unionist roots, The 
Scottish Unionists had relied upon the party's ability to display a dual Scottish 
and British identity through the use of Unionist-nationalism (see chapter 6), 
whereas Thatcher viewed England as the senior partner in the Union by virtue 
of its greater population, and did not believe that Scotland could, 'claim 
devolution as a right of nationhood inside the Union',ll Thatcher was intent on 
devolving power to individuals through income tax reductions and greater 
choice, but lain Hutchison states that, 'this commitment to full unionism 
alienated many', 12 
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After 1987 Thatcher was branded as undemocratic. and the Scottish 
Office lost much of its legitimacy, because of its capacity to deliver the 
Government's objectives in Scotland, despite the Scottish Conservatives' 
overwhelming reliance on English support to pass Scottish legislation. This is 
ironic, as Unionist concepts such as the 'property owning democracy' and 
'democratic intellectualism' were intrinsically linked to the pursuit of 
democracy (see chapter 1). Scottish Unionists, such as Walter Elliot, contrasted 
this with Labour's state-controlled socialism, which was portrayed as the 
antithesis of Scottish nationalism. Indeed, Noel Skelton believed that, regardless 
of political affiliation, the Scottish MPs at Westminster should reflect the 
views of the Scottish nation (see chapter 6). Yet, under Thatcher, the Scottish 
Conservatives displayed, 'a partisanship which relished attacking the other 
parties' devolutionism and nationalism',l3 and this combined with the vocal 
and numerical dominance of the Conservative Party by its southern English 
MPs to create the perception that the party was 'anti-Scottish'. 
Hugo Young, concludes that Thatcher's, 'bossiness, smugness, 
righteousness and inextinguishably English gentility - made her particularly 
rebarbative to a nation with a powerful sense of its own identity' .14 
Nevertheless, Thatcher was not 'anti-Scottish', as she compromised her 
objective of minimising public spending by allowing Scotland to continue 
recelvmg 20% more public expenditure per head of population than England 
(see chapter 2). Furthermore, the poll tax was introduced at an earlier date in 
Scotland at the request of the Scottish Conservative Party and the business 
community, leading Thatcher to believe that she was addressing a Scottish 
grievance (see chapter 5). In fact, Scotland lagged behind Thatcher's English 
and Welsh reforms in the fields of privatisation and competitive tendering. 
Scots were also prominent figures in all of her Cabinets, and her election 
agent between 1981 and 1987 was a Scot. 
Moreover, Thatcher treated Scottish civil society and the English 
Establishment in a similar fashion, prompting Gamble to state, 'This lack of 
deference both for established institutions and for established status and wealth 
was part of Thatcherism's popular appeal' .IS Thatcher's economic strategy had 
301 
as equally an adverse effect m northern England as in Scotland, and her 
opposition to Home Rule was grounded on her conviction that it would result 
in increased taxation and the break up of the UK (see chapter 6). Thatcher 
also greatly admired the qualities of individualism, self-help and 
entrepreneurship, which she closely associated with the Scottish enlightenment 
philosopher, Adam Smith, and with the Scottish contribution to the British 
Empire (see chapter 6). Far from 'Anglicising' Scotland, her policies were 
intended to inject private enterprise into the Scottish economy, and further 
bind Scotland into the international marketplace, whilst defeating socialism on 
a UK-wide basis. 
On the other hand, Thatcher was unaware that her attack on the post-
war consensus, which she conveyed through the use of British nationalist 
rhetoric, was fracturing the Scottish consensus on administrative devolution. 
Finlay explains that, 'The corporatism of post-war Scotland, which had acted 
as a sort of surrogate form of democracy, was abolished, and the various 
interest groups and sectional interests that were previously able to impress their 
views upon government, now found themselves out in the cold' .16 The sale of 
publicly-owned industries weakened Scottish loyalty to the British state, and 
Thatcher's assault on the trade unions damaged a British trade union network 
that helped to generate British working-class solidarity (chapters 2 and 3). 
Thatcher's welfare state reforms also caused great consternation in 
Scotland, and Scots were at the forefront of the defence of British institutions 
such as the NIlS and the social security system (see chapter 4). In effect, the 
post-war consensus made the British unitary state acceptable to all classes of 
Scot as well as civil society, because it allowed Scottish autonomy whilst 
providing for Scotland's economic and social needs. As a result, the Scottish 
reaction to Thatcher's policies was overwhelmingly conservative, but in 
institutional rather than political terms, as civil society and the Labour Party 
sought to defend their power bases from Thatcher's overhaul. 
Ironically, Thatcher's efforts to restore British greatness by overturning 
the post-war consensus were perceived by many Scots to have accelerated 
Britain's decline and discredited the British unitary state. By abandoning the 
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consensus the Conservative Party ceased to be a 'national party' that sought to 
represent the interests of the peripheral areas of the UK, and the Scottish 
Conservative Party lost its ability to appeal to Scottish middle·class voters. The 
response of civil society, and the Labour Party was to embrace the need for 
devolution, which was intended to enable Scotland to opt out of Thatcher's 
restructuring, whilst retaining the benefits of the Barnett formula. 
As Thatcher departed Downing Street, in November 1990, her legacy 
was a Britain intensely divided by class, nationality, and between those in 
employment and those out of work. In Scot1an~ these divisions, which had 
been a crucial factor in Thatcher's British electoral success, unified Scots 
against Thatcher and the Scottish Conservatives, leading to the emergence of a 
new Scottish consensus in favour of constitutional change. 
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